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Abstract
Class imbalance problem has been identified as one of the top ten challenging problems in
machine learning research. Traditional machine learning tends to favour the majority class
and results in very high overall accuracy while performs poorly on the minority class. The
problem can be more severe when there are missing values in the imbalanced data. It will
further destroy the symmetry of the training data and decrease the classifier’s performance.
In order to counter this challenge, a number of techniques have been proposed to handle
missing values or imbalanced data. However, each method focuses on a single problem.
It cannot solve the complex problem of imbalanced data with missing values by simply
combining two methods. Moreover, class imbalance problem, which has a negative impact
in spam detection on online social network, has not been considered in previous study. Fur-
ther, machine learning-based technique for ’drifting’ spam detection is still open, because
the structure are changing from time to time which decreases the classification perfor-
mance. Last but not least, traditional classifiers have not considered the security problem
in spam detection, therefore, adversaries can exploit specific vulnerabilities exposed by
classical methods to fool the classification systems.
In this dissertation, I attempt to address the aforementioned problems. The work mainly
consist of four schemes: Firstly, we propose a fuzzy-based learning method, which can deal
with the imbalanced data and robust to missing values at the same time. In the new solu-
tion, both missing data imputation and rebalance of the training data are treated as a specific
missing data estimation problem. The proposed method has two steps: weighting and re-
covery. In the weighting step, the weights obtained by membership functions are used to
quantify the contribution of the observed data to the missing features. In the recovery step,
xvii
missing values are estimated by considering different contribution of the observed data.
Secondly, in order to deal with the class imbalance problem in spam detection with respect
to online social network, we develop an ensemble learning. The presented ensemble learn-
ing approach involves three steps. Class distribution rebalance using various strategies,
including random oversampling, random undersampling and fuzzy-based oversampling;
classification model creation upon each of the redistributed data sets; and decision making
based on majority voting. After that, we have modelled the ‘drifting’ Twitter spam detec-
tion problem. The scheme of the proposed ensemble learning involves three steps: data
preparation, multiple classifier creation and final results aggregation. Experiments results
show that the proposed algorithm can build an effective classification model for streaming
Twitter spam detection in dataset with imbalanced class distribution. Finally, the vulnera-
bility of support vector machine regarding poisoning attack has been investigated, and the
possible defence strategy has been analysed as well.
All in all, our work is of great of significance in this research area either from academic
or industrial perspective, although there are still some ongoing work to do in future. In
order to enable validation and extension of the work in this thesis, the datasets can be
download from http://nsclab.org/nsclab/resources/.
Keywords: Machine Learning, Sampling, Ensemble, Imbalanced Data, Missing Data,
Social Network, Adversary Learning.
xviii
Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter first introduce the background of the research problems, followed by motiva-
tion and the detailed explanation of the identified research problems. Finally, the contribu-
tions and organization of this thesis have been outlined.
1.1 Background
In the terminology of machine learning, classification which is a supervised learning proce-
dure, trains a concise classification model based on a set of correctly labelled observations.
Then, the classification model is used to predict the labels for the test data which are repre-
sented by observed features. Machine learning techniques have been successfully applied
in many scientific fields such as computer science, engineering, statistics, biology and even
medicine.
However, in many real-world problems, the classification performance drops dramat-
ically during to the class imbalance problem. Generally speaking, class imbalance [1–3]
appears in the training set when the instances of one class are significantly outnumbered
by the instances of another class. In some applications, class imbalance is treated as an
1
intrinsic property. For example, in twitter spam detection, there are usually very few spam
samples compared to a large number of legitimate Tweets. In some other applications, class
imbalance could be caused by variable factors such as time and storage, which hinders the
classification ability of standard learning algorithms. For instance, suppose a dataset is
produced from a continuous data stream and there are sporadic interruptions during the
transmission, it is likely that the acquired dataset is extrinsic imbalanced. With class im-
balance, conventional machine learning tends to favour the majority class and results in
very high overall accuracy while performs poorly on the minority class. However, in most
cases, the minority class is highly interested from a learning point of view [4, 5]. For ex-
ample, in the diagnosis of a disease, we often have plenty of data for the healthy condition
but very limited data about diseases. If a learning algorithm is applied to such data directly,
the learned diagnosis model would perform poorly because it is biased to the major class of
healthy data [6]. The problem will be more severe when there are missing values present in
the imbalanced data. The missing values will further destroy the symmetry of the training
data and decrease the classifier’s performance. This thesis aims to improve the classifi-
cation performance when we are faced with deficient data, which means imbalanced data
with missing values.
Although many techniques have been developed to deal with missing values [7] or
imbalanced data [1], none of these techniques have been initially designed for both. To
be specific, the techniques of estimating missing values [7, 8] do not have the capability to
address the problem of imbalanced data. The techniques proposed for handling imbalanced
data [1, 9] have not considered the problem of missing data. Therefore, the problems of
imbalanced data with missing values must be effectively addressed in real world pattern
classification tasks.
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In addition, although machine learning (ML) is commonly used in multiple disciplines
and real-world applications, such as information retrieval, financial systems, health, bio-
metrics and online social networks, their security profiles against deliberate attacks have
not often been considered. Sophisticated adversaries can exploit specific vulnerabilities ex-
posed by classical ML algorithms to deceive intelligent systems. It is impossible to forecast
all potential face spoofing attacks and fake fabrication techniques, as attackers constantly
aim to find novel ways to cheat the system [10]. Therefore, we must have a good under-
standing of the vulnerabilities as well as potential attacks so as to develop novel method to
guarantee that machine learning can be securely applied in an adversarial setting [11].
This chapter introduces the research problems and research strategies.
1.2 Motivation and Research Issues
In the last decades, many techniques have been proposed to address either missing data or
imbalanced data problem.
Class imbalance that presents between two classes is referred to between-class im-
balance. However, the decreased classification performance on the minority class is not
only because of the between-class imbalance. Another problem is within-class imbalance,
which concerns itself with the distribution of representative data for subconcepts within a
class [12]. The existing approaches for imbalanced data learning fall into three groups: data
sampling, cost-sensitive learning and ensemble learning. Data sampling re-distributes the
training data by sampling, which allows classifiers to perform in the conventional way. Two
well-known approaches are undersampling and oversampling, either eliminating the ma-
jority class instances [13–15] or increasing the minority class instances [16–21]. However,
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undersampling may remove some important information from the training data. Oversam-
pling may add noise to the training data and violate the inherent geometrical structure of
the original data [5]. Besides, feature selection [22], [23] can be considered as another sam-
pling technology, which has been widely applied in imbalanced high-dimensional data. To
address the class imbalance problem, the cost-sensitive learning can work on the data level,
algorithm level or both. It takes the misclassification cost into consideration and assigns a
higher cost to misclassified positive samples [24]. However, the misclassification costs are
often unknown and cost-sensitive learning usually leads to overfitting [25]. Lastly, ensem-
ble learning trains multiple classifiers for the same task and combines their predictions to
classify new instances, which can effectively improve the classification performance. The
typical ensemble methods include bagging-family-based, boosting-family-based and ran-
dom forests-family-based learning methods [26, 27]. The limitation of ensemble learning
is time-consuming [26].
Nowadays, real world data can be obtained from various ways such as sensor networks,
questionnaires, online service streaming API etc. However, many of the real world appli-
cations suffer from the problem of incomplete and imbalanced data [28, 29]. Incomplete
data have missing values [30],since some of the data values in the current observation have
not been stored. For example, in a manufacturing line, it is not feasible to record every
line variables of every product at all times. Instead, variables are only measured on some
products at certain times without significantly slowing down producing output.
The existing techniques have a number of limitations. Without knowing the data dis-
tribution in advance, statistical imputation usually lead to bias. The soft-computing tech-
niques usually do not function when there are a large amount of missing values. In par-
ticular, none of the techniques have been initially designed for imbalanced data learning
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problem. In real-world applications, the deficient data (missing value in the imbalanced
data) is a critical problem for machine learning and knowledge discovery [7, 31]. Inappro-
priate treatment of missing values will cause large errors or even false results. Therefore, it
is very necessary to address the two problems simultaneously when using machine learning
classification algorithms with deficient data.
In the thesis, another problem investigated is that the data structure are changing from
time to time, which is referred to “data drift”. “Twitter spam drift” is taken as an example
for detailed study. Twitter as one of the most popular online communication medium,
is inevitably attracting many spammers to infiltrate legitimate users’ accounts with large
number of spam links. To alleviate the spamming problem, recent researchers focused on
applying machine learning techniques to Twitter spam detection with satisfactory results
reported. However, tweets are retrieved in a streaming way, thus the performance of an
existing machine learning based classification model decreases seriously over time.
In addition, although machine learning, as an emerging field, is commonly used in
security-sensitive applications, their security properties against deliberate attacks have not
yet been taken into account, and there remain many unsolved research problems. For ex-
ample, training targeted attacks have only been sparsely addressed under different scenar-
ios [32] or to a limited extent [33]. For example, it is hard to choose the best starting
point and it is unreasonable to assume that the attacker controls the labels (e.g., flips the
label) of the injected points in real world problems when conducting a poisoning attacks
against a support vector machine; it is hard to identify the data distribution for the empirical
framework of classifier security in the case of drifting Twitter spam [34].
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1.3 Overview of the Work and its Contribution
This thesis first aims to address the deficient data classification problem. Moreover, the
online social media spam detection has been studied by taking drifting twitter spam and
class imbalance problem into account. Furthermore, considering that conventional machine
learning algorithms have not taken the security issue into account, this thesis also simulates
and analyses the vulnerability of support vector machine classification algorithm. Overview
of the work and the major contributions are summarized as follows:
• Firstly, to deeply understand the problem of class imbalance, this work has modelled
it using varies of datasets across different kind of imbalanced ratios. Meanwhile,
different levels of missing values are investigated in the imbalance data. Experiment
results quantitatively show the impact of the deficient data (missing values and im-
balance class) to classification performance.
• Secondly, to address class imbalance and missing values at the same time, a new
approach is proposed to unify two different problems as a specific missing data im-
putation problem. The proposed algorithm rebalances the training data by creating
synthetic samples for the minority class. We apply the new fuzzy based learning
algorithm to the deficient data (in order to address class imbalance and missing val-
ues). To evaluate the proposed method, a large number of classification experiments
have been carried out on 27 well-known datasets. The results show that the proposed
method significantly outperforms other 10 state-of-the-art individual methods and 8
different combinations.
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• Thirdly, considering online social network spam detection experiences the class im-
balance problem, an ensemble approach is developed to empower the information de-
composition algorithm for repairing imbalanced data. The new algorithm integrates
the information decomposition, random undersampling and random oversampling
into a compound spam detection framework.
• Fourthly, to alleviate the ‘data drifting’ problem in online social network spam detec-
tion, we make use of asymmetric sampling technique to re-balance the sizes of spam
samples and non-spam samples in small number of imbalanced training data, and
then update the model from time to time. A number of experiments are performed on
ground-truth datasets to evaluate the proposed method. Experimental results show
that the proposed scheme can significantly improve the detection performance.
• Finally, in order to further explore the vulnerabilities of the classification algorithms,
and response to the threat of adversarial data manipulation. In this thesis we specif-
ically investigate the vulnerability of SVM with an effective and applicable attack
by minimizing the margin and maximizing the hinge loss. Meanwhile, the potential
defence methods have been discussed.
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2: This chapter presents the comprehensive literature review of the existing
method for addressing imbalanced data, and techniques for dealing with missing
values are also recalled. In addition, the disadvantages of the recalled methods are
also discussed.
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• Chapter 3: We investigate the class imbalance problem as well as the classification
with deficient data problem. Experiments show that the classification performance
decreased with the increase of imbalance ratio and percentage of missing values.
• Chapter 4: In this chapter, a fuzzy-based oversampling algorithm is developed to
address the class imbalance problem, and it is also robust to missing values. Experi-
ments based on deficient data have been conducted and analysed.
• Chapter 5: In order to empower the new fuzzy-based oversampling method, the
ensemble learning has been employed in out study. The proposed ensemble method
is capable in real-world spam detection. A series of experiments and analysis have
been conducted in order to show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
• Chapter 6: This chapter proposes another new ensemble method based on fuzzy re-
distribution and asymmetric sampling. The new scheme can address ‘drifting’ spam
detection problem. The empirical study shows that the asymmetric-based ensemble
can further improve the classification performance for at least 5%.
• Chapter 7: We investigate the vulnerabilities of the Support Vector Machine (SVM)
classification algorithm, and response to the threat of adversarial data manipulation.
The new experimental result in this study is that SVM will lose its generalization
even though several support vectors have been attacked.
• Chapter 8: This chapter concludes the contributions of the thesis and offers some
ideas for future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter first recalls the class imbalance and missing values problems, separately.
Then, existing work regarding the deficient data classification problem has been reviewed.
2.1 Class Imbalance
Imbalanced data means the target classes of the data is skew in distributions; that is, there is
at least one class of instances which significantly out numbers other classes. Accordingly,
the minority dataset is called positive examples while the majority dataset is called negative
examples. Traditional classification methods, seeking to minimize the overall error rate of
the whole training set, do not perform well on imbalanced data, since they generally assume
a relatively balanced class distribution, and put too much strength on the majority class.
Moreover, there exist many domains that do not have a balanced dataset. Such as med-
ical problems-rare but dangerous illness, discrimination between earthquakes and nuclear
explosions, document filtering, direct marketing, detection of oil spills, network intrusion
detection, detection of fraudulent telephone calls, spam filtering, and detection of false
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information. However, traditional classification algorithms are more focused on classifica-
tion of majority samples while ignoring or misclassifying minority samples. In practice,
the minority samples which rarely occur are usually the most important to us.
Table 2.1: Imbalanced data learning techniques
Category Acronym Year Algorithm Study work
Sampling
Basic methods
ROS 2004 Random oversampling [35] [1] [13] [9]
RUS 2004 Random undersampling [35] [1] [13] [9]
Advanced
methods
NCL 1972 Neighbourhood Cleaning Rule [36] [9]
OSS 1997 One-Sided Selection [37] [13] [9]
TL 1976 Tomek Links [38] [9]
SM 2002 SMOTE [17] [13] [1]
BSM 2005 Borderline SMOTE [18] [13] [1]
SM+ENN 2004 SMOTE+ENN [35] [9]
SL-SM 2009 Safe-Levels-SMOTE [39] [9]
WE 2004 Wilsons Editing [40] [13]
BootOS 2007 Bootstrap-based Oversampling [41] [3]
ADA-SYN 2008 Adaptive Synthetic Sampling [42] [1]
CBOS 2004 Cluster-based oversampling [16] [13]
SMOTE-FRST 2012 SMOTE based on fuzzy rough set theory [43] [25]
CBUS 2013 Cluster-based undersampling [14] [25] [14]
MWMOTE 2014 Majority Weighted Minority Oversam-tech
[12]
[44]
Cost-sensitive
Cost-sensitive
sampling
Costing 2003 Cost-sensitive meta-learning [45] [46]
Cost-sensitive
non-sampling
MetCost 1999 MetaCost [47] [46]
CSC 2003 CostSensitiveClassifier [45] [46]
Thresholding 2001 Thresholding methods MetCost [48] [46]
weighting 2007 Instance-weighting method [49] [46] [50]
Ensemble
Bagging
asBagging 2006 Asymmetric bagging [51] [27]
RB Bagging 2009 Roughly Balance Bagging [52] [27]
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Category Acronym Year Algorithm Study work
SMOTEBagging 2009 SMOTE and Bagging [53] [53]
Over Bagging 2009 Random oversampling and Bagging [53] [53]
Under Bagging 2006 Random undersampling and Bagging [54] [27]
Lazy Bagging 2008 Lazy Bagging [55] [56]
RFS 2008 Random features selection [57] [58]
asBagging FSS 2014 Asymmetric bagging and feature subspace
[59]
[59]
IAB 2016 An Improved Asymmetric Bagging [60] [60]
Boosting
SMOTEBoost 2003 SMOTE and the boosting procedure [61] [27]
EasyEnsemble 2009 EasyEnsemble [62] [27]
BalanceCascade 2009 BalanceCascade [62] [63]
RAMOBoost 2010 RAMOBoost [64] [63]
RUSBoost 2010 Random undersampling and boosting [65] [27]
LP-Boost 2002 Linear program approaches to boosting [66] [66]
Random Forests
RBF 2004 Balanced Random Forest [67] [67]
WRF 2004 Weighted Random Forest [67] [67]
Others
Kernel methods
KBA 2006 Kernel boundary alignment considering im-
balanced data distribution [68]
[1] [27]
GSVMs 2005 Granular support vector machines [69] [1]
GSVM-RU 2006 Granular SVM-Repetitive Undersam-
pling [70]
[1]
KernelADASYN 2015 Kernel based adaptive synthetic data genera-
tion for imbalanced learning [71]
[71]
Active learning
2007 Active Learning on the border [72] [1]
GSsw/GSadapt 2013 Active Learning for Discovery and Classifica-
tion [73]
[73]
PLAT+CFI 2015 positive label threshold and the combination
method [74]
[75]
OCE 2006 Off Center Entropy [76] [77]
IFROWANN 2015 Imbalanced Fuzzy-Rough Ordered Weighted
Average Nearest Neighbor Classification [78]
[78]
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Table 2.2: Advantages and disadvantages of the methods for dealing with imbalanced data
Technique Advantages Disadvantages
Undersampling
• Re-distribute the training dataset • Lead to poor performance when the size of the mi-
nority class is very small.
• Easily implemented •May remove some important information
Oversampling
• Re-distribute the training dataset • Lead to time consuming due to additional generated
information
• Easily implemented •May lead to over-fitting
Cost-
sensitive
• Minimize the cost by biasing the classifier toward
the misclassified samples
• It is very hard to identify the appropriate costs for
particular problem.
Ensemble
• Achieve better performance than individual classi-
fier
• Time consuming
• Resilience to Noise
To address the class imbalance problem, many methods have been proposed. Generally
speaking, approaches to classification with imbalanced data issues involve three main cat-
egories: the resampling, cost-sensitive methods and the ensemble methods [1], [79]. Table
2.1 is the detailed description of each method with the related reference and study work.
Table 2.2 presents the general advantage and disadvantages of each technique. In this chap-
ter we mainly pay more attention to resampling and ensemble techniques which are more
related to our study. For the detailed information of each technique, please refer the related
work from Table 2.1.
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2.1.1 Resampling Approaches
The data sampling approach is actually a re-balancing process for an imbalanced dataset.
The simplest oversampling method is to randomly duplicate the minority class, namely ran-
dom oversampling (ROS) [35], which usually causes over-fitting. To overcome ROS’ draw-
back, some complicated sampling methods were developed. Chawal et al. proposed a syn-
thetic minority oversampling technique SMOTE [17]. However, SMOTE does not consider
the original distributions of classes, it may lead to more over-fitting between classes. Han
et al. [18] realized that most of the classification algorithms are attempting to learn from
the borderline of each class in the training process, and proposed Borderline-SMOTE over-
sampling method [18]. Furthermore, cluster-based oversampling (CBOS) was proposed to
even out the between-class imbalance as well as the within-class imbalance [16]. In addi-
tion, Barua proposed a Majority Weighed Minority Oversampling Technique(MWM) [12]
to address the class imbalance problem.
The simplest undersampling method is random undersampling (RUS) [35], which ran-
domly removes examples from the majority class. One-sided selection(OSS) [37] is another
early undersampling technique, which removes the majority class examples that are consid-
ered either redundant or noisy. Later, Wilsons editing (WE) [40] was proposed to apply the
KNN to classify each example and remove misclassified majority instances. Rahman and
Davis introduced a cluster based under-sampling (CBUS) [14] method. In addition, The
author proposed the SMOTE+ENN [35] method which first apply SMOTE to the training
data and then make use of Wilson’s Edited Nearest Neighbor Rule (ENN) to remove the
misclassified majority class examples.
In this section, we will provide a detailed introduction in regard to some popular sam-
pling methods, because they are closely related to this research.
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Random over-sampling (ROS): In ROS, a new minority sample is created by ran-
domly selecting a training sample from the minority class, and then duplicating it. In doing
so, the class distribution can be balanced, but this may usually cause over-fitting and longer
training time during imbalance learning process.
Random under-sampling (RUS): This technique draws a random subset from the ma-
jority class while discarding the rest of instances, where the class distribution can be bal-
anced. The size of the subset is calculated according to the desired class distribution ratio.
However, one common criticism is that some important information may be lost when ex-
amples are removed from the training data set at random, especially when the dataset is
small.
One-sided selection(OSS) [37]: OSS initially reduce the number of redundant neg-
atives by creating a subset, consistent with the training set. After this, it deletes those
negative examples which are participated at Tomek links [38]. Precisely, given an in-
stance xi ∈ Smin, and xj ∈ Smaj , Tomek link first calculate the distance between xi
and xj , then xi and xj is called Tomek link as long as there is no example xk, such that
d(xi, xk) < d(xi, xj) or d(xj, xk) < d(xi, xj). In this case, xi and xj are regarded as either
noise or near a border, which will be ‘cleanup’ in order to create a training set consisting
of safe cases by removing the considered either redundant or ‘noisy’ examples of the ma-
jority class examples. Other similar works that using Tomek links are condensed nearest
neighbor rule and Tomek Links (CNN+Tomek Links) [35], neighbourhood cleaning rule
(NCL) [80], and SMOTE applies Wilson’s ENN rule [35].
Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Techniques (SM) [17]: This technique add new
artificial minority attribute examples by extrapolating instances from the k nearest neigh-
bors (kNN) to the minority class instances. To be specific, let x, as a sample from the
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minority class, and y is one of its neighbours based on kNN-based approach. In order to
generate a synthetic sample from the original minority class sample, say z, SM create a
synthetic z using the linear interpolation of x and y:
g = x+ gap× (y − x)
where gam is a random number between 0 and 1.
However, one typical shortage is that SM generates numbers of synthetic data samples
from the original minority class while ignoring the nearby majority class samples.
Borderline-SMOTE (BSM) [18]: BSM is an attempt to improve upon SMOTE by
only over-sampling minority class instances which are considered to be on the border of the
minority-decision region. It can be described as follows: Firstly, for each original sample
xi ∈ Smin, choose a set of its neighbours using kNN . Then, identify the number t of nearest
neighbours that belong to the majority class. Then if k/2 < t < k is true, xi ∈ Smin is
considered as borderline instance. Finally, SM is applied to create new examples by using
borderline samples.
SMOTE applies Wilson’s ENN rule (SM+ENN) [35]: This technique is mainly for
removing any over-fitting examples using three nearest neighbours from training set. For
example, artificially introducing some minority class can expand the majority class clusters,
which may lead the minority examples deep into majority class space. In this situation, a
classifier can be over-fitting. This method is more applicable when facing a small number
of positive class examples.
Safe-Levels-SMOTE (SL-SM) [39]: Considering SMOTE has the disadvantages of
ignoring the nearby majority samples because it randomly generates numbers of synthetic
data samples based on a joining minority instance and its neighbours. SL-SM carefully
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oversamples the minority class along the same line with different weight degree. To be
specific, SL-ML first calculates a safe-level for each positive sample. In this case, all syn-
thetic instances are created only in safe regions because each synthetic sample is positioned
closer to the largest safe level.
Adaptive Synthetic Sampling [42, 71, 81–85]: Generally speaking, ADASYN uti-
lizes a systematic method to adaptively assign different oversampling ratio according to
their distributions. Many adaptive synthetic sampling techniques have been proposed [1].
For example, considering SM creates the same number of synthetic samples for each
minority class dataset without considering its neighbours, which usually cause overlap-
ping between classes [1]. Several adaptive sampling methods such as Adaptive Synthetic
Sampling (ADASYN) [42], probability density function (PDF) estimation based over-
sampling (PDFOS) [81], KernelADASYN [71], adaptive sampling with optimal cost [82],
Minority Oversampling Technique based on Local Densities in Low-Dimensional Space
(MOT2LD) [83] have been developed to address such limitation. Specifically, the main
idea of ADASYN is to use a density distribution function to identify the number of syn-
thetic samples to be generated regarding each of the minority class, and then adaptively
assigns different weights for the minority class in order to alleviate the imbalance ratio.
By doing so, ADASYN not only can re-balance the training data by adaptively gener-
ating synthetic data samples for the minority class but also can shift the classifier deci-
sion boundary regarding the easily misclassified samples. Motivated by the success use of
ADASYN, [12] proposed a KernelADASYN algorithm for class imbalance problem. In
order to obtain a reliable sampling distribution for synthetic minority class samples gener-
ating, KernelADASYN applies kernel density estimation methods to identify the PDF of
the minority class. After that, ADASYN is used to weight the sampling distribution of the
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minority class. Finally, experiments show satisfied results. Further, in [85] an Adaptive
Semi-Unsupervised Weighted Oversampling (A-SUWO) has been developed for dealing
with imbalanced binary dataset problem. This method first groups the positive class us-
ing a semi-unsupervised hierarchical clustering, and then, the oversample ratio for each
sub-cluster will be adaptively determined by using the cross-validation and classification
complexity. Finally, the minority class will be re-balanced by taking their Euclidean dis-
tance into account.
Wilsons Editing(WE) [40]: WE which introduced by Barandela et al., modifies the
older strategy (by Wilson) for pruning a data set in order to improve the balance level.
Precisely, this technique consists of applying the kNN classifier with k = 3 to classify
each example in the training set by using all the remaining examples, and removing those
majority class instances whose class label does not agree with the class associated with
the largest number of the k = 3 neighbours. Realized that the editing technique did not
produce significant reductions in the size of the majority class. Barandela et al. modified
the distance calculation with the weighted distance below mentioned, which have taken the
class into account. Formula (7.3.1) is the modified weighting distance, where Ni is the
number of examples in class i of the training data, N is the total number of samples in the
dataset, and m is the number of features in each sample. We can see that the weighting
distance for a minority class sample is smaller than the weighting distance for a majority
class sample.
weighting distance =
(
Ni
N
) 1
m
(2.1.1)
Cluster-based over-sampling(CBOS) [16]: The main idea of this approach is that be-
fore performing random over-sampling, first using k-means algorithm to cluster the minor-
ity and majority classes separately. After the training examples of each class have been
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clustered, all clusters in the majority class, except for the largest one, are randomly over-
sampling as the same number of the training examples as the largest cluster samples. Then
the total number of the majority clusters are even out to each cluster of minority clusters.
Thus, the minority class and majority class are balanced with the same number of exam-
ples. Finally, merge the updated minority class and majority class into one data set as a
new training data set. Take the example from [16], let assume that the training examples of
the minority and majority classes are respectively clustered as follows:
Majority class: 10, 10, 10, 24 (which means there are four clusters with each cluster has
10, 10, 10, 24 examples, respectively).
Minority class: 2, 3, 2
According to CBOS, we obtain the below new distribution of each cluster:
Majority class: 24, 24, 24, 24
Minority class: 32, 32, 32
That is to way, in the majority class, all size 10 clusters are oversampled to 24 training
samples, which is the largest majority subcluster. In this respect, the minority should have
the same number of examples which is 96 after resampling, since it includes only three
clusters, therefor, each minority class cluster is randomly oversampled until it contains
96/3 = 32 examples.
Cluster-based under-sampling(CBUS) [14]: The aim of Cluster-based undersam-
pling approach is not to balance the data ratio of majority class of minority class into 1:1,
instead, to reduce the gap between the numbers of minority class and minority class. Dif-
ferent from CBOS, this method only clusters the majority class into k clusters and regard
each cluster as one subset of the majority class samples. After that combine each cluster
with the whole minority class, and then the combined datasets will be considered as the
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updated training datasets. Finally, classify all the k datasets with a classifier and chose the
one that has the highest accuracy for building the training model.
Majority Weighed Minority Over-sampling Technique (MWM) [12]: This tech-
nique involves three key steps, identifies the most important and hard-to-learn minority
class samples, Simin, calculates a select weight Sw from each member of Simin, and gener-
ates the synthetic samples from Simin using Sw and produce the output set Somin by adding
the newly generated samples to the original minority class, Smin.
Precisely, there are three stages in constructing Simin. In the first stage, MWMOTE
filters the original minority class samples, Smin, in order to find a filtered minority set,
Sminf . In this respect, the nearest neighbour of each sample xi of Smin is calculated,
NN(xi). Then xi will be removed if its NN(xi) contains only the majority class samples.
In the second stage, construct a borderline majorities, Nmaj(xi) for each xi with expected
the number of majority neighbours used for constructing informative minority samples (k2)
as small as possible, and a borderline majority set Sbmaj is obtained by combining all the
Nmaj(xi). Finally, MWMOTE constructsNmin(yi) regarding each yi ∈ Sbmaj , and then we
can obtain Simin by combining all the Nmin(yi).
For the weights of MWMOTE, Sw is expressed as:
Sw(xi) =
∑
yi∈Sbmaj I(yi, xi) where Iw(yi, xi) is the information weight, which is com-
puted as the product of the closeness factor, Cf (yi, xi) and the density factor Df (yi, xi):
Iw(yi, xi) = Cw(yi, xi)×Dw(yi, xi) (2.1.2)
While the closeness factor Cf (yi, xi) is defined as:
Cf (yi, xi) =
f( 1
dn(yi,xi)
)
Cf (th)
× CMAX (2.1.3)
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Where Cf (th) and CMAX are the user defined parameters and f is a cut-off function
which is:
f(x) =
{
x if x 6 Cf (th)
Cf (th) otherwise
(2.1.4)
Moreover, MWMOTE compute Df (yi, xi) by normalizing Cf (yi, xi), which is:
Df (yi, xi) =
Cf (yi, xi)∑
q∈SiminCf (yi,xi)
(2.1.5)
In addition, in synthetic samples generating process, MWMOTE first cluster Smin into M
clusters, which can be denoted as L1, L2, · · · , LM . Then select a sample x from Simin
following the probability distribution Sp(xi) (where Sp(xi) = Sw(xi)/
∑
zi∈Simin Sw(zi)).
Let’s assume x ∈ Lk. After After that randomly choose another sample y from Lk, and
generate a synthetic sample s using the linear interpolation of x and y, which is:
s = x+ a× (y − x) (2.1.6)
Where α is a random number of [0, 1].
Feature Selection (FS) [12]: This technique is employed in the asBagging FSS method
[12], in which the irrelevant and redundant features are expected to be removed. In order
to delete the redundant features, FS first collect the similar features into multiple different
groups by using hierarchical clustering method which utilizes Pearson correlation coeffi-
cient [86]. The Pearson correlation coefficient computes the similarity across two features
fi and fj as:
Sim(fi, fj) =
∑N
k=1(fik − f¯i)(fjk − f¯j)√∑N
k=1(fik − f¯i)2
√∑N
k=1(fjk − f¯j)2
(2.1.7)
Where fik is the value of fi on the kth sample, f¯i is the mean of fi and N is the size
of the training dataset. After the multiple clusters are obtained, FS utilize the following
signal-noise ratio (SNR) to extract the most relative features of the classification task:
SNR(fi) = |µ0 − µ1|/(σ0 + σ1) (2.1.8)
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Where µ0 and µ1 are mean values of feature f1 belonging to two different classes, σ0 and σ1
are their standard deviations. According to [86], the extracted features are closely related
with classification and approximatively non-redundant.
2.1.2 Cost-sensitive Approaches
Researchers have shown that cost-sensitive learning has a strong connection with imbal-
anced data learning, and various studies have emphasized that cost-sensitive learning even
superior than sampling techniques for dealing with class imbalance problems in certain
domains [1, 3, 87–90]. Different from sampling techniques which create synthetic sam-
ples for the minority class, cost-sensitive approaches are mainly focused on the assigning
different costs for the misclassified data samples. Many cost-sensitive methods have been
proposed. One category is adaptive boosting-based cost-sensitive such as meta cost [47],
AdaCost [91], AdaC1, AdaC2 and AdaC3 [92], Multi-class classification using AdaBoost
[93], adjusting misclassification costs algorithm [94], cost-based soft-margin maximization
method [79], empirical study [95], CogBoost [96], Cost-Sensitive Large margin Distribu-
tion Machine (CS-LDM) [97]. The main idea of weighting strategy of AdaBoost is to
balance the weights between the misclassified class samples and correctly classified sam-
ples, which means the costs of the misclassified samples will increase while the costs for
the correctly grouped samples will decrease by an identical ratio. However, one problem
is that an explicit description of misclassification costs is hard to know in many situations,
another issue is that it is very challenging to determine a cost for a given domain which is
even impossible.
Another category is decision tree-based cost-sensitive learning. Generally speaking,
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there are three forms regarding this category which are: decision threshold-based cost-
sensitive adjustments; the node of split criteria-based cost-sensitive learning; and cost-
sensitive pruning-based decision tree. In [98], the placement of the decision threshold, the
imbalance ratio of the training data and the misclassification costs of each class have been
discussed, and [99] presented the evidence regarding the varying of the cost matrix and the
moving of decision tree threshold in terms of misclassification costs were unknown. Sheng
and Ling [46] proposed a Thresholding approach for imbalanced data learning. Similar to
other cost-sensitive mate-learning techniques, with the help of Thresholding, the existing
cost-sensitive learning algorithms can be converted into cost-sensitive ones. In this respect,
Thresholding can assign proper thresholds for the training class samples By taking misclas-
sification cost into account. Experiments have shown the sensitivity of Thresholding on the
misclassification cost ratio, especially when there is large difference on misclassification
costs. Sahin et al. [100] proposed a novel cost-sensitive decision tree method for fraud
detection problem. The proposed scheme is focused on minimizing the sum of misclassi-
fication cost and developing the strategy of splitting attribute regarding each non-terminal
node. Experiment results show that the proposed method outperforms other state-of-the-
arts techniques in fraud detection problem. Further, by using an evolutionary algorithm for
the selection of classifier and placement of the weights for the fusion process simultane-
ously, [88] presented an effective ensemble learning in terms of the basis of a cost matrix
for addressing the minority classification performance. The proposed algorithm is using
ROC analysis to optimize its parameters rather than a fixed cost matrix. Experiments on
various of imbalanced data demonstrated the useful of the proposed scheme.
Besides, neural networks (NN)-based cost-sensitive learning [89,101–103] is also widely
studied in the community of class imbalance. In general, there are four ways of introducing
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cost sensitivity to neural networks: probabilistic estimate-based cost sensitivity; neural net-
work outputs-based cost sensitivity; learning rate based and error minimization function-
based cost sensitivity, all such scenarios are studied in [101]. Firstly, the probability es-
timation regarding the neural network output has been adaptively modified by integrating
the classification cost factors into test step. Then, another scheme is to change the output
of the neural network [103], which means the outputs of the neural network are modified in
order to focus more on the easily misclassified class. In addition, cost-sensitive factors can
also be utilized in modifying the learning rate in order to keep a balance in training time
by assigning more attention on costly samples and decrease the learning rate in regard to
each costly sample. Finally, one can make use of the expected cost minimization function
to replace the error-minimizing function [101].
Although we have recalled some cost-sensitive methods, there are still much cost-
sensitive learning for dealing with class imbalance problem. For example, meta cost [47],
adjusting misclassification costs algorithm [94], and kernel-based one-class classifier via
optimizing its parameter [104]. The use of cost-based soft-margin maximization method
[79], which is used to penalize certain misclassified examples and treats the positive and
negative example differently. Least Squares Fuzzy One-class [105] and Near-Bayesian
SVM [106]. Readers who are interested can refer to these works for a broader overview.
2.1.3 Ensemble Approaches
Using ensemble learning to boost classifier’s performance has been widely used for a long
time. Many works have reviewed such learning from various perspective [27,29,107,108].
Basically, ensemble learning can be generally grouped into bagging family-based ensemble
learning, boosting family-based ensemble learning, and random forests.
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The idea of Bagging is to train multiple classifiers based on different inputs either us-
ing iteration of bootstrap sampling methods upon training samples or by using different
weights for the observations, and majority voting is used for final decision making. The us-
ing of bagging can reduce the variance of the mean squared error (MSE) and significantly
improve the classification performance. However, since bootstrap sampling works upon
the unlabelled data, in this case, the class imbalance still holds when using the bagging
method. To overcome this shortage, various approaches have been proposed, which in-
cludes: Asymmetric Bagging(asBagging) [59], SMOTEBagging [53], Over Bagging [53],
Underbagging [54], Roughly Balance Bagging(RB Bagging) [52], EasyEnsemble and Bal-
anceCascade [62], Lazy Bagging [55], features selection-based ensemble [109], asBag-
ging FSS(ABSF) [59], Local-and-Over-All Balanced Bagging [110], Neighbourhood Bal-
anced Bagging [111], Improved Asymmetric Bagging [60]. Generally, asBagging improve
the SVM classification performance based on the many bootstrap iterations. In each iter-
ation, asBagging initially keeps the minority class samples, and derives the same number
of majority samples for training the model. SMOTEBagging first re-distribute the imbal-
anced data using SMOTE, and then apply bagging to the majority class. Over Bagging is
a method that using random oversampling for the minority class samples on the each iter-
ation. In RB Bagging, the full minority class samples are maintained, while the number of
majority class samples are determined by a negative binomial distribution. EasyEnsemble
first partitions the majority class into several subsets, and then combine each of the divided
subsets with the minority class to form a new training data for learning, while BalanceCas-
cade iteratively removes the correctly classified samples, by doing so the classifier would
be more sensitive to the misclassified samples in the next prediction process. Consider-
ing the nearest neighbours of the unlabelled samples usually provide helpful information
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for enhancing the classification performance, Lazy Bagging only utilizes bagging to the
identified k nearest neighbours. In order to draw more minority class samples, a Local-
and-Over-All Balanced Bagging has been developed by taking the radical probabilities of
sampling examples into account, and experiments have shown competitive results of the
proposed Local-and-Over-All Balanced Bagging method. Later, a new ensemble algorithm
called asBagging FSS(ABSF) [59] which combining asymmetric bagging ensemble clas-
sifier and feature subspace, is proposed by Yu and Ni. Realized that local characteristics
of the minority class distribution often very helpful in improving the classification per-
formance, Neighbourhood Balanced Bagging method has been presented modifying the
sampling probabilities from the training data in terms of the class distribution. In addition,
Wang and Shao argued that current SVM-based learning often encounter some problems
such as small size of the sample and long feedback cycle, to address these problems, they
provide an Improved Asymmetric Bagging by applying a new fuzzy SVM. Experimental
results illustrate that the retrieval efficiency and retrieval precision can be improved Im-
proved Asymmetric Bagging.
Another category is boosting-based family study [112] includes: RUSBoost [65], SMOTE-
Boost [61], RareBoost [113], AdaBoost [114], LPBoost [66], integrated sampling tech-
nique with an ensemble of SVMs [115], boosting ensemble of SVMs [115, 116] Ranked
Minority Over-sampling in Boosting (RAMOBoost) [64], and even comparative study of
boosting ensemble [117]. RUSBoost algorithm is to make use of RUS to form several
subsets which contains the same number of minority and majority class samples, and the
classification model is built based on each subset. In order to avoid the minority class be-
ing over-trained, Chawla et al [61] proposed a SMOTEBoost method for addressing the
class imbalance problem. Instead of increasing the weight for the minority class samples,
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SMOTEBoost algorithm is mainly focused on generating some synthetic minority samples
for the minority class using SMOTE method. In [113], a different treatment of minority
and majority predictions has been presented, in which the weights of correctly classified
samples will be decreased if the accuracy is greater than 50%. Some other algorithms such
as SVM-based boosting ensemble either combine an integrated sampling method with an
ensemble of SVM or by taking the excessive bias obtained by soft margins SVM into ac-
count. Further, realizing that many real-world solutions usually cannot achieve a robust
efficiency due to the complex characteristics of the datasets, to alleviate this issue, Chen et
al. [64] presented a RAMOBoost learning method. Given an imbalance dataset, RAMO-
Boost adaptively modifies the samples weights based on the data distribution. Experiments
across 19 real-world datasets emphasized the effectiveness of the RAMOBoost algorithm.
Finally, Random Forest (RF) [118] which is a well-known decision tree ensemble based
on bagging, is popularised used in class imbalance problem [23, 26, 119–121]. There are
two kinds of RF: balanced random forest (RBF) and weighted random forest (WRF). For
BRF learning, it obtains the minority samples using bootstrap at each iteration; after that,
the same number of majority class samples will be extracted and combined with the sam-
pled minority class to form a training data; then, train a model with each bootstrap sample,
and finally, majority voting is using for the decision-making. Differently, WRF will con-
sider the classes’ weights during learning process, which means there is a penalization
for the misclassified minority class samples. Finally, a weighted majority vote is used for
decision-making. RF has been used many research areas such as: disease diagnosis [122],
civil war onset prediction [123], DNA-binding sites in proteins prediction [124], ecological
data mining [125].
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2.1.4 Other Approaches
To deal with the class imbalance problem, other kind of approaches such as active learning
and kernel-based methods, have been proposed recently.
Previously, active learning is used to solve problems of unlabelled data. However,
nowadays, researchers have developed many approaches using active learning for imbal-
anced datasets [72, 73, 126–128]. For instance, to reduce the computational cost of SVM
when dealing with big imbalanced datasets, [127], [72] proposed an active learning strat-
egy which can effectively choose most useful instances from a given dataset rather than
searching the entire given dataset space. Li et al. [128] proposed an active co-selecting
approach for classifying imbalanced sentimental data. classification. The proposed co-
selecting approach initially trains two complementary classifiers with two disjoint feature
subspaces. The trained classifiers are then used for selecting the most useful positive class
instances by leveraging a certainty measurement and an uncertainty measurement. At the
same time, it automatically labels the these selected instances, which reduced the effort
for humans. In [73], a unified active learning model has been proposed for discovering
rare categories classifying new categories by adapting query criteria online. Considering
the shortage of time-consuming and the setting proper values misclassification cost arise
during the training process, Zieba and Tomczak [129] proposed a boosted SVM with active
learning used for dealing with imbalanced data by taking the ratio between negatives and
positives into accounts. Each of the based learners in the boosted SVM is built based on
a selected samples, which are situated near the borderline. In [74], an active learning for
noisy labelling imbalanced multiple data scheme has been presented. This method first
reduces the class membership from the multiple noisy label set regarding each sample of
the training set using a positive threshold. Then, three label strategies which are based on
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uncertainty derived from multiple labels, uncertainty derived from the learned model and
the combination method, have been provided for improving the classification performance.
In addition, kernel-based methods also have been proposed for imbalanced data learn-
ing [68, 71, 130–133]. To alleviate the decreased classification performance problem when
using SVM classifier, a kernel-boundary-alignment (KBA) method which is based on mod-
ifying the kernel matrix according to the imbalanced data distribution, has been proposed
[131], [68]. KBA method employs the adaptive conformal transformation (ACT) methodol-
ogy, in which the feature-space distance and the class imbalance ratio is considered during
the conformal transformation regarding a kernel function. By modifying the kernel matrix
in the feature space, the KBA algorithm can improve the imbalanced data learning issue.
The theoretical analyses and empirical studies demonstrate that the effectiveness of the
proposed KBA algorithm. In [130], a new two-class kernel based classification method has
been developed using orthogonal forward selection (OFS). The kernel classifier is com-
posed of two elements for dealing with the class imbalance problem. The first element
combines the idea of leave-one-out (LOO) cross-validation and area under curve (AUC)
evaluation metric to form a unified LOO-AUC objective function which is used as a se-
lection mechanism for the most optimal kernel model, while the second one employs a
forward regularized orthogonal weighted least squares algorithm to assign greater weight
to misclassified data samples in the positive class.
2.2 Missing Values
Missing values in real world data often cause serious problems for machine learning and
knowledge discovery [7], [31]. One simple strategy is ‘complete case analysis’ that ignores
the observations with missing values and uses only the complete case data. The other
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strategy is recovering the missing values [134]. In this section, we give a short review
on the recent progress. For detailed reviews on missing values techniques, please refer
to [7, 135].
Many methods have been proposed to impute the missing values [136], [30], [134],
[135]. The recovery/imputation approach [7, 31] aims to construct a predictive model to
estimate absent values according to the information provided by the dataset. The existing
imputation methods can be categorized into two groups [137]: traditional statistical im-
putation methods and soft computing methods with machine learning. The typical statis-
tical methods including hot-deck imputation and regression substitution recover the miss-
ing value with the similar data among the historical data. A simple way is to recover a
missing value with the mean/mode of features upon all the training data. Nevertheless,
the mean/mode imputation usually makes the distribution more peaked around the mean
and has negative impacts to the variance. To address this problem, some advanced meth-
ods [136], such as linear regression imputation [138], multiple imputation [139] and Ex-
pectation Maximization (EM)-based algorithm are proposed. Regression imputation uses
the observed data to estimate the continuous missing values. EM algorithm is an itera-
tive procedure, which uses the observed values to impute a missing value (Expectation)
and checks whether the recovered value are most likely (Maximization). If not, EM al-
gorithm re-estimates a more likely datum until it reaches the most likely value [30]. In
addition, multiple imputation (MI) [139] is another common method for missing data re-
covery. MI replaces each missing value by M simulated values [140]. The statistical
analyses are performed across the M complete datasets. Then, these results are combined
to produce the final estimation such as the average of the M imputations [140]. However,
the regression imputation could underestimate the missing values when the observed data
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are not clearly divided or when there are only a few data. The multiple imputation and
expectation-maximization imputation may lead to high bias because the optimal control
factor setting could be miscalculated without the distribution of real-world data. To reduce
the bias caused by simple statistical models, some sophisticated methods such as principal
component analysis (PCA) models [141] and Fuzzy-Rough sets Imputation [135] have been
developed. Different from the previous Bayesian PCA imputation [142], the recent meth-
ods adapt a PCA exploitation into a general problem of PCA-model building, when there
are missing values in the training dataset. Fuzzy-rough sets imputation can use three kinds
of fuzzy-rough set: implicator/t-norm based fuzzy-rough set, OWA-based fuzzy-rough set
and vaguely quantified rough set. A limitation of fuzzy-rough sets imputation is that its
performance is sensitive to the number of observed features.
The soft computing recovery techniques have been proposed to impute missing values
by constructing a predictive model from the observed information. The well-known stand-
alone learning approaches include k-nearest neighbour (kNN) [134], self-organising maps
(SOM) [143], multilayer perceptron (MLP) [144], support vector machine (SVM) imputa-
tion and Bayesian network [145]. Other approaches such as decision tree and fuzzy neural
networks can deal with missing values during classification process without any imputa-
tion [146]. SOM is a method for both data correction and imputation, which can address
missing data of both numerical and categorical type. During the imputation procedure, it
first trains a SOM model based on the dataset with no missing values, then makes impu-
tation for the prediction set of samples with missing values. MLP uses the complete data
to train a regression model and chooses one variable as the target each time. kNN im-
putation [134], which is an instance-based method, considers the k closest stored training
instances when a new input vector is encountered. Zhu et al. [137] argued that none of
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Figure 2.1: Impact of missing values and imbalance ratios
previous techniques are for mixed-attribute datasets and proposed a mixture kernel based
iterative estimator of using heterogeneous attributes. SVM imputation treats missing values
as decision features. It uses support vectors to create the SVM model and then estimates
continuous values. In addition, Liu et al. [147] developed an algorithm for estimating miss-
ing values in visual data based on simple low-rank tensor completing, in which the tensor
completion is treated as a convex optimization problem. A recent research [146] has con-
ducted an experimental study among various machine learning techniques. The research
pointed out that kNN imputation has been widely applied in missing data recovery, because
it is easy to implement with relatively high accuracy [146], [28].
2.3 Related Work for Two Problems
Za´rate et al. have presented a comparison study of techniques to repair the deficient data,
especially for massive missing data [148]. The study firstly identified the related attributes
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with respect to the data structure determination. The missing values were imputed based on
related attributes and characteristics deletion. After attributes transformation, inconsistent
data identification and outlier analysis, four classification algorithms including K-Means,
C4.5, Artificial Neural Networks and Naı¨ve Bayesian classifiers were employed to examine
the classification performance. Their experiment results confirmed that the presence of
missing data in an imbalanced database will significantly affect the performance of data
mining algorithms.
Our experiment results are in line with Za´rate’s. Fig.2.1 shows F-measure (FM) of
several methods in incomplete and imbalanced datasets. The first graph shows the FM
values in the vehicle2 dataset, while the second graph exhibits the average FM values of
WMW with different imbalance ratios. ‘ORI’ denotes the decision tree classifier. Mix is a
recent method to deal with missing values. MWM is a recent method to handle imbalanced
data. We can see the performance drops quickly with the increase of missing values and
imbalance ratio. The results further evidence that the classification performance can be
severely aggravated when missing values present in the imbalanced data. Our experiment
results also show that the existing techniques cannot exhibit reliable performance when two
problems are presented simultaneously in various datasets.
The results from Za´rate’s experiments and our experiments prove that existing tech-
niques cannot solve the problems of missing values and imbalanced data simultaneously.
These observations become the motivation of our work.
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Chapter 3
Problem Investigation
This section aims to show how the imbalanced ratio and percentage of missing values
can impact the classification performance. A comparative study is present to evaluate the
classification performance when we are faced with deficient data.
3.1 Datasets
The 24 datasets used in this study are listed in Table 3.1. Data information includes data
name, data size, minority data samples, majority data samples, and the class attribute and
IR(imbalance ratio). The datasets cover a variety of sizes and imbalance level. Precisely,
the imbalance ratio varies from 1.82 (highly imbalanced which can be regarded as im-
balance due to rare instances) to almost 129.44 (only slightly imbalanced which can be
regarded as relative imbalance). The diversity of instances varies from the smallest dataset
with 101 examples to the largest dataset 4177 observations. These datasets are down-
loaded from KEEL-dataset repository1 [15]. In Table 3.1, PB0 shorts for Page-blocks0,
PB13vs4 shorts for Page-blocks13vs4, A9vs18 for Abalone9vs18, S6vs23 for shuttle-
6 vs 2-3, A3vs11 for Abalone-3 vs 11, ww3vs7 for winequality-white-3 vs 7, A20vs8910
1All these datasets can be downloaded from http://sci2s.ugr.es/keel/datasets.php.
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Table 3.1: Dataset characteristics
Data set Ins(#) Min(#) Maj(#) Attr(#) IR
Glass1 214 76 138 9(9/0/0) 1.82
Glass0 214 70 144 9(9/0/0) 2.06
Yeast1 1484 429 1055 8(8/0/0) 2.46
vehicle2 846 218 628 18(0/18/0) 2.88
vehicle1 846 217 629 18(0/18/0) 2.9
vehicle3 846 212 634 18(0/18/0) 2.99
G0123vs456 214 51 163 9(9/0/0) 3.2
yeast3 1484 163 1321 8(8/0/0) 8.1
PB0 5472 560 4913 10(4/6/0) 8.79
G016vs2 192 17 175 9(9/0/0) 10.29
Glass2 214 17 197 9(9/0/0) 11.59
Glass4 214 13 201 9(9/0/0) 15.47
PB13vs4 472 115 357 10(4/6/0) 15.86
A9vs18 731 42 689 8(7/0/1) 16.4
G016vs5 184 9 175 9(9/0/0) 19.44
S6vs23 230 10 220 9(0/9/0) 22
Glass5 214 9 205 9(9/0/0) 22.78
yeast4 1484 51 1433 8(8/0/0) 28.1
A3vs11 502 15 487 8(7/0/1) 32.47
yeast6 1484 35 1449 8(8/0/0) 32.73
A17vs78910 2338 58 2280 8(7/0/1) 39.31
ww3vs7 900 20 880 11(11/0/0) 44
A20vs8910 1916 26 1890 8(7/0/1) 72.69
A19 4177 32 4145 8(7/0/1) 129.44
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for Abalone-20 vs 8-9-10, A19 for Abalone19. It is worth mentioning that in this study,
we are aiming to show the impact of the class imbalance as well as the missing values to
the classification performance. Even though all the datasets are low dimensional, high-
dimensional data also suffering class imbalance problem, which can be seen from chapter
4.
3.2 Selected Methods for Class Imbalance and Missing Val-
ues
Recent study [149] shown that simple methods such as ROS, RUS perform better than
’intelligent’ approaches. Seiffert et al. outlined that ROS, RUS, WE, SM, and BSM are
the most popular used resampling techniques [13]. Therefore, RUS, ROS, SM, BSM and
WE are selected in this study. In addition, other typical techniques such as CBOS, CBUS,
SM+ENN,and MWM are also implemented to conduct a comprehensive comparison. The
original training sets without resampling are used in the first step to provide baseline for
the comparative study. For missing data recovery approaches, we employ mixture-kernel-
based imputation [150] and regularized expectation-maximization algorithm [151, 152]
techniques, because they have demonstrated good performance in missing data estima-
tion. The parameters in missing values estimation are chosen as: σ = 0.2, q = 2, ρ = 0.95
for kernel imputation. The original datasets with 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% random missing
values which are labelled as ‘None’, are used to create a baseline.
For under-sampling such as RUS, six parameters are 20%, 50%, 70%, 90% and 1:1,
indicating the percentage of the majority class removed. For example, if a dataset contained
1000 majority class instances, 20% means 200 majority instances will be removed after
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resampling. With over-sampling approaches of ROS, SM, BSM, over-sampling rates of
20%, 50%, 70% and 90% and 1:1 are evaluated. For example, 20% means extra 20% of
minority examples are added. 1:1 means the minority class and majority class will have
the same size after resampling. For Wilsons editing(WE), unweighted version is used in
this study.The parameters of MWM are setted as k1 = 5, k2 = 3, k3 = Smin/2, Cp = 3,
Cf (th) = 5, and CMAX = 2.
3.3 Classification Algorithms
In this study, we employ three classifiers: C4.5 decision tree, KNN, linear discriminant
analysis (LDA) to build classification models. These well-known classifiers have demon-
strated good classification capabilities in various applications. All of the selected algo-
rithms and methods are implemented with Matlab 2012B.
C4.5 [153] decision tree, which builds decision trees using an entropy-based splitting
criterion stemming, is sensitive to class imbalance. C4.5 works globally, instead of paying
attention to specific data points. C4.5 improves upon ID3 by adding support for handling
missing values and tree pruning.
KNN [154] is a lazy learning, where an instance is classified by a majority vote of its
neighbours. In the experiments, we assign k = 1 and use the Euclidean distance metric.
The instance is simply assigned to the class of its nearest neighbour.
Linear discriminant analysis (LDA) [155] is one of the commonly used classification
methods. It can address the within-class imbalanced data. LDA technique maximizes the
ratio of between-class variance to within-class variance over the dataset, therefore, guaran-
teeing maximal separability.
In this study, HoldOut is used in the classifier training process, which randomly divides
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the given dataset into two independent sets , one for training and the other for validation.
In the experiments 60% of the samples are randomly chosen as the training data and the
rest 40% are used for validation. The average results of 10 runs of HoldOut experiments
are presented.
3.4 Performance Measure
In this study, we consider the minority class as the positive class and the majority class as
the negative class. The confusion matrix includes: true positive (TP), false positive (FP),
true negative (TN), and false negative (FN). In the context of class imbalance, overall accu-
racy is not a good metric for measuring the performance of classifiers. Four other metrics,
precision, recall, F-measure, and AUC [156], are used for performance evaluation in this
study. Precision measures the behaviour of a classifier to successfully predict positive ex-
amples into the correct positions, Recall measures the prediction accuracy over the minority
class.
The main goal of improving imbalanced learning is to increase recall without sacrificing
the precision. Precision and recall can be conflicting in imbalance learning. The reason
is that increasing the true positive for the minority class can also lead to the number of
false positives increasing. F-measure (FM) is defined as the harmonic mean of recall and
precision. FM is a single value reflecting the ‘goodness’ of the classification performance.
AUC is not sensitive to the distribution between the majority and minority classes, which
can sort models by overall performance.
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(3.4.1)
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Figure 3.1: Classification performance in terms of dataset with 1% missing values .
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(3.4.2)
FM =
(1 + β2) ·Recall · Precision
β2 · (Recall + Precision) (3.4.3)
AUC =
1 + TP
TP+FN
+ FP
FP+TN
2
(3.4.4)
Where xii is the number of cases in the main diagonal of the confusion matrix, and N is
the total examples, x.i and xi.are the number of column and row counts.
3.5 Experiment Results
This section reports the experiments and results. A set of experiments use imbalanced data
without missing values. Others use imbalanced data with missing values.
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Figure 3.2: Classification performance in terms of dataset with 5% missing values .
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Figure 3.3: Classification performance in terms of dataset with 10% missing values .
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Figure 3.4: Classification performance in terms of dataset with 1% missing values (with
missing data recovered).
3.5.1 Imbalanced Data with Missing Values
Fig.3.1, Fig.3.2 and Fig.3.3 report the Recall, FM and AUC performance with different
percentage of missing values and imbalanced ratios. One can see that with the increase
of the imbalance ratio, the classification performance decreases. It becomes more severe
when there are missing values presented. As shown in Fig.3.1, the Recall values drops for
at least 20% when IR ranges from 15 to 30 and more. Fig.3.2 and Fig.3.3 show the same
trend.
3.5.2 Imbalanced Data with Missing Values Recovered
Fig.3.4, Fig.3.5 and Fig.3.6 present the results produced by the combination of sampling
methods and missing data recovery. For missing data recovery, we employ the regularized
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Figure 3.5: Classification performance in terms of dataset with 5% missing values (with
missing data recovered).
expectation maximum (REM) statistical method. It can be observed that for most tech-
niques, the classification performance is more or less improved when the missing values
have been recovered before training. For example, Fig.3.1 shows that the recall of the com-
bination of CBUS and C4.5 is lower than 0.4 when the IR is larger than 30. Fig.3.4 depicts
that the recall of the combination of CBUS and REM is more than 0.65 under the same
scenario. That means the recovery of missing values can help improving the classification
performance.
However, the simple combination of data sampling and missing data recovery cannot
solve the problems completely. For example, the FM value of the combination of CBUS
and REM is only around 0.2, which is not acceptable. Therefore, it is very necessary to
develop new algorithms to well address class imbalance and missing values at the same
time.
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Figure 3.6: Classification performance in terms of dataset with 10% missing values (with
missing data recovered).
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented an empirical study on the problem of deficient classification. The
experiments evaluated 13 methods on 27 datasets. The target is to examine the reliability of
different resampling approaches, and clarify the research motivation of this PhD thesis. As
far as we know, no related work has been done to empirically analyse imbalanced learning
problem with missing values being considered.
The results show that class imbalance has a negative impact on classification perfor-
mance. This problem can be more severe when there are missing values presented. It is
very necessary to develop new techniques that can tackle imbalanced data problem and
missing values.
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Chapter 4
Fuzzy-based Information Decomposition
for Incomplete and Imbalanced Data
4.1 Introduction
Machine learning and data mining has been widely used in many areas, such as such as
fraudulent credit card transaction identification, [157], text categorization [158], medical
diagnosis [159], intrusion detection [160], agricultural product inspection [161], and on-
line traffic classification [162]. However, in most cases, these areas are experiencing the
class imbalance problem, and this problem can be more severe when there are missing
values presented in imbalanced data. In this chapter, we will present a fuzzy-based learn-
ing to model the imbalance problem with robust to missing values, that is, to address the
deficient data classification problem. To evaluate the performance of the new proposed
method, a large number of classification experiments have been carried out on 27 well-
known datasets. The results show that the developed method significantly outperforms
other 10 state-of-the-art individual methods and 8 different combination methods in the
critical situation of imbalanced data as well as imbalanced data when there are missing
values presented.
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4.1.1 Motivation
Class imbalance problem has been identified as one of the ten challenging problems in
data mining research [163]. With class imbalance, conventional machine learning tends to
favour the majority class and results in very high overall accuracy while performs poorly
on the minority class. However, in most cases, the minority class is highly interested from
a learning point of view [4, 5]. For example, in the diagnosis of a disease, we often have
plenty of data for the healthy condition but very limited data about diseases. If a learning
algorithm is applied to such data directly, it would be biased by the majority class and the
learned model would perform poorly in the diagnosis of a disease [6]. However, minority
class is often the most interesting and valuable for the data analyst [164]. Hence, a natural
question in data mining research is how to improve the performance of classifiers when
faced with imbalanced data?
Another big challenge [28, 29] is Incomplete data when learning from real world im-
balanced data. The classification performance drops dramatically when there are missing
values present in the imbalanced dataset. Therefore, the problems of deficient data must be
effectively repaired in real world pattern classification tasks.
Although many techniques have been developed to deal with missing values [7] or
imbalanced data [1], none of these techniques have been initially designed for both. To
be specific, the techniques of estimating missing values [7, 8] do not have the capability
of addressing the problem of imbalanced data while techniques for handling imbalanced
data [1, 9] have not considered the problem of missing data in imbalanced learning.
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4.1.2 Contribution
This work aims to solve the two problems at the same time. The major contributions are
summarized as follows.
• We have unified the problems of missing values and imbalanced data as a specific
estimation problem.
• We have developed a novel information decomposition algorithm that can use exist-
ing data to estimate missing values and create new samples.
• We carry out a large number of experiments to evaluate the proposed algorithm. In
detail, the results on twenty-two different imbalanced datasets show that our algo-
rithm significantly outperforms the five existing methods.
A large number of experiments are carried out on 27 well-known datasets for perfor-
mance evaluation. The results show the new fuzzy-based information decomposition (FID)
method significantly outperforms 10 state-of-the-art methods in the critical situation of de-
ficient data classification.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents the details of the
proposed method, followed by the theoretical analysis in Section 4.3. The experiments
design are described in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents the the experimental results.
Section 4.6 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Proposed Method
In this section, we propose a fuzzy-based information decomposition (FID) method, which
can address the problem of missing values and the problem of imbalanced data. Firstly, we
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Table 4.1: Symbols used in this chapter
Notation Description
(x1, · · · , xm) Row vector
(x1, · · · , xm)T Transposition of (x1, · · · , xm), column vector
NaN Missing value
D Domain of observed features w.r.t row vector
h Length step
I and Is interval
U Discrete universe of the column vector
us Centre of Is
µ(xi, us) Weight
` Synthetic samples to be generated
pi Number of missing values in ith column vector
X Minority class
Y Majority class
will describe the details of the new FID method in the context of missing values. Then, we
will discuss how to use the new FID method to solve the problems of missing values and
imbalanced data at the same time. We clarify the symbols used in this chapter in Table 4.1.
4.2.1 Information Decomposition
Fig. 4.1 illustrates the processing flow of FID. FID uses a membership function (MF) of a
fuzzy set to determine the contribution (weights) of each observed data and combines all
observed data to recover a missed feature value.
Let’s start with a column vector as an example to describe the FID algorithm. Suppose
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Figure 4.1: Processing flow of FID
the column vector, x, has m features, and t feature values of x are missing.
x = (x1, · · · , NaN, · · · , xi, · · · , NaN, · · · , NaN, · · · , xm)T
where xi is a feature value, NaN denotes a missing value and the superscript T denotes
the transpose of a vector. We useD to represent the index set of all observed feature values,
D = {i|xi 6= NaN, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m}. (4.2.1)
We define the upper bound a and the lower bound b for the domain of feature values. In
this work, we set a to the minimum value and b to the maximum value of the observed data,a = min{xi|i ∈ D}b = max{xi|i ∈ D}. (4.2.2)
Accordingly, we obtain an interval I = [a, b]. We do the computation,
h = (b− a)/t,
where h is the step length which is determined by t, to be used in the estimation of the con-
tribution (weights) of all observed data. The interval I is divided to t parts for determining
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the weights to recover the missing values, I =
⋃t
s=1 Is, where
Is = [a+ (s− 1)× h, a+ s× h), s = 1, 2, · · · , t− 1 (4.2.3)
It = [a+ (t− 1)× h, a+ t× h]. (4.2.4)
It is worth noting that the intervals are divided evenly based on the number of missing
values. One can observe that the length of the t discrete intervals are the same, that is, h.
They can be specifically defined as, I1 = [a, a + h), I2 = [a + h, a + 2 × h), · · · , It−1 =
[a+ (t− 2)× h, a+ (t− 1)× h), and It = [a+ (t− 1)× h, a+ t× h]. In particular, t = 1
means there is only one missing value. When t = 1, we don’t need to divide the interval
and we have I1 = I = [a, a+ h] = [a, b].
For the contribution weighting, we define the discrete universe ofx, U = {u1, u2, · · · , ut}
[165], [166], where
us = (a+ (s− 1)× h+ a+ s× h)/2, s = 1, 2, · · · , t. (4.2.5)
The discrete universe of x and its feature value interval have a close relationship. One can
see us − us−1 ≡ h, and us is the centre of Is.
We aim to recover the t missing values according to the (m − t) observed feature
values. Each recovered value is related to a point in the discrete universe. Any observed
data will make contribution to recover t missing values. We employ the fuzzy membership
function [167], [168] to achieve the goal. The idea is to conduct a mapping from x× U to
[0, 1]:
µ : x× U → [0, 1],
(xi, us)→ µ(xi, us).
For the scenario presented in this chapter, regarding the setx, for each Is, s = 1, 2, · · · , t.
accordingly to [165], [167], the fuzzy set I˜s is usually represented as µIs . Where µIs(xi) is
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called the membership degree of xi in the fuzzy set I˜s, for an element xi of x. Since the
fuzzy set I˜s is completely characterized by its MF, and has a universe of discourse x of R,
we express it in a more convenient and concise way (refer to formula (4.2.6)).
According to [166], we employ the following linear membership function for calculat-
ing the contribution weight of each observed element xi on Is:
µ(xi, us) =
{
1− ‖xi−us‖
h
if ‖xi − us‖ ≤ h
0 otherwise.
(4.2.6)
Where µ(xi, us) denotes the membership degree of xi in the fuzzy set I˜s in fuzzy set theory.
Actually, I˜s = {µ(xi, us) | i ∈ D}. Although the value of length sept h is depended on the
number of missing values, it is worth mentioning that h provide a range of what kind
of observed values can contribute to the sth missing value. Other ranges of definition
such as ‖xi − us‖ ≤ h/2 may result in different values. This chapter employ the general
expression, which is ‖xi − us‖ ≤ h. Part of future work in this area will further study this
problem with different membership functions.
Then, according to the contribution weight, we can obtain the contribution of an ob-
served data xi to Is which is given as:
mis = µ(xi, us)× xi, i ∈ D . (4.2.7)
In this chapter, we define mis as information decomposition from xi to Is. Now, we use
information decomposition to recover the sth missing value of x
m˜s =

x¯ if
∑
i∈D
µ(xi, us) = 0∑
j∈D
mis∑
i∈D
µ(xi,us)
otherwise
(4.2.8)
(4.2.9)
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Algorithm 4.1: FID-Based Data Repairing
1: INPUT: number of synthetic samples to be generated `, minority class X , majority class Y ;
2: OUTPUT: re-balanced over-sampling dataset: (X˜, Y˜ );
For each feature vector x in X and Y ;
3: identity the number, t, of missing values in x;
4: set a = min{xi|i ∈ D} and b = max{xi|i ∈ D};
5: compute step length, h = (b− a)/t;
6: compute intervals Is and It using formula (4.2.3) and formula (4.2.4);
For s = 1 : t
7: compute us = (a+ (s− 1)× h+ a+ s× h)/2;
8: compute weight µ(xi, us) using formula (4.2.6);
9: compute information decomposition from xi to Is, mis = µ(xi, us)× xi;
10: Recover missing value m˜s using formula (4.2.8);
End For
End For
11: return (X˜, Y˜ );
where x¯ is the mean of all observed feature values.
∑
i∈D
µ(xi, us) = 0 occurs when no
observed feature values contribute to Is. In other words
∑
i∈D
µ(xi, us) = 0 means I˜s = {0},
which means there is no contributions from all the observations in x to I˜s. To deal with
this exception, we recover the missing value to the mean of all observed feature values.
Otherwise, the weighted mean is used to estimate the missing value.
Finally, we can use this method to recover all of the t missing values in x. The infor-
mation decomposition method guarantees that the recovered values can evenly distribute in
the feature space.
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4.2.2 FID-Based Data Repairing
In this subsection, we discuss how to use the FID method to repair the training data, i.e.,
missing data recovery and imbalanced data re-distribution. Algorithm 4.1 shows the de-
tailed steps. It is worth noting that the synthetic data samples (size of `) to be generated are
initially treated as missing values. Moreover, considering there are also missing values in
the original data, we denote the total number of the data to be generated as t.
Let us consider an incomplete and imbalanced training dataset. X and Y denote the
minority class and the majority class, respectively.X = {x1,x2, · · · ,xi, · · · ,xn}Y = {y1,y2, · · · ,yi, · · · ,yn} (4.2.10)
where xi and yi are column vectors. n is the number of features for data representation.
For example, xi is composed of the ith feature values of all instances in the minority class.
We focus on the minority class. It only needs to recover missing values in the majority
class. FID can be applied to each column vector straightforward. For the minority class X ,
the FID-based data repairing has two steps:
1. creating new empty instances, which are synthetic instances to be generated;
2. applying the FID method.
In the first step, we create ` new minority instances with its feature values assigned as
‘NaN’ in order to re-balance the training data. For example, the ith column vector, xi,
originally has pi missing values. Now, the number of missing values is (pi + `). In the
second step, the FID method is applied on xi to recover the (pi + `) missing values. We
can operate each column vector and obtain a new minority training set.
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The new FID method can address the problems of missing values and imbalanced data
at the same time. Although it belongs to the over-sampling approach, FID is different from
other over-sampling techniques. As we stated before, ROS and CBOS are over-sampling
techniques that simply duplicate some instances in the minority class, which will cause
over-fitting. SM, BSM and MWM firstly choose a seed sample of using a kNN-based
approach, then generate some synthetic instances based on the linear interpolation. Barua
et al. pointed out [12], for one thing, the kNN-based clustering approach may generate
wrong minority class instances; for another, such techniques may make the learning tasks
difficult when there are insufficient information about the minority samples.
Moreover, previous over-sampling techniques perform on an instance by instance base.
It will cause negative impacts to pattern classification when features of different attributes
present independent distributions. However, the new FID method can avoid this problem
because it works on a feature vector by feature vector base. Section 4.2.3 details an exam-
ple.
4.2.3 An Example for Illustration
To illustrate how FID works, we create a simple example using two-dimensional data. Table
4.2 shows two datasets for the minority class: (1) original dataset with missing values; (2)
expected dataset with data recovering. The original incomplete minority class dataset is
a subset of Haberman’s Survival dataset. Please note that FID can also be applied to the
majority class to recover missing values.
For class redistribution, assume we want to generate 2 synthetic samples, i.e., ` = 2.
In this example, the bold characters x1 and x2 denote the column vectors. The sym-
bol xij is the jth feature belong to the ith column vector. Therefore, we have, x1 =
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Table 4.2: Minority class data used for example
Minority class samples with MV Data to be recovered and re-balanced
Index x1 x2 Pattern Index x1 x2 Pattern
1 30 1 malignant 1 30 1 malignant
2 NaN 3 malignant 2 * NaN 3 malignant
3 30 0 malignant 3 30 0 malignant
4 31 2 malignant −→ 4 31 2 malignant
5 31 4 malignant 5 31 4 malignant
6 33 10 malignant 6 33 10 malignant
7 ** NaN NaN malignant
8 ** NaN NaN malignant
*: missing value in the second sample, **: synthetic samples to be generated. Note that the left data mean
there is one missing value presented, the right one represents the data (marked as NaN ) to be estimated.
(x11, x12, · · · , x16)T = (30.0, NaN, 30.0, 31.0, 31.0, 33.0)T andx2 = (x21, x22, · · · , x26)T =
(1.0, 3.0, 0.0, 2.0, 4.0, 10.0)T .
In the following process, we are aiming to estimate the missing values presented by
NaN inx1. Firstly, we copyx1 to a general working vectorx, that isx = (x1, x2, · · · , x6)T =
x1 = (30.0, NaN, 30.0, 31.0, 31.0, 33.0)
T . There is one missing value in x, so we have
p1 = 1. Because we want to create 2 synthetic samples, the total number of values to be
estimated will be t = 1 + 2 = 3.
According to formula (4.2.1), we can calculate the index set of all observed feature
values in x, which is D = {i|xi 6= NaN, i = 1, 2, · · · , 6} = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6}. Then, we can
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obtain a and b using formula (4.2.2),
a = min{xi|i ∈ D} = min{30.0, 30.0, 31.0, 31.0, 33.0} = 30
b = max{xi|i ∈ D} = max{30.0, 30.0, 31.0, 31.0, 33.0} = 33.
(4.2.11)
Therefore, we have I = [30, 33]. According to h = (b− a)/t, we can calculate: h =
(b− a)/3 = 1, Then by following formula (4.2.3) and (4.2.4), which are:
I1 = [a, a+ 1× h), I2 = [a+ 1× h, a+ 2× h), I3 = [a+ 2× h, a+ 3× h].
we can obtain I1 = [30, 31), I2 = [31, 32) and I3 = [32, 33]. Further, we calculate the
discrete universe U using us = (a+ (s− 1)× h+ a+ s× h)/2, s = 1, 2, 3. In particular,
us is the centre of Is.
U = {u1, u2, u3} = {30.5, 31.5, 32.5}
Now we compute the contribution weight of each observed element xi on Is using the fuzzy
membership function µ(xi, us) from (4.2.6),
µ(xi, us) =
{
1− ‖xi−us‖
h
if ‖xi − us‖ ≤ h
0 otherwise.
Because ‖x1 − u1‖ = ‖30− 30.5‖ = 0.5 < h, we have
µ(x1, u1) = 1− ‖x1 − u1‖
h
= 1− ‖30− 30.5‖
1
= 0.5
Because ‖x1 − u2‖ = ‖30− 31.5‖ = 1.5 > h, we have µ(x1, u2) = 0.
Similarly, we can obtain other contribution weights:
µ(x1, u3) = µ(x3, u2) = µ(x3, u3) = µ(x4, u3) = µ(x5, u3) = µ(x6, u1) = µ(x6, u2) = 0
µ(x3, u1) = µ(x4, u1) = µ(x4, u2) = µ(x5, u1) = µ(x5, u2) = µ(x6, u3) = 0.5
we have, m11 = µ(x1, u1)× x1 = 0.5× 30 = 15 and
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Table 4.3: Recovered and re-distributed minority class data
Minority class samples with MV Data to be recovered and re-balanced
Index x1 x2 Pattern Index x1 x2 Pattern
1 30 1 malignant 1 30 1 malignant
2 * m˜(1)1 3 malignant 2 * 30.51 3 malignant
3 30 0 malignant 3 30 0 malignant
4 31 2 malignant −→ 4 31 2 malignant
5 31 4 malignant 5 31 4 malignant
6 33 10 malignant 6 33 10 malignant
7 ** m˜(1)2 m˜
(2)
1 malignant 7 ** 31.0 2.2 malignant
8 ** m˜(1)3 m˜
(2)
2 malignant 8 ** 31.5 7.2 malignant
m31 = m13 = 15, m41 = m42 = m51 = m52 = 15.5, m12 = m32 = m33 = m43 =
m53 = m61 = m62 = 0.
Considering
∑
i∈D
µ(xi, u1) = 0.5 + 0.5 + 0.5 + 0.5 + 0 = 2 6= 0,
and (4.2.8), the missing values presented in x1 is,
m˜
(1)
1 =
∑
i∈D
mi1∑
i∈D
µ(xi, u1)
=
15 + 15 + 15.5 + 15.5 + 0
0.5 + 0.5 + 0.5 + 0.5 + 0
= 30.5
m˜
(1)
2 = 31, and m˜
(1)
3 = 31.5.
For x2 (the second column vector), we can assign x2 to x and calculate the synthetic
values in the same steps. x2 has no missing values (p2 = 0), therefore, t = ` = 2. We can
obtain, m˜(2)1 = 2.2 and m˜
(2)
2 = 7.2. Finally, we obtain a re-balance and recovered dataset
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for minority class, which is shown in Table 4.3. It is worth to mention that the proposed
FID algorithm is suitable for any dimensional dataset, because it works feature vector by
feature vector. This is also demonstrated in the example.
4.3 Theoretical Analysis
In this section we give a theoretical justification for the range of generated data, and then
we further analyse the data distribution in two real world scenarios.
4.3.1 Range of Generated Data
This section aims to prove each generated data m˜i belongs to an Is-based interval. There-
fore, the generated data is lined up with the behind class distribution.
Let’s denote [as, bs] = Is, where Is is the sth interval. Then,
m˜i ∈ (as − h
2
, bs +
h
2
)
where h is the length of the interval Is, called length step in Section 3.1.
As we stated before, here us is the centre of Is, which means h = as− bs, and therefore
‖as − us‖ = ‖bs − us‖. Moreover, according to formula (4.2.8), if xi > bs + h2 , i ∈ D ,
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then µ(xi, us) = 0. Otherwise, from formula (4.2.8), we can obtain,
m˜i =
∑
i∈D
µ(xi, us)× xi∑
i∈D
µ(xi, us)
<
∑
i∈D
µ(xi, us)× (bs + h2 )∑
i∈D
µ(xi, us)
< bs +
h
2
Similarly, we can obtain
m˜i =
∑
i∈D
µ(xi, us)× xi∑
i∈D
µ(xi, us)
>
∑
i∈D
µ(xi, us)× (as + h2 )∑
i∈D
µ(xi, us)
> as +
h
2
Therefore, we have proved that each generated value belongs to an interval.
4.3.2 Distribution-based Case Study
In this section, we will use two cases, uniform and Gaussian, to show the generated data
well match the class distribution. Fig.4.2 is the PDF (probability density function) exhi-
bition of two well-known distributions in real world data: Gaussian distribution (N(0, 1))
and Uniform distribution (u(0, 1)). In each case study, we first generate a dataset with the
size of 50 (marked as Original in Fig.4.2) based on the uniform distribution, u(0,1) and
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Figure 4.2: Illustrating of the data distribution w.r.t Probability Density Function (PDF)
Gaussian distribution, N(0,1). Then an oversampling rate of 50% is assigned each dataset
via FID algorithm (redistributed dataset is denoted as FID). Finally, we compare the PDF
of these two datasets with the analytical PDF. Fig.4.2(a) indicates that the empirical PDF
obtained via the proposed FID algorithm is closer to the analytical PDF-u(0,1). The curve
displayed in Fig.4.2(b) demonstrates that the re-distributed data in terms of FID can fit
the analytical distribution very well. However, one can see that the curve produces by the
original data displays a quite different distribution. It is worth to mention that Fig.4.2 indi-
cate that the PDF obtained by our proposed algorithm can fit the popularly used Gaussian
distribution, even though it cannot fit the uniform distribution as well as Gaussian distribu-
tion, this result is much better than the original data, which demonstrates that the proposed
algorithm is suitable for the popularly used distributions.
To further explore the data distribution, we provide an illustration of the data via box-
plot. The boxplot is one of the most frequently used graphical techniques for comparing
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of Turkey boxplot
univariate data and displaying data features such as the central tendency, dispersion, skew-
ness and potential outliers [169], [170]. In a boxplot (refer to Fig. 4.3), the ordered values
of the data are divided into four ‘equal’ parts. Precisely, the box is surrounded by the in-
terquartile range which contains approximately 50% of the total data. The length of the
box equals the interquartile range IQR = Q3 − Q1, the lower and upper bounds are the
first and third quartile. Besides, there are two ‘whiskers’ from each end of the box to the
most remote observations. The lower Whisker is defined as 1.5× IQR lower than Q1, and
the upper Whisker is 1.5× IQR higher than Q3. Any observations that outside the interval
(the fence) are marked as potential outliers.
Fig.4.4 contains two scenarios: uniform distribution and Gaussian distribution. The
first graph of both scenarios (denoted as u(0,1) and N(0,1) in Fig.4.4, respectively) present
the data distribution with the size of more than 50 thousand, which is theoretically most
close to its analytical data distribution. The middle graphs of Fig.4.4(a) and Fig.4.4(b) are
based on the original data with the size of 50, while the last graph of each scenario exhibits
the redistributed data distribution in terms of FID at an oversampling rate of 50%.
Precisely, Fig.4.4(a) reveals that the upper bound of the box based on original data is
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Figure 4.4: Display of distribution: a boxplot
about 0.1 higher than the box based on analytical data (with an upper bound value at 0.75
level), and the median of the original data is 0.05 higher than the analytical data (with
median value of 0.5). However, the re-distributed data via FID is much more close to the
analytical data, with an upper bound of the box only 0.005 higher, and median value 0.015
higher. Moreover, although Fig.4.4(a) indicates that the interval based on both original data
and re-distributed data via FID are similar to the analytic data N(0, 1), one can see that the
length of the first and third quartile based on original data are not even , which means the
data is quite skewed (with its median value 0.35 higher than N(0, 1)). Comparatively, the
re-distributed data via FID presents a much better improvement, with its median only about
0.1 higher than the analytical data N(0, 1).
All in all, compared with the original data, we can see that the median in terms of the
proposed FID algorithm is more likely to lie in the middle of the box, and the box, upper
whisker and lower whisker are most close to the analytical distribution (u(0,1) and N(0,1).
Therefore, this procedure emphasizes that the redistributed data via FID is more practical
and applicable.
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Table 4.4: Datasets Information
Data # Size # Min # Maj # Att IR
Mammographic (Mam) 833 406 427 5 1.05
heart 270 120 150 13 1.25
bupa 345 145 200 6 1.38
Colon 62 22 40 2000 1.82
MC2 125 44 81 39 1.84
Yeast1 1484 429 1055 8 2.46
ILPD 583 167 416 9 2.49
Haberman’s Survival (haber) 306 81 225 3 2.78
vehicle2 (Vh2) 846 218 628 18 2.88
vehicle1 (Vh1) 846 217 629 18 2.90
vehicle3 (Vh3) 846 212 634 18 2.99
Glass0123vs456 (G06) 214 51 163 9 3.20
BMG 2417 547 1870 39 3.42
kc2 522 107 415 21 3.88
kc3 194 36 158 39 4.39
expedia (expe) 3125 417 2708 40 6.49
pc3 1077 134 943 37 7.04
pc4 1458 178 1280 38 7.19
pc1 705 61 644 37 10.56
housing (hou) 506 35 471 14 13.46
Glass4 (G4) 214 13 201 9 15.47
Page-blocks13vs4 (Pb134) 472 115 357 10 15.86
Glass016vs5 (G0165) 184 9 175 9 19.44
Glass5 (G5) 214 9 205 9 22.78
pc5 17186 516 16670 38 32.31
Abalone-17 vs 8-9-10 (A1710) 2338 58 2280 8 39.31
MC1 1988 46 1942 38 42.22
4.4 Performance Evaluation
A large number of experiments have been carried out to evaluate the proposed FID method.
We have compared FID with 10 existing methods on 27 public datasets. This section reports
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the experiments and results.
4.4.1 Datasets
To investigate the proposed algorithm works in varies scenarios, twenty-seven datasets from
different databases are used in our study. Table 4.4 lists the datasets used in this work. The
first column is the name of datasets, and followed by other columns, which are size of the
whole dataset, number of majority class samples, size of minority class samples, attributes
and imbalance ratio (IR). One can see that in our experiments, the datasets have a variety
of sizes, attributes and IR. The scale of the dataset varies from 62 to 17186. The attributes
range from 3 to 2000. The IR, the size of the majority class over the size of the minority
class, varies from 1.05 (slightly imbalanced) to 42.22 (highly imbalanced). Our proposed
approach works for both high dimensional datasets and low dimensional datasets.
Among the datasets, MC2, kc2, kc3, pc3, pc4, pc1, pc5 and MC1 are from the PROMISE
repository software engineering databases [171]. Heart, bupa, housing, Mammographic,
ILPD, and Haberman’s Survival are from the UCI machine learning repository [172].
Colon is a DNA microarray data [173]. BMG and expedia are web-usage data [174]. The
rest datasets are from the KEEL-dataset repository [175]. To simulate the deficient data
classification problem, we follow the traditional way [135], [137], [142] and randomly re-
move 5% or 10% of the feature values in each dataset. In the remaining of this chapter, we
will use the abbreviation to indicate the datasets.
4.4.2 Evaluation Measures
A well-fact is that in class imbalance problems, overall classification accuracy is not a
good metric for measuring the performance of classifiers. In this case, model performance
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is measured using different commonly used learning metrics [1], [12], [26], [13]: Accuracy
(Acc), Recall (equation 3.4.2), Geometric mean (GM), Area under the ROC curve (AUC)
(equation 3.4.4), and Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC) [26].
GM is the geometric mean of the classification accuracy between classes. A low GM
value indicates that at least one class cannot be classified effectively. AUC, is the area under
and ROC area, which related to TPR (true positive rate) to the FPR (false positive rate). It is
not sensitive to the distribution between the majority and minority classes, can sort models
by overall performance. MCC, which considers both error rates and mutually accuracies
on both classes, is less influenced by imbalanced unseen test sets. MCC ranges from 1
(perfect prediction) to -1 (inverse prediction), while 0 indicates that the model produces
random results.
In this work, we consider the minority class as the positive class and the majority class
as the negative class. The other three metrics can be defined as follows.
Acc =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(4.4.1)
GM =
√
TPR ∗ TNR (4.4.2)
MCC =
TP × TN − FP × FN√
(TP + FP )(TP + FN)(TN + FP )(TN + FN)
(4.4.3)
4.4.3 Setting of Experiments
In this empirical study, we implement the methods of RUS, ROS and SMOTE (SM) that
are commonly used sampling procedures [13]. The algorithms such as CBUS, CBOS and
MWM were also considered in our experiments. In addition, we implement the mixture
kernel-based imputation (Mix) [137], and kNN imputation (KNNI) [31], because they are
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Table 4.5: Parameter setting
Algorithm Parameter setting
Mix σ = 0.2, q = 2, ρ = 0.95
KNNI K=3
SM K=5
CBOS K=5
CBUS K=3
MWM k1 = 5, k2 = 3, k3 = Smin/2, Cp = 3, Cf (th) = 5, and CMAX = 2.
SOMI Default setting in SOM toolbox
popular in missing data estimation. Moreover, SOMI1 [143] method which was reported
to have the best performance compared with other data-driven methods such as multilayer
perceptron ANNs, likelihood-based approaches and classical multiple regression analysis,
is also employed in this work. Parameters setting for Mix, KNNI, SM, CBOS, CBUS,
MWM and SOMI are presented in Table 4.5. Besides, the original (ORI) datasets without
sampling or imputation are used to provide a baseline for the performance evaluation. In
order to further challenge the new FID method, we combine some missing values recovery
methods with some imbalanced data learning methods, detailed information are listed in
Table 4.6.
In addition, RUS, was performed at 20%, 50%, 70% and 90% of the majority class,
which indicates the percentages of the majority class samples to be removed. For exam-
ple, ‘20%’ means 20% of the majority samples were removed. For the over-sampling
approaches, four over-sampling rates are used in the experiments: 200%, 500%, 700% and
1SOM toolbox is available at: http://research.ics.aalto.fi/software/somtoolbox/.
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Table 4.6: Methods for comparison
Technique Abbr. Type
Experimats based on Original data ORI None
Mixture kernel based imputation Mix [137] Imputation
kNN imputation KNNI [134] Imputation
Self-organizing-map SOMI [143] Imputation
SMOTE SM [17] Sampling
Cluster based ovesampling CBOS [16] Sampling
Cluster based undersampling CBUS [14] Sampling
Random oversampling ROS [176] Sampling
Random undersampling RUS [176] Sampling
Majority Weighed Minority oversampling MWM [16] Sampling
Proposed algorithm FID Sampling
Mix + MWM CMM Both
SM + MWM CSM Both
KNNI + MWM CKM Both
SOM + MWM CSM Both
KNNI + RUS KRUS Both
KNNI + ROS KROS Both
KNNI + CBUS KCU Both
KNNI + CBOS KCO Both
900%. For example, ROS with ‘200%’ means 200% of the minority samples were added.
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Figure 4.5: Overall Accuracy performance: imbalanced data.
In our experiments, we applied k-fold cross validation (CV) for performance evalua-
tion. In order to guarantee that each fold of the training data contains at least one sample
from every minority class, we performed 5-fold cross validation on Glass5, Glass016vs5,
Glass4 and Colon datasets because of very small sizes. For example, there are only 9 mi-
nority class samples in Glass5, Glass016vs5 datasets. For other datasets, we used 10-fold
cross validation. All methods are only applied to the training data rather than the whole
dataset. We report the average of 10 runs of each experiment with five different settings.
C4.5 decision tree [153] is employed to build a classification model using an entropy-based
splitting criterion stemming. It is sensitive to class imbalances, because C4.5 works glob-
ally, rather than paying attention to specific data points. In addition, all of these learning
methods were implemented with Matlab 8.0.
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Figure 4.6: Overall Recall performance: imbalanced data.
4.5 Results Discussion
In this section, we first present the experiment results based on imbalanced data, then the
results based on imbalanced data when there are missing values presented will be discussed,
followed by detailed results for class imbalance when there are 10% missing values, and
the analysis of the impact caused by imbalance ratio and missing values.
4.5.1 Results Discussion for Imbalanced Data
Fig.4.5, Fig.4.6 and Fig. 4.7 report the overall Accuracy, Recall and AUC performance
of the 8 sampling methods. Comparatively, once can see that FID has the highest mean,
upper quartile, and lower quartile of all the compared methods, which indicates that FID
provides superior results on imbalanced data learning. Even though SM and MWM obtain
the highest median values (about 0.8), we can see that FID (about 0.79) also achieves very
comparative result which is only 0.01 lower. Fig.4.5 also indicates that CBUS has the
CBUS has the lowest lower quartile and median, as well as the largest range between upper
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Figure 4.7: Overall AUC performance: imbalanced data.
quartile and lower quartile values, which means CBUS has the worst accuracy performance.
Fig.4.6 presents the Recall performance. One can observe that FID has the second
highest average, upper quartile and lower quartile values. Even though, CBUS has the
highest median and average values, its Accuracy and AUC values are the worst, which
means CBUS is not applicable. Moreover, although ROS results in highest lower quartile
value, its upper quartile is even the worst one among all the methods, and the overall values
in the box is at least 5% less than FID.
Fig. 4.7 shows that the proposed FID achieves outstanding overall AUC performance
compared with the other 7 methods. The boxplot demonstrates that the median of FID
is about 0.01 higher than the second best method. Compared with ORI, FID achieves a
significant improvement over 0.05. Similarly, Fig. 4.10 illustrates that FID outperforms
all the other techniques, and especially has a significant improvement compared with ORI.
For example, FID achieves a median value at about 0.675 which is about 0.10 higher than
ORI.
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Figure 4.8: Overall Accuracy performance: Datasets with 10% missing values.
Figure 4.9: Overall Recall performance: Datasets with 10% missing values.
4.5.2 Results Discussion for Imbalanced Data With Missing Values
In this section, we only provide the results based on dataset with 10% missing values,
because dataset with 5% missing values has similar results. Fig. 4.8, Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.10
compares the 10 state-of-the-art and 8 different combinations of missing value imputation
and imbalanced data learning method in terms of Accuracy, Recall and AUC performances
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Figure 4.10: Overall AUC performance: Datasets with 10% missing values.
on the problem of class imbalance with missing values presented. Precisely, Fig. 4.8 shows
that FID has the highest upper quartile and lower quartile, as well as the second highest
average values. Moreover, it also has the tightest box among these techniques that don’t
have the outliers, which indicates the smallest variation in Recall results. Other algorithms
such as KNNI, ROS, SM, CBOS and MWM are not stable, this can be seen from the
overall Recall perfrmance in Fig. 4.9, where KNNI and MWM have very large variation in
results. While ROS, SM, and CBOS have the lowest lower quartile, which depicts the bad
performance of these methods.
Fig. 4.10 presents the overall AUC performance of 19 approaches (listed in Table 4.6)
on the datasets with 10% missing values. In general, Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.10 reveal that
FID has the best performance in all scenarios. Other methods do not work stably in all
cases. For example, MWM is the second best method when there are no missing values,
however, its performance is far worse when there are 10% missing values presented in the
imbalanced data.
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Table 4.7: Averaged GM and MCC values of each technique
P.M. MV
Techniques
ORI Mix KNNI ROS KROS KRUS SM KSM KCO KCU MWM CMM CSM FID
GM
5% 0.475 0.512 0.504 0.518 0.515 0.511 0.535 0.535 0.511 0.485 0.511 0.535 0.506 0.561
10% 0.421 0.452 0.450 0.490 0.487 0.499 0.509 0.526 0.482 0.469 0.455 0.476 0.465 0.536
MCC
5% 0.353 0.399 0.391 0.390 0.388 0.380 0.400 0.408 0.386 0.305 0.381 0.403 0.368 0.433
10% 0.290 0.332 0.334 0.356 0.356 0.363 0.362 0.398 0.352 0.289 0.317 0.336 0.321 0.409
Table 4.7 confirms again that our proposed algorithm has the best performance in terms
of the average GM and MCC values. Precisely, the GM values show that FID is better
than other methods. In the case of the 5% and 10% missing percentage, FID can improve
the performance of GM value at about 10 percent compared with ORI. Even though KSM
which is the combination of KNNI and MWM, achieves much better performance than
ORI, the GM of FID is still higher than KSM.
The MCC shows the similar results with GM. The SM and KSM display superior per-
formance among the conventional methods. FID can further improve MCC about 3.0 and
1.1 percent compared to SM and KSM. The single imputation techniques such as Mix,
KNNI and SOMI, can improve the classification performance. FID outperforms these im-
putation techniques by at least 3 percent. The reason is that missing data imputation algo-
rithms are not initially designed for imbalanced data learning. For example, considering
a column feature vector, the time complexity of KNNI is O(tm) and the time complexity
of FID is O(tm + mlog(m)). KNNI can impute the missing values, but cannot deal with
the class imbalance problem. FID not only can impute the missing values but also can
re-distribute the imbalanced data. Another advantage of FID compared to KNNI is that,
FID has no restriction to the percentage of missing values, while KNNI usually does not
function when there are a larger amount of missing values. In Colon dataset (refer to Table
71
Table 4.8: AUC values in terms of datasets with 10% missing values
Data
ORI Mix SM KROS KSM CKM FID
AUC Std.A AUC Std.A AUC Std.A AUC Std.A AUC Std.A AUC Std.A AUC Std.A
Mamm 0.780 0.009 0.788 0.003 0.787 0.005 0.760 0.007 0.784 0.006 0.785 0.007 0.790 0.001
heart 0.706 0.037 0.727 0.047 0.734 0.038 0.740 0.028 0.744 0.020 0.743 0.017 0.747 0.010
bupa 0.569 0.021 0.576 0.008 0.591 0.020 0.604 0.023 0.618 0.033 0.571 0.007 0.608 0.016
colon 0.602 0.020 0.653 0.007 0.640 0.009 - - - - - - 0.657 0.008
MC2 0.588 0.005 0.564 0.002 0.589 0.006 0.657 0.006 0.632 0.004 0.656 0.002 0.617 0.003
Yeast1 0.627 0.004 0.629 0.004 0.657 0.002 0.608 0.004 0.631 0.015 0.630 0.004 0.653 0.003
ILPD 0.527 0.010 0.533 0.006 0.623 0.005 0.565 0.010 0.598 0.005 0.546 0.007 0.638 0.004
haber 0.599 0.007 0.583 0.011 0.619 0.025 0.569 0.020 0.599 0.016 0.603 0.016 0.619 0.007
Vh2 0.867 0.004 0.873 0.003 0.875 0.003 0.891 0.003 0.900 0.004 0.880 0.003 0.887 0.008
Vh1 0.614 0.012 0.636 0.012 0.660 0.017 0.645 0.011 0.661 0.011 0.682 0.014 0.682 0.002
Vh3 0.594 0.058 0.638 0.029 0.664 0.019 0.650 0.055 0.656 0.015 0.664 0.058 0.669 0.012
G06 0.847 0.005 0.875 0.005 0.877 0.004 0.882 0.004 0.882 0.010 0.879 0.005 0.876 0.006
BMG 0.615 0.016 0.642 0.015 0.693 0.006 0.707 0.018 0.683 0.019 0.622 0.012 0.692 0.011
kc2 0.640 0.030 0.628 0.010 0.685 0.019 0.658 0.017 0.664 0.014 0.700 0.042 0.692 0.013
kc3 0.565 0.006 0.604 0.011 0.601 0.011 0.573 0.012 0.591 0.016 0.628 0.010 0.635 0.007
expe 0.632 0.033 0.675 0.035 0.733 0.012 0.760 0.043 0.751 0.028 0.632 0.029 0.735 0.029
pc3 0.540 0.016 0.565 0.021 0.583 0.024 0.613 0.023 0.588 0.036 0.643 0.013 0.603 0.011
pc4 0.586 0.009 0.577 0.013 0.710 0.009 0.707 0.011 0.729 0.011 0.688 0.014 0.738 0.008
pc1 0.564 0.099 0.566 0.087 0.596 0.013 0.628 0.009 0.616 0.007 0.593 0.128 0.621 0.011
housing 0.554 0.004 0.543 0.008 0.572 0.007 0.590 0.016 0.658 0.004 0.567 0.004 0.663 0.003
G4 0.515 0.019 0.695 0.055 0.674 0.071 0.675 0.016 0.738 0.046 0.747 0.030 0.784 0.027
Pb134 0.890 0.012 0.891 0.007 0.893 0.010 0.895 0.014 0.890 0.009 0.899 0.016 0.899 0.007
G0165 0.568 0.010 0.589 0.006 0.697 0.012 0.615 0.025 0.704 0.019 0.564 0.005 0.781 0.015
G5 0.558 0.022 0.552 0.017 0.674 0.014 0.574 0.017 0.684 0.038 0.543 0.024 0.678 0.013
pc5 0.621 0.016 0.634 0.006 0.778 0.008 0.739 0.010 0.739 0.007 0.621 0.008 0.728 0.009
A1710 0.555 0.008 0.602 0.003 0.609 0.005 0.628 0.004 0.630 0.005 0.628 0.005 0.630 0.003
MC1 0.503 0.007 0.552 0.013 0.518 0.009 0.571 0.010 0.556 0.006 0.547 0.008 0.584 0.005
Std.A: Standard Deviation of AUC values. blod print means better performance.
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8), when there are 10% missing values, all of the KNN-based algorithms do not function.
The reason is that they cannot find enough complete neighbours without missing values for
a given sample.
Generally speaking, existing methods are affected by the problems of missing values
and imbalanced data significantly. In particular, the previous individual technique cannot
show consistent performance in terms of the four measures. However, FID can address the
two problems at the same time, and displays the best results for most cases measured by
any performance metrics.
4.5.3 Detailed AUC Results for Imbalanced Data With Missing Values
Table 4.8 reports the detailed AUC results of the 7 methods on the 27 dataset when the
missing percentage is 10%. Note that in this section we specifically present the techniques
with good performance. For example, we pick up Mix as a representation of imputation
techniques, SM as the representation of traditional sampling techniques, and KROS, KSM
and CKM as the representation of the combined methods. It is worthwhile to point out
that CBOS do not function on Colon, fMC1, fMC3, fpc1, kc3 and G0165 datasets due to
missing values presented, while CBUS do not function on Colon, fMC2 and kc3 datasets
for the same reason.
The results show FID has the best performance in most cases, which further confirms
the robustness of FID. We can see FID has the best performance on 17 out of 27 datasets.
Although FID is not the best one in some cases, it exhibits very comparative results in those
cases. For example, KROS has the best AUC value on Glass013vs456 dataset, 0.882, while
FID achieves 0.876 which is only 0.006 lower.
To be more specific, FID outperforms Mix method across all datasets. The missing data
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imputation techniques are not initially designed for imbalanced data learning problems,
therefore, when facing imbalanced datasets with missing values, these techniques cannot
achieve significant improvement. FID performs better than SM in almost all cases (except
Haberman’s Survival dataset). SM is not robust to missing values, that is to say, the missing
values presented in the imbalanced datasets decreased its performance.
Although the combined techniques have achieved slightly better performance in some
situations, our proposed algorithm exhibits very comparative results in such cases. It is
worthwhile to mention that the combination of two approaches is not practical. For exam-
ple, KROS obtains higher AUC values in 6 out of 27 cases, however, its performance is far
worse than ORI on some of other datasets such as Mammographic and Haberman’s Sur-
vival. Interestingly, techniques such as SM, KROS, KSM and CKM even do not function
on Colon dataset. The reason is that, there are no enough samples for training the model
after automatically ignore examples with missing values.
4.5.4 Statistical Tests for Performance Comparison
In this chapter, we applied the hypothesis testing2 techniques [177], [178], [179], [180] to
provide a good view on how the classification methods performed and whether our FID sig-
nificantly outperformed existing methods. We used AUC [181] as the evaluation criterion.
Firstly, we applied a Friedman test to detect statistical differences among the outcomes of a
set of methods. The p-values of the Friedman test on the original datasets and the datasets
with missing values are all less than 0.001. It means the hypothesis of equivalence can
be rejected with high confidence and there are significant differences. Then, a series of
2Readers who are interested can refer to: http://sci2s.ugr.es/sicidm/, together with the sta-
tistical tests software
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Table 4.9: Wilcoxon tests for FID and other methods (No missing values)
Comparison R+ R− Hypothesis (α = 0.05) p-value
FID vs. ORI 378 0 Rejected < 0.001
FID vs. SM 268 110 Accepted 0.058
FID vs. ROS 335 43 Rejected < 0.001
FID vs. RUS 378 0 Rejected < 0.001
FID vs. CBOS 340 38 Rejected < 0.001
FID vs. CBUS 307 71 Rejected 0.005
FID vs. MWM 300 78 Rejected 0.008
Wilcoxon paired signed-rank tests have been conducted to do a pairwise comparison be-
tween our proposed FID and each of others method. The different performance scores are
based on the outcomes of two classifiers. In the reported results, R+ represents the sum of
ranks when the first method outperformed the second, and R− vice versa.
The statistical tests tell us whether a hypothesis of comparison could be rejected at a
specified level of significance α. It would be very useful to present the p-value in terms of
each comparison. Then, one can see whether the new FID method can significantly improve
the classification performance and how big the improvement is. In this work, we report the
α value as well. All non-parametric statistical analyses are performed using SPSS 23. The
significance level is set to 95%. We only report the results on the datasets with no missing
values and the datasets with 10% missing values. The datasets with 5% missing values
produced similar results to that of 10% missing values.
Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 are for Wilcoxon paired signed-rank tests over the datasets
with 0% or 10% missing values. The results in Table 4.9 show that FID has a significant
improvement compared with the sampling methods. Even though there is no big difference
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Table 4.10: Wilcoxon tests for FID and other methods (datasets with 10%-MV)
Comparison R+ R− Hypothesis (α = 0.05) p-value
FID vs. ORI 351 0 Rejected < 0.001
FID vs. Mix 351 0 Rejected < 0.001
FID vs. KNNI 341 10 Rejected < 0.001
FID vs. SM 295.5 29.5 Rejected < 0.001
FID vs. KSM 251 74 Rejected 0.017
FID vs. SOMI 351 0 Rejected < 0.001
FID vs. ROS 317 34 Rejected < 0.001
FID vs. KROS 277.5 73.5 Rejected 0.010
FID vs. RUS 335 16 Rejected < 0.001
FID vs. KRUS 277 74 Rejected 0.001
FID vs. CBOS 220 11 Rejected < 0.001
FID vs. KCO 298.5 52.5 Rejected 0.002
FID vs. CBUS 265 35 Rejected < 0.001
FID vs. KCU 300 51 Rejected 0.002
FID vs. MWM 336 15 Rejected < 0.001
FID vs. CMM 315 36 Rejected < 0.001
FID vs. CKM 259 41 Rejected 0.002
FID vs. CSM 350 1 Rejected < 0.001
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Figure 4.11: Relationship between IR and percentage of MV.
between FID and SM, the significant level is very low at 0.058. Moreover, FID has higher
ranks than SM, which means FID is better. Figures 4.7 & 4.10 and Table 4.7 & 4.8 provide
more evidence on this observation. Table 4.10 summarizes the Wilcoxon paired signed-
rank tests on the datasets with 10% missing values. The tests rejected all the hypothesis
of equivalence with low p-values, hence FID can significantly improve the classification
performance in the cases of missing values and imbalanced classes.
4.5.5 Impact of IR and Percentage of MV
In this subsection, we further explore how classification performance can be affected by
the degree of imbalance and percentage of missing values. Fig. 8 displays the performance
of AUC in terms of three different percentages of missing values and different imbalance
ratios. The left top graph is the performance AUC with IR ranging between 2 and 5. The
right top one shows the results when IR is between 5 and 10. The range of IR for the left
below graph is [10, 20]. The results for IR> 20 is shown in the right below graph.
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With our experiment settings, the impact of missing values is not obvious when the
imbalance ratio is less than 10. For example, most methods achieved similar performance
in the datasets with 5% or 10% missing values. However, AUC decreased quickly with
the increase of IR. When IR is larger than 20, the AUC of SM dropped from 0.68 for 5%
missing values to 0.62 for 10% missing values.
Moreover, one can see that the missing data imputation algorithm Mix cannot solve the
imbalanced data learning problem. The results show that the performance of Mix is not
better than ORI’s performance for most of the times.
The sampling and combined techniques such as SM and KSM can improve the classifi-
cation performance. KSM works much better than SM when IR is between 5 and 20. The
difference on AUC can be more than 0.02. When IR is larger than 20, KSM and SM have
similar results that are worse than FID’s performance. The results show that simple com-
bination of missing data imputation methods and imbalanced data learning methods is not
reliable to handle two problems. If there are a large number of missing values, imputation
methods may have many errors. The number of errors will be enlarged by imbalanced data
learning, so the classification result cannot be effectively improved.
The proposed FID outperforms other methods in all cases. To be specific, when the IR
is less than 20 and there are 5% or 10% missing values, the performance of FID is the best
and robust. For example, the AUC of FID can achieve 0.68. When IR is larger than 20,
FID still showed better performance.
4.5.6 Remarks
All of the results confirm that FID is superior to the existing methods. The key reason is
that FID can effectively address the problems of missing values and imbalanced data at the
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same time.
The nature of the previous methods limits their performance under the critical situa-
tion of imbalanced and incomplete data. Firstly, the previous sampling methods tend to
re-distribute the imbalanced training data but ignore the missing values. However, missing
values can affect the imbalanced learning. Secondly, the over-sampling methods such as
SM, ROS, MWM, and CBOS, are unable to generate enough useful synthetic examples due
to the extremely small size of the minority class. For example, in the severely imbalanced
datasets such as G5, A1710 and MC1, the minority class comprise less than 3% of the total
instances. In that case, the under-sampling methods such as RUS, CBUS may remove very
useful information from the majority class, which affects the learning from the imbalanced
data. Thirdly, the previous sampling methods aim to re-distribute the training set by gen-
erating or deleting some examples on an instance by instance base. A behind assumption
is that the samples in a class are strongly dependent on each other for each feature. In
reality, this assumption may not hold, so such artificially re-balancing technique may lead
to a biased classifier. It is also a possible reason for CMM performing worse than FID.
However, the proposed FID algorithm does not have such assumptions. In addition, the
previous missing values recovery methods cannot be used for re-balancing the imbalanced
dataset. Thus they are hard to achieve significant improvements when learning from such
imbalanced datasets.
All in all, the experimental results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm can be
applied to different scenarios such as missing data problem, class imbalance problem and
both problems.
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4.6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we have proposed a unified fuzzy-based information decomposition (FID)
method to address the deficient data classification problem. The FID applies fuzzy logic
to combine the observed data for recovering missing data and creating synthetic samples.
Also, we have carried out a large number of experiments to evaluate the performance of
FID. On the 27 well-known public datasets, FID is compared to 10 state-of-the-art methods
as well as the combination of these techniques in the research area. The FID outperforms
not only the existing methods that focus on one of the problems but also the combined
method. All in all, we have reported the results from three points of view: overall perfor-
mance, detailed results and statistical ranking. The results show that FID can achieve stable
and excellent classification performance on all of the datasets, and the performance of FID
is significantly better than other techniques under varying settings of experiments.
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Chapter 5
Modelling of Spam Detection in Online
Social Network
In this chapter, we experimentally demonstrate that the unequal distribution between spam
and non-spam classes has a great impact on spam detection rate. To address the problem,
we propose a fuzzy-based oversampling (FOS) method that generates synthetic data sam-
ples from limited observed samples based on the idea of fuzzy-based information decom-
position. Moreover, we develop an ensemble learning approach that learns more accurate
classifiers from imbalanced data in three steps. In the first step, the class distribution in
the imbalanced data set is adjusted by using various strategies, including random over-
sampling, random undersampling and FOS. In the second step, a classification model is
built upon each of the redistributed data sets. In the final step, a majority voting scheme
is introduced to combine the predictions from all the classification models. We conduct
experiments real-world Twitter data for the purpose of evaluation. The results indicate that
the proposed learning approach can significantly improve the spam detection rate in data
sets with imbalanced class distribution.
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5.1 Introduction of the Background
Being an important source for real-time information dissemination in recent years, Twit-
ter is inevitably a prime target for spammers. It has been showed that the damage caused
by Twitter spam can reach far beyond the social media platform itself. To deal with the
increasing threats from spammers, security companies, as well as Twitter itself, are com-
bating spammers to make Twitter a spam-free platform. For example, a spam can be re-
ported by clicking on the ‘report as spam’ link in their home page on Twitter [182]. Twitter
also implements blacklist filtering as a component in their detection system called Bot-
Maker [183]. However, due to the time lag, blacklist usually fails to protect victims from
new spam [184]. The research shows that more than 90% victims may visit a new spam
link before it is blocked by blacklists [185]. In order to address the limitations of blacklists,
recently, researchers proposed machine learning based methods that regard spam detection
as a binary classification problem [186]. A number of statistical features, such as account
age, number of followers or friends and number of characters in a tweet, are extracted to
characterise tweets. In conventional supervised detection paradigm, a set of labelled spam
and non-spam sample tweets are prepared in advance for training a classification model.
Afterwards, the classification model is applied to detect spam in the coming tweets. A
number of machine learning methods have been investigated in the topic of Twitter spam
detection [187].
However, most of the studies overlook a fundamental issue that is widely seen in real-
world Twitter data, i.e., the class imbalance problem. That is to say, we normally have a
large number of non-spam tweets, while only have a small number of spam tweets. In this
respect, traditional classifiers usually biased toward the non-spam class, and lead to low
spam detection rate. To alleviate this problem, we will study the Twitter spam detection
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problem and present an ensemble learning for Twitter spam detection.
5.1.1 Motivation
Twitter has gained significantly in popularity in recent years and become an important
source for real-time information sharing and news dissemination. Inevitably, the growth
of Twitter is accompanied by a significant increase of spamming activities targeting on
the platform. Twitter spam is usually referred to as the unsolicited tweets that contain
malicious links directing victims to external sites with malware downloads, phishing, drug
sales, or scams, etc. [188]. A series of incidents showed that Twitter spam not only affects
user experience, but also poses significant threats of damages beyond the social networking
platform itself. As an example, in September 2014, a nationwide Internet meltdown in New
Zealand was caused by a Twitter spam campaign that spread DDoS attack malware in the
guise of leaked nude photos of Hollywood celebrities [189].
The traditional approach to detect and filter spam is based on blacklists. For example,
Trend Micro develops a blacklisting service called Web Reputation Technology system to
filter spam URLs for users [190]. Twitter also implements a blacklist filtering module in
their anti-spam system BotMaker [191]. Nonetheless, the blacklist-based schemes fail to
protect victims from emerging spam due to the time lag [184]. A previous study shows
that more than 90% of victims may click through a new spam link before it is blocked by
blacklists [186].
In order to overcome the limitation of blacklisting, a lot of researchers have proposed
machine learning based schemes that detect Twitter spam by mining the spammers’ and
spam tweets’ unique patterns, without checking the embedded URLs [192,193]. This kind
of spam detection schemes usually involves a few steps. First of all, the features that can
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differentiate spam from non-spam are selected and extracted from the tweets or authors.
Example features include account age, number of followers, number of following, and
number of characters in a tweet. Second, a small set of training data samples are labelled
(as spam or non-spam) based on some ground truth. Finally, various machine learning
algorithms can be applied to develop classification models, which can then be deployed
to detect spam in a real-time basis. A number of recent studies [187, 188, 194, 195] have
reported satisfactory results obtained using machine learning-based detection schemes.
However, most previous studies overlook the issue of imbalanced class distribution that
widely exists in real-world Twitter data. That is, the proportion of the spam tweets is much
smaller than that of the non-spam tweets in reality. For example, a study based on a data
sample back in 2009 [196] suggested that 3.75% of tweets are spam. In the meantime, the
experimental data sets used in most related works have similar amounts of spam data and
non-spam data. Therefore, it is interesting to see the effectiveness of the machine learning-
based detection schemes on data sets with various distributions of spam and non-spam
classes.
In this chapter, we investigate the class imbalance problem in machine learning based
Twitter spam detection. We begin by examining the detection performance in data sets
with varying class imbalance rates from 2 (i.e., the number of non-spam tweets is twice as
the number of spam tweets) to 20. The preliminary results show that the increase of class
imbalance rate leads to slightly better precision in spam detection along with a significant
decrease (over 30%) in detection rate. In other words, in the data sets that the non-spam
tweets extremely outnumber the spam tweets, a large proportion of spam tweets can be
missed by the detection schemes.
To address the problem, we propose an ensemble learning approach that incorporates
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data preprocessing techniques that mitigate the impact of imbalanced class distribution.
Specifically, the proposed approach builds an ensemble classifier in three steps. In the
first step, multiple strategies, including random oversampling, random undersampling and
fuzzy-based oversampling, are adopted to adjust the class distribution in the data. In the
second step, a classification model is trained from each of the redistributed data sets re-
spectively. In the last step, a majority voting scheme is introduced to combine all of the
classification models. Experimental results derived from real-world Twitter data shows that
the proposed approach can significantly improve the performance of spam detection in data
sets with different degrees of class distribution.
5.1.2 Contributions
We highlight our main contribution as following.
1) To address the imbalanced twitter spam detection problem, we present an interesting
work that is to use ensemble empowered information decomposition approach to solve the
challenging problem of learning from imbalanced data. the proposed approach builds an
ensemble classifier in three steps. In the first step, multiple strategies, including random
oversampling, random undersampling and fuzzy-based oversampling, are adopted to adjust
the class distribution in the data. In the second step, a classification model is trained from
each of the redistributed data sets respectively. In the last step, a majority voting scheme is
introduced to combine all of the classification models.
2) The proposed algorithm not only can be used to binary problems but also can be
applied to multiclass classification problem. Precisely, we can apply this approach to create
synthetic samples for each minority class.
3) We conduct extensive experiments on different kinds of imbalanced Twitter spam
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datasets. Experimental results derived from real-world Twitter data shows that the proposed
approach can significantly improve the performance of spam detection in data sets with
different degrees of class distribution.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review on Twitter
spam detection. In Section 3, we demonstrate the class imbalance problem and present
the proposed approach. The experimental results obtained from real-world Twitter data is
presented and analyzed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Related Work of This Chapter
Spam mitigation is one of the key security challenges in online social networks as well as
in the cyber space in general [197–200]. Traditionally, blacklists are used for detecting
and filtering unwanted information including spam. For example, Twitter implements a
blacklist filtering module in their anti-spam system BotMaker [191]. Trend Micro [190]
offers a blacklisting service based on the Web Reputation Technology, which is able to
filter harmful spam URLs. Blacklists have a critical disadvantage. That is, it takes some
time for the new malicious links to be included in the blacklists. A lot of damages can have
already been caused during the time lag [184, 186].
Heuristic rule-based methods for filtering Twitter spam have been developed in some
earlier attempts to overcome the limitations of blacklisting. Yardi et al. [201] proposes to
detect spam in #robotpickupline (hashtag created by themselves) through three rules, which
are suspicious URL search, username pattern matching and keyword detection. Kwak et
al. [202] proposes to remove all the tweets that contain more than three hashtags so as to
eliminate the impact of spam on their research.
A lot of recent studies propose to apply machine learning techniques for identifying
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Twitter spam based on a range of features, including tweet-based, author-based, and so-
cial graph based attributes. For instance, Wang et al. [203] present an approach based
on Bayesian models to detect spammers on Twitter, and Benevenuto et al. [188] propose
to detect both spammers and spam using the Support Vector Machine algorithm. In [9],
Stringhini et al. train a classifier using the Random Forest algorithm, which is then used
to detect spam in three social networks, including Twitter, Facebook and MySpace. Lee
et al. [204] deploy some honeypots to derive the spammers’ profiles, and they extract the
statistical features for spam detection using several machine learning algorithms, such as
Decorate, RandomSubSpace and J48.
It has been showed that some basic features used in the above studies can be easily fab-
ricated by purchasing followers, posting more tweets, or mixing spam with normal tweets.
Accordingly, researchers propose some robust features that rely on the social graph to avoid
feature fabrication. For example, Song et al. [205] propose to extract the distance and con-
nectivity between a tweet author and its audience to determine whether it is a spam tweet
or not. After merging the sophisticated features with the basic feature set, they show that
the performance of several classifiers is improved to nearly 99% True Positive and less
than 1% False Positive. Yang et al. [195] also propose some robust spam features, which
include Local Clustering Coefficient, Betweenness Centrality and Bidirectional Links Ra-
tio. They show that their feature set can outperform the features used in the previous
works [188, 194, 203, 204]. In this work, we use the simple tweet-based and author-based
features to study the impacts of class imbalance. We do not adopt the advanced features,
because they require comprehensive knowledge of user connections.
Besides, some researchers resort to analyzing the embedded URLs in tweets to detect
spam. Thomas et al. [206] make use of several URL-based features, such as the domain
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Figure 5.1: Performance Degradation Caused by Class Imbalance
tokens, path tokens and query parameters, along with some features of the landing page,
such as DNS information and domain information. Lee et al. [206] investigate into the
characteristics of Correlated URL Redirect Chains, and some relevant features, such as
URL redirect chain length, relative number of different initial URLs.
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5.3 Learning from Imbalanced Twitter Spam Data
In order to apply machine learning techniques to Twitter spam detection, each tweet in
the data set is presented as a feature vector. The feature vector consists of the observed
values on a set of predetermined features of a tweet. In this work, we define the feature set
using both tweet-based and author-based attributes. Specifically, the tweet-based features
are number of retweets, number of hashtags, number of user mentions, number of URLs,
number of characters, and number of digits in the tweet. Besides, the author-based features
include number of followers, number of followings, number of published tweets, number
of user favorites, and number of lists. The complete list of features is given in Table 5.1. We
note that all the selected features can be extracted out of the tweets with little computational
overhead, such that they are suitable for real-time detection.
Now suppose we are given a set of labeled data consisting of n spam tweets and m
non-spam tweets:D = (x1, ω+), , (xn, ω+), (x(n+1), ω−), · · · , (x(n+m), ω−), in which each
xi ∈ R(i = 1, · · · , n + m) is the feature vector of ith tweet, while ω+ and ω− are the
corresponding class label for spam and non-spam respectively (here we consider spam
tweets to be the positive class and non-spam tweets to be the negative class). Based on the
data set, we can train a classification model using supervised learning algorithms, which
can predict whether any given test tweets belongs to ω+ or ω− (i.e., F (x) : R→ {ω+, ω−}).
As in many data mining application domains, Twitter spam detection faces the class
imbalance problem. That is, in a data set randomly collected from the Twitter platform,
the number of spam tweets is usually much less than the number of non-spam tweets (i.e.,
n m). In this work, we define the class imbalance rate in data set D as:
γ =
n
m
.
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In practice, the class imbalance rate can be varying depending on the activeness of spam
campaigns during the observation or data collection period. For example, a study based on
a data set of 2000 tweets [196] showed that 3.75% of the collected tweets are spam. This
yields a class imbalance rate over 25. However, most existing works on machine learning
based spam detection are carried out without the class imbalance problem in mind, so that
their evaluation results are obtained from relatively balanced data sets, which are purposely
formed by including similar amounts of spam and non-spam tweet samples. Therefore,
such results cannot reflect the actual performance of the spam classifiers in the real world.
To demonstrate the problem, we conduct a series of preliminary experiments using
data sets with class imbalance rates varying from 2 to 20 with incremental steps of 2 (i.e.,
γ = 2, 4, 6, · · · , 20). Fig.5.1 shows the detection performance results, which are obtained
using Random Forest [118] as the base classification algorithm. We can find that as the class
imbalance rate rises from 2 to 20, the true positive rate of the positive class (i.e., the spam
detection rate) witnesses a significant decrease of 33% in average (among 10 independent
tests with different data sets). In particular, when γ = 20, the averaged detection rate is
down to 34%, which means over 66% of spam are missed by the detection. In the meantime,
the false positive rate drops from around 6% to less than 1% when the class imbalance rate
increases. The reason is that the classifier is significantly biased to the negative class. In
other words, the imbalance rate between spam and non-spam classes in real world data will
have a significant impact on the spam detection rate.
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Table 5.1: Lightweight Statistical Features
Feature name Description
account age The age (days) of an account since its creation
no follower The number of followers of this twitter user
no following The number of followings/friends of the user
no user favorite The number of favorites this user received
no list The number of lists this twitter user added
no tweet The number of tweets this twitter user sent
no retweet The number of retweets this tweet
no hashtag The number of hashtags included in this tweet
no user mention The number of user mentions included in tweet
no URL The number of URLs included in this tweet
no char The number of characters in this tweet
no digits The number of digits in this tweet
5.4 Proposed Scheme
5.4.1 Data sampling techniques
In order to address the class imbalance problem in Twitter spam detection, we propose an
ensemble learning approach that incorporates a majority voting scheme to combine mul-
tiple classification models. In particular, each model is independently built upon a data
set that is re-balanced from the given imbalance data set using one of the following data
sampling methods: random oversampling (ROS), random undersampling (RUS) and fuzzy-
based oversampling (FOS). It is worth to mention that the parameters for ROS, RUS and
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FOS are oversampling rate and undersampling rate, therefore, one need to provide such
parameters before using these methods. The parameters used in this study are introduced
in Section 5.5.1.
Random oversampling (ROS): This method takes as input the data of the spam class
D+ and an oversampling ratio α. It then randomly selects a number of α×n samples from
D+ with replacement. The generated data samples are combined with D+ to form the new
set of training samples D′+ for the spam class.
Random undersampling (RUS): This method takes as input the data of the non-spam
class D− and an undersampling ratio β. It then randomly selects a number of (1− β)×m
samples from D− and discards the rest to form a new non-spam set D
′
−.
Fuzzy-based information decomposition oversampling (FOS) This method takes as
input the data of the spam class D+ as well as an oversampling ratio α. It then generates
a number of alpha × n synthetic samples based on the idea of fuzzy-based information
decomposition [207]. In general terms, the algorithm derives the synthetic samples based
on the observed distribution of original minority class data samples. Specifically, the algo-
rithm first divides each dimension of the feature space into t = alpha × n intervals, such
that each interval contains approximately the same amount of observed values. Secondly, it
employs a fuzzy membership function to estimate the weights of the observed data values
with respect to each interval. Finally, these weights are used for generating a synthetic data
value from each interval. For more information, please refer to the proposed FID algorithm
in Chapter 4.
Theorem 1. When
∑
i µ(xi, us) 6= 0 (i.e., at least some observed data contribute informa-
tion to the interval), the generated data value.
m˜i ∈ (di − hi
2
, ei +
hi
2
)
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where [as, bs] denotes the boundary of sth interval.
Proof Recall that us is the center of the sth interval and hs is the width of the sth interval,
thus we have hs = bs − as and as − us = bs − us. According to the fuzzy membership
function, if xi − us > hs then µ(xi, us) = 0. This leads to the statement: if xi > bs + hs/2
then µ(xi, us) = 0. Therefore, when
∑
i µ(xi, us) 6= 0,
m˜s =
∑n
i=1mis × xi∑n
i=1 µ (xi, us)
=
∑n
i=1 µ (xi, us)× xi∑n
i=1 µ (xi, us)
<
∑n
i=1 µ (xi, us)× (bs + hs2 )∑n
i=1 µ (xi, us)
< bs +
hs
2
Similarly, we can obtain,
m˜s =
∑n
i=1mis × xi∑n
i=1 µ (xi, us)
=
∑n
i=1 µ (xi, us)× xi∑n
i=1 µ (xi, us)
>
∑n
i=1 µ (xi, us)× (as − hs2 )∑n
i=1 µ (xi, us)
> as − hs
2
Fig.5.2 gives an illustration of the FOS approach based on simulation data. In particular,
the original data set showed in subgraph (a) consists of a random sample of equal size
from two distributions with normal probability density functions. In the imbalanced dataset
showed in subgraph (b), 80% of the data points from the blue class are randomly removed
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Figure 5.2: Illustrating of the minority and majority class samples on original data, imbal-
anced data and redistributed data using FOS approach
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Figure 5.3: Distribution Simulation, APDF:Analytical PDF; EPDF: Empirical PDF.
so that the data set becomes class imbalanced. FOS is applied to this data set and the
rebalanced data are showed in subgraph (c). We can see that the distribution of the blue
class data is similar to the original data. Fig.5.3 is the PDF exhibition of three kinds of
popular used distribution: Gaussian distribution (N(0, 1)), Uniform distribution (u(0, 1))
and Poisson distribution (p(1)). The size of originally created data is 50, then we make use
of FOS algorithm to generate new data with an oversampling rate of 200%, which means
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Algorithm 5.1 Proposed Ensemble Learning
INPUT: Training data set D; Oversampling ratio α; Undersampling ratio β;
OUTPUT: Multiple base classifiers F1(x), F2(x), and F3(x)
1: Generate D1 = D
′
+
⋃
D− with ROS method D
′
+ = ROS(D+, α);
2: Generate D2 = D
′
+
⋃
D− with RUS method D
′
− = RUS(D−, β);
3: Generate D3 = D
′′
+
⋃
D− with FOS method D
′′
+ = FOS(D+, α);
4: for i in 1, 2, and 3; do
5: Train classifier Fi using base classification algorithm: Fi(x) = BASE(Di);
6: end for
7: return F1(x), F2(x), and F3(x)
TESTING
INPUT: Test data point z;
OUTPUT: Class prediction ω for z
/*Initialization*/
1: v(i+) = 0, v(i−) = 0;
2: for i in 1, 2, and 3 do
3: if Fi(z) = + do vi+ = vi+ + 1;
4: else do vi− = vi− + 1;
5: end if
6: end for
7: if vi+ > vi− do return ω+;
8: else do return ω−;
9: end if
the size of the data is 150 after processed by FOS. One can see that data processed by the
proposed algorithm not only can fit the Analytical Gaussian distribution PDF quite well,
but also works well for the other two kinds of distributions.
5.4.2 Ensemble Empowered Information Decomposition Approach
Ensemble method is a machine learning algorithm where several individual learning al-
gorithms are trained for the same task, and the outcomes of each learning algorithm are
combined to obtain the final results in order to obtain better predictive performance [208].
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Generally speaking, an ensemble is built in three steps [208], [209], which are ensemble
strategy, learners, and final results generation procedure. Many prevailing methods [209],
[210], [211], are from Bagging [212] and Boosting [213], families. The predicted results
have shown that ensemble method could achieve better results that single learner [214].
Recently, there are many other methods for obtaining the component learners. For example,
Jia and Lu [215] proposed sampling ensembles to improve the prediction accuracy for
frequent patterns; Xia et al. used ensemble imbalance learning in predicting blocking bugs
[216], Wang et al. used ensemble learning method with miRNA data classification [217];
Yang [218] et al. discussed the sample subset optimization(SSO) technique to imbalance
and ensemble learning problems in bioinformatics domain etc.. Moreover, when it comes
to combine the prediction results for the final results. There are many methods that we
can employ such as simple averaging [219], Weighted Averaging [220] , learner combiner
[221], and using genetic programming [222]. However, one of the popularly used strategies
is majority voting method [223], which will be employed in this chapter. Based on what we
discussed above, there are mainly three key issues needed to be dealt with in our proposed
scheme:
In the first step, we adopt the data sampling methods discussed in previous sections to
pre-process the imbalanced training data set.
In the second step, a classification model is trained from each of the generated datasets
respectively (i.e.,D′+
⋃
D−, D+
⋃
D
′
−, and D
′′
+s
⋃
D−). In this work, we adopt a number
of widely used supervised learning algorithms for the purpose of evaluation, including
Nave Bayes, Support Vector Machines (SVM), C4.5 Decision Trees and Random Forest
[224].
In the last step, a majority voting scheme is introduced to combine the classification
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Table 5.2: Confusion Matrix
Classified as Spam Classified as Non-Spam
Spam true positive false negative
Non-Spam false positive true negative
models to predict the class of any given test data. The proposed scheme is summarized in
Algorithm 5.1.
5.5 Evaluation
5.5.1 Evaluation Methods
To evaluate the proposed approach, we use a real-world Twitter spam data set that we pub-
lished in an earlier study [225]. The data set consists of more than 600 million tweets with
URLs. The ground truth of the data set is set up using the Web Reputation Service pro-
vided by Trend Micro. In particular, the service is able to identify whether any given URL
is malicious as well as to which category the URL belongs. In particular, we define those
tweets that contain malicious URLs as Twitter spam. The dataset has been made publicly
available to fellow researchers for the purpose of validation and extension. From the raw
data, we construct a series of experimental datasets with ten different class imbalance rates,
which are γ = 2, 4, 6, , 20. For example, given a class imbalance rate of 10, we randomly
select one thousand spam tweets and ten thousand non-spam tweets to form the spam class
and the non-spam class respectively. Moreover, for each of the class imbalance rates, we
repeat the process for 10 times to derive 10 independent data sets. In other words, the re-
sults given in the following are obtained from 10 independent tests. In each derived data
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set, half of the data samples from each class are randomly selected to be training data and
the rest are used for testing.
We use a number of metrics to measure the spam detection performance, including True
Positive Rate (which is also called recall, or spam detection rate in our application domain,
refer to equation 3.4.2), False Positive Rate, Precision (refer to equation 3.4.1), and F-
Measure (refer to equation 3.4.3). Given the true positive, false negative, true negative and
false positive as illustrated in Table 5.2, the False Positive Rate can be calculated as follows.
False Positive Rate =
false positives
falsepositives+ truenegatives
In the evaluation, we use 4 popular supervised learning algorithms that are commonly
used in the related studies, including Nave Bayes, Support Vector Machines (SVM), C4.5
Decision Trees and Random Forest (RF) [224]. In particular, we find that the Random
Forest algorithm achieves the best detection performance across all experiments, thus we
only report the results for Random Forest in the following due to space limits. We also
note that although the spam detection performance is weaker for the other three learning
algorithms, the proposed ensemble approach manages to improve their performance in
general.
For the purpose of comparison, the performance of learning from the imbalanced data
directly are given as a baseline. Besides, we compare the proposed ensemble learning
approach with the fundamental methods for processing imbalanced data, i.e., random over-
sampling (ROS), random undersampling (RUS), and the fuzzy-based oversampling (FOS).
For each of the oversampling methods, we test a number of oversampling rates (i.e., ) rang-
ing from 20% to 2000%, plus the equal class distribution setting (oversampling until the
two classes have the same number of data points). For the undersampling method, we test
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the undersampling rates (i.e., β) ranging from 20% to 90%, plus the equal distribution set-
ting (remove majority class data until the two classes have the same number of data points).
Through extensive experiments, we find that the spam detection performance is not sensi-
tive to the selection of resampling rate. That is, different oversampling settings yield similar
detection accuracy for FOS and ROS. The same happens to RUS with a undersampling rate
between 20% and 90%. The equal distribution setting for RUS is an exception. It yields
much poorer results as a standalone approach because it prunes too much information of the
negative class (i.e., non-spam tweets), but it boosts the detection accuracy of the ensemble
approach in which it is used together with FOS and ROS as a voter. In summary, the results
in the following sections are based on the parameters that yield the best performance of
each approach in average. In particular, we use α = 200% for oversampling (that is, FOS
and ROS), β = 90% for standalone undersampling (i.e., RUS), and equal distribution for
undersampling in the ensemble approach.
5.5.2 Results of Learning from Imbalanced Data
We first look at the situation where the unequal distribution between classes is not so severe.
Fig.5.4 presents the spam detection results derived by random forest classifiers based on
data sets in which the number of non-spam tweets is twice as the number of spam tweets
(i.e., γ = 2).
In terms of true positive rate, directly learning from data sets with an imbalance rate
of 2 yields 66% in average. While the oversampling methods FOS and ROS improve the
performance to 74% and 72%, the undersampling method RUS achieves an even better
result at 78%. The ensemble approach also manages to raise the true positive rate to 75%.
The ensemble approach produces an average false positive rate at 11%, which is much
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Figure 5.4: Spam Detection Results in Data Sets with a Class Imbalance Rate of 2
lower than RUS (over 16%) and slightly higher than FOS and ROS at round 10%. The
classifiers trained on the original imbalanced data obtained the lowest false positive rate
at around 7.5%. This indicates that sampling techniques boost the true positive rate at the
cost of raising the false positive rate in the meantime. The precision result is the analogue
to false positive rate result. That is, the original imbalanced data yields the best results,
followed by FOS, ROS, Ensemble approaches, while RUS produces the poorest precision.
The last subgraph of F-Measure result shows that directly learning from imbalanced
data yields poorer performance. In addition, FOS, ROS, RUS and the ensemble approach
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Figure 5.5: Spam Detection Results in Data Sets with a Class Imbalance Rate of 10
can increase the performance to different extents. Next, we look at the situation where the
non-spam data significantly outnumber the spam data. Similarly, Fig.5.5 shows the results
derived by random forest classifiers based on data sets in which the number of non-spam
tweets is ten times as the number of spam tweets (i.e., γ = 10). In this case, the result in
terms of true positive rate is quite different to the case in Fig.5.4. Firstly, the performance
of directly learning from data sets with an imbalance rate of 10 drops to 41%. Secondly,
RUS yields slightly higher true positive rate results at 43%. Thirdly, ROS and FOS bring
an improvement of roughly 7% and the ensemble approach manages to significantly raise
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the true positive rate with 12%. Fig.5.5 also shows that the average false positive rate of all
methods is lower than 2% and the average precision of all methods is higher than 78%.
In the last subgraph in Fig.5.5, we can see that the imbalanced data leads to the poorest
performance at 56% in terms of average F-Measure. FOS, ROS and RUS increase the
performance to 61%, 60%, and 57% respectively. Finally, the ensemble approach obtains
the best F-Measure performance at 63%.
5.5.3 Impact of Class Imbalance Rate
In the last section, we have seen that when the non-spam tweets significantly outnumber
the spam tweets in the data, the performance of machine learning based spam detection is
degraded. In the following, we continue to investigate how varying class imbalance rates
affect the spam detection performance. Fig.5.6 compares the averaged true positive rate of
the five different approaches in regards to the class imbalance rate γ. When γ = 2, random
forest classifiers are able to identify 66% of the spam tweets by directly learning from the
imbalanced data sets. By preprocessing the imbalanced data sets using FOS, ROS, and
RUS, the detection rates are improved to 74%, 74% and 79% respectively. Moreover, the
proposed ensemble approach successfully identifies 75% of the spam tweets in average.
As γ increases, the true positive rate of all approaches exhibits a gradual decrease. After
γ > 4, the true positive rate results of the ensemble approach remain the best, which are
over 10% higher than directly learning from the imbalanced data.
Fig.5.7 depicts the average false positive rate of the different approaches with respect
to the class imbalance rate. When the imbalance among classes is not significant (i.e.,
γ = 2), the ensemble approach yields a false positive rate of 11% in average, while the
classifiers trained from imbalanced data directly obtain the second lowest at around 6.5%.
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Figure 5.6: True Positive Rate versus Varying Class Imbalance Rate
Figure 5.7: False Positive Rate versus Varying Class Imbalance Rate
The three data preprocessing methods FOS, ROS, and RUS raise the false positive rate to
9.6%, 10.6% and 16% respectively. As the class imbalance rate rises to 4, the false positive
rates of all approaches decrease to below 5%. If γ rises over 16, the false positive rates of
all approaches fall below 1%. This is expected as the classifiers are biased to the negative
103
Figure 5.8: Spam Detection Precision versus Varying Class Imbalance Rate
Figure 5.9: Spam Detection F-Measure versus Varying Class Imbalance Rate
class, so that most of the errors are type II errors (false negatives) and type I errors (false
positives) are sparse.
The averaged spam detection precision performance is illustrated in Fig.5.8. Learning
from imbalanced data directly can achieve 82% to 90% precision across all of the class
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Figure 5.10: True Positive Rate versus Varying Class Imbalance Rate
imbalance rates, and the ensemble approach shows an average precision between 76% and
78%, while the precision of other methods falls between them. The reason behind this is
that the proposed ensemble learning approach identifies more spam tweets at the cost of
raising a bit more false alarms in the data sets with various rates of class imbalance.
From the above discussion, we know that the proposed ensemble learning approach
resulted in higher true positive rate at the cost of raising a bit more false alarms (higher
false positive rate and lower precision). This makes the best F-measure results as given in
Fig.5.9, since the F-Measure is a harmonic mean of precision and recall (true positive rate).
In particular, the ensemble learning approach generates an F-Measure of 76% when γ = 2,
and then the value gradually decreases to around 55% as γ goes up to 20. In general,
this shows an improvement up to 9% compared with learning from the imbalanced data
directly, and also a lead around 3% to the other data preprocessing methods. We believe
this is because other methods misclassified many spam tweets as non-spam tweets, in this
case, the classification model may become useless.
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Figure 5.11: False Positive Rate versus Varying Class Imbalance Rate
5.5.4 Impact of the Amount of Positive Data
In the above sections, the evaluation results are obtained by fixing the number of spam
tweets in each experiment to a thousand. In the following, we explore the impact of in-
creasing sample size.
Fig.5.10 illustrate the true positive rate results obtained with one thousand (1k) and two
thousand (2k) spam data respectively. For the purpose of clarity, here we limit ourselves
to the comparison of the ensemble approach and the baseline approach of learning directly
from imbalanced data. We can see the by increasing the training sample size, the baseline
approach obtains 3% to 5% increase given different settings of imbalance rate. Nonethe-
less, the ensemble approach also sees an obvious improvement from 3% to 6%. In Fig.5.11,
we can see increasing the number of spam samples also slightly raises the false positive rate
for the ensemble learning approach when the class imbalance rate is smaller than 10. In the
case where γ > 12, the false positive rate results of the ensemble approach and the baseline
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Figure 5.12: Spam Detection Precision versus Varying Class Imbalance Rate
Figure 5.13: Spam Detection F-Measure with Different Training Data Set Size
approach drop to below 1% and 0.4% respectively.
In Fig.5.12, we can see that by increasing the spam sample size, we can improve the
precision with up to 3% for both the ensemble approach and the baseline approach. Finally,
Fig.5.13 presents the results in terms of F-Measure. We can see that the ensemble approach
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with 2k spam data derives the best average F-Measure results. It starts at 78% when the
imbalance rate is 2, and gradually drops to 60% when the imbalance rate increases to 20.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the class imbalance problem in machine learning based Twitter
spam detection. It has been showed that the effectiveness of detection can be severely
affected by the imbalanced distribution of spam tweets and non-spam tweets, which is
widely seen in real-world Twitter data sets. An ensemble approach has been proposed to
mitigate the impact of class imbalance. Extensive experiments have been conducted using
real-world Twitter data. The results show that the proposed approach can improve the spam
detection performance on imbalanced Twitter data sets with a range of imbalance degrees.
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Chapter 6
Modelling of ‘Drifting’ Twitter Spam
Detection
6.1 Introduction
Spam has become a critical problem in online social networks. Recent, research works
focus on applying machine learning techniques for Twitter spam detection, which make
use of the statistical features of tweets. We observe existing machine learning based detec-
tion methods suffer from the problem of Twitter spam drift, i.e., the statistical properties
of spam tweets vary over time. To avoid this problem, an effective solution is to train one
twitter spam classifier every day. However, it faces a challenge of the small number of
imbalanced training data because labelling spam samples is time-consuming. This chapter
proposes a new method to address this challenge. The new method employs two new tech-
niques, fuzzy-based redistribution and asymmetric sampling. We develop a fuzzy-based
information decomposition technique to re-distribute the spam class and generate more
spam samples. Moreover, an asymmetric sampling technique is proposed to re-balance
the sizes of spam samples and non-spam samples in the training data. Finally, we apply
the ensemble technique to combine the spam classifiers over two different training sets.
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A number of experiments are performed on a real-world 10-day ground-truth dataset to
evaluate the new method. Experiments results show that the new method can significantly
improve the detection performance for drifting Twitter spam.
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Figure 6.1: Number of characters in tweets
110
6.1.1 Motivation
We observe a critical problem from the real-world Twitter data, named “twitter spam drift”
[185], which seriously affects the detection performance of existing machine learning-
based methods. The problem is that Twitter spam is drifting over time in the statistical
feature space. Thus, the classification model that is trained on using old spam samples
cannot accurately recognise the drifted spam tweets. Figure 6.1 reports the statistics about
number of characters in tweets in our experiment dataset. We can see that the number of
characters in spam tweets changes quickly in the 10 days. Figure 6.2 shows the account
age of tweets. The account ages of spam tweets have a significant change in the 10 days.
Although researchers are working to detect spam, spammers are also trying to avoid
being detected. For example, spammers could evade current detection features through
posting more tweets or even use adversarial machine learning strategy to avoid being de-
tected [226]. To address the problem of twitter spam drift, an effective solution is to train
one twitter spam classifier every day. However, it faces a challenge of the small number of
imbalanced training data because labelling spam samples is time-consuming. For example,
if we manually label 100 tweets, we could obtain 5 spam tweets and 95 non-spam tweets.
When a small number of imbalanced training data are used to train a classifier, that will
cause the classifier biased toward the non-spam class. The spam detection performance
will become poor.
In this work, we treat drifting Twitter spam detection as a specific machine learning
problem with a small number of imbalanced training data.
6.1.2 Contribution
The major contributions of our work are summarised as follows.
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Figure 6.2: Account age of tweets
• We propose a new detection method to address the problem of twitter spam drift. The
new method can learn from a small number of imbalance training data by employing
two new techniques, fuzzy-based redistribution and asymmetric sampling.
• We develop a new fuzzy-based re-distribution technique that applies information de-
composition to generate more spam samples in line with the spam class distribution.
• We develop a new asymmetric sampling technique to re-balance the sizes of spam
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samples and non-spam samples in the training data. Finally, the ensemble technique
is used to combine the twitter classifiers over two different training sets.
A number of experiments are performed on a real-world 10-day ground-truth dataset to
evaluate the new method. Experiments results show that the new method can significantly
improve the detection performance for drifting Twitter spam. The rest of this chapter is
organised as follows.
Section 6.2 presents a review on recent works of Twitter spam detection. In Section 6.3,
we describe the details of our new spam detection method. The experiments and results are
reported in Section 6.4. Finally, Section 6.6 concludes this work.
6.2 Related Work of This Chapter
Recently, many researchers have applied various machine learning techniques for Twitter
spam detection [188,203,225]. This section gives a short review of related work. For more
information, please refer to Chapter 5.
Many studies have been proposed to apply machine learning techniques for Twitter
spam detection based on a range of new features, including tweet-based, author-based, and
social graph based attributes [203]. Lee and Jong [206] collected the spam relevant features
such as URL, redirect chain length, Relative number of different initial URLs etc. Wang
et al. [185] introduced Bayesian model-based approach to detect spammers on Twitter.
Benevenuto et al. [188] proposed to detect both spammers and spam using the Support
Vector Machine algorithm. Stringhini et al. [194] trained a classifier by using the Random
Forest algorithm, which was then used to detect spam in three social networks, including
Twitter, Face-book and MySpace. Lee et al. [204] deployed some honeypots to derive the
113
spammers’ profiles. They extracted the statistical features for spam detection using several
machine learning algorithms, such as Decorate, RandomSubSpace and J48.
In our group’s previous work [185, 227], it is observed that Twitter spams are drifting
over time in the statistical feature space. The problem is named “twitter spam drift”, which
seriously affects the detection performance of existing machine learning-based methods.
Chao et al. has studied this problem by using 1 million spam tweets and 1 million non-
spam tweets, and proposed an asymmetric self-learning algorithm for drifting spam detec-
tion [185]. However, we identified that an effective solution for detecting drifted tweet
spam is to train one twitter spam classifier every day, while it faces a challenge of the small
number of imbalanced training data. In this situation, the classifiers for spam detection
are most likely to be overwhelmed by the non-spam class and ignore the spam class. Al-
though [185] studied the drifting twitter spam problem, the class imbalance issue has not
been considered. Moreover, that work also using a large amount of training data, which
usually impossible to label such large number of tweets in short time. To alleviate these
problems, we first apply the fuzzy-based redistribution to the imbalanced data, and then an
asymmetric bagging method has been developed for building the classification model with
small number of training data.
6.3 Proposed Method
This section presents a new detection method that employs a new fuzzy-based redistribu-
tion, a new asymmetric sampling and the ensemble technique.
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Figure 6.3: New detection framework
6.3.1 New Detection Framework
In this chapter, we treat the detection of drifted spam tweets as a specific learning prob-
lem with a small number of imbalanced training data. The spam class is the minority
class and the non-spam class is the majority class. The size of training data including la-
belled spam and non-spam samples is small for the binary classification task. In order to
handle the class imbalance problem, we make use of our previous proposed fuzzy-based
re-distribution algorithm (chapter 4) to re-balance the small number of imbalanced training
data. Furthermore, considering we are also faced with small number of training data prob-
lem, we develop an asymmetric bagging algorithm to empower the proposed fuzzy-based
redistribution method.
Figure 6.3 shows the new framework for detecting drifted spam tweets. In this frame-
work, a new fuzzy-based distribution technique is applied to extend the original training
dataset by creating synthetic spam samples. Then, we conduct asymmetric sampling on the
two training datasets. In order to balance the size of spam and non-spam, the new asym-
metric sampling technique applies the over-sampling strategy to spam training tweets and
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the under-sampling strategy to non-spam training tweets. Ensemble training is combined
with the asymmetric sampling to construct a set of classifiers from each training dataset.
Finally, two sets of classifiers are combined to detect spam from the testing tweets.
6.3.2 Fuzzy-Based Redistribution
To alleviate the imbalance between spam and non-spam classes in the training data, we de-
velop a new fuzzy-based redistribution algorithm. The fuzzy-based redistribution employs
information decomposition, which is a new oversampling technique proposed in our previ-
ous work [207] for class imbalance issue, to generate reliable synthetic spam samples. It
takes the training spam set, S+, and the number of synthetic spam samples to be generated,
t, as input. As shown in the Algorithm 1, there are three steps, small interval partition,
weights calculation and synthetic values generation.
Given a set of labelled spam and non-spam tweets, S+ and S−. The spam class is
denoted as,
S+ = (y1, ω
+), (y2, ω
+), · · · , (yN , ω+),
where yn, n = 1, 2, · · · , N , is a tweet sample. Let’s denote
xi = (x1i, x2i, · · · , xNi)T , i = 1, 2, · · · ,M
as the set of the ith feature value for all tweets, where N means the number of total spam
samples, and M means the number of total feature values for each sample. By following
the proposed FID algorithm in Chapter 4, we can obtain a value range of the i-th feature,
Ai = [ai, bi] ,
where
ai = min{xji|j = 1, 2, · · · ,m}
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Algorithm 6.1: Fuzzy-based Redistribution
1: INPUT: Minority data S+, number of synthetic samples to be generated t.
2: OUTPUT: Re-distributed minority class samples: FID(S+, t).
/*Initialization*/
3: for each column feature vector xi, do
4: According to formula (6.3.1) and (6.3.2), partition the feature vector-based interval
into t small intervals.
5: Calculate the weights using formula (6.3.3) from the observed data to each intervals.
6: Calculate m˜si using formula (6.3.4), m˜si is the sth generated value of xi.
7: end for
and
bi = max{xji|j = 1, 2, · · · ,m}.
To generate t synthetic spam samples, according to FID algorithm, t small intervals can be
expressed by
Asi = [ai + (s− 1) ∗ hi, ai + s ∗ hi), s = 1, 2, · · · , t− 1, (6.3.1)
Ati = [ai + (t− 1) ∗ hi, ai + t ∗ hi], (6.3.2)
where hi = (bi − ai)/t.
The synthetic spam samples are generated according to the N labelled spam samples.
We choose the fuzzy membership µ(xi, uj) which was also employed in the proposed FID
algorithm, to perform the mapping.
µ(xji, usi) =
{
1− ‖xji−usi‖
hi
if ‖xji − usi‖ ≤ hi
0 if ‖xji − usi‖ > hi
(6.3.3)
where hi is called step length. Finally, we can obtain the sth synthetic value for xi:
m˜si =
 x¯i if
∑m
j=1 µ (xji, usi) = 0∑m
j=1mjsi∑m
j=1 µ(xji,usi)
otherwise
(6.3.4)
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Algorithm 6.2: Asymmetric Sampling
1: INPUT: Minority training dataset S+ ; majority training dataset S−; number of
non-spam samples to be removed l ;
2: OUTPUT: Re-balanced training dataset.
3: Randomly select l samples from S−, denote the new majority class as S−n =
R(S−, l).
4: S+n = Bootstrap examples from S
+, s.t |S+n | = |S−n |, S+n = B(S+n , |S+n | = |S−n |);
5: The re-balanced training dataset is: Sn = S+n
⋃
S−n .
where x¯i is the mean of the observed values of xi, and mjsi is calculated as:
mjsi = µ(xji, usi) ∗ xji (6.3.5)
Algorithm 6.1 summarise the spam sample generation process for fuzzy-based distribution.
The synthetic spam samples are generated in the way of feature by feature, so they keep
very good independence.
6.3.3 Ensemble with Asymmetric Sampling
In this section, a new asymmetric sampling technique is proposed to create balanced train-
ing data for training a single classifier. We apply the under-sampling strategy to the non-
spam class, which randomly remove some samples from the non-spam class. We apply the
over-sampling strategy to the spam class, which randomly reduplicate the spam samples.
This asymmetric sampling technique can effectively combine the advantages of under-
sampling and over-sampling. Algorithm 6.2 describes the details of asymmetric sampling.
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Furthermore, we combine asymmetric sampling and bootstrap to implement an ensem-
ble classifier. As shown in Algorithm 3, we first delete l non-spam samples and obtain
S (FID)−n = R
(
S−, l
)
.
Then, we make use of bootstrap method to extract the same number of spam samples as
non-spam samples,
S (FID)+n = B
(
S (FID)+n ,
∣∣S (FID)+n ∣∣ = ∣∣S (FID)−n ∣∣)
where
∣∣S (FID)+n ∣∣ = ∣∣S (FID)−n ∣∣ means the number of spam samples equals the number
of non-spam samples. Finally, with the ensemble classifiers, we apply the majority voting
rule to do the decision making. Its merits lie in neither requiring any complex knowledge
nor any prior knowledge [3].
This new detection method uses two different training datasets for ensemble learning.
• One is the original training dataset.
• In the other training dataset, the spam class includes the original spam samples and
the synthetics spam samples generated by fuzzy-based redistribution.
The ensemble with asymmetric sampling process is conduced on both of the training
datasets. All twitter classifiers from the two training datasets are combined to make the
final decision. Our empirical study shows this new method can effectively address the
drifting twitter spam detection problem with small number of imbalanced training data.
6.4 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the new detection method, we carried out a number of experiments on a real-
world twitter dataset. This section reports the experiments and results. We first introduce
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Algorithm 3: New Detection Method
TRAINING
INPUT: Minority training dataset S+ ; majority training dataset S−; number of
non-spam samples to be removed l; size of ensemble N , C4.5 classifier I .
OUTPUT: Ensemble classifierC∗.
1: S(FID)+n = FIDoS(S
+, 2× |S+|);
2: for n = 1 to N .
3: S (FID)+n = B
(
S (FID)+n ,
∣∣S (FID)+n ∣∣ = ∣∣S (FID)−n ∣∣),
S (FID)−n = R (S
−, l).
4:Cn = I
(
S (FID)+n , S (FID)
−
n
)
.
5: end for
6: for n = N + 1 to 2N .
7: Sn+ = B(Sn+,
∣∣Sn+∣∣ = ∣∣Sn−∣∣),
S−n = R(S
−, l).
8:Cn = I(S+n , S
−
n ).
9: end for
10: C∗ = {Cn, 1 < n < 2N}.
TESTING
1: INPUT:Test data point z.
11: OUTPUT: Class prediction for z.
12: for n = 1to 2N .
13: calculate Cn(z).
14: end for
15: C∗(z) = Aggregation {Cn(z), 1 < n < 2N}.
the experiment setup for the empirical study, which includes ground-truth dataset, basic
classifiers and performance metrics.
6.4.1 10-day Ground-truth Dataset
In this work, we used Twitter’s Streaming API to collect tweets with RULs in a period of 10
consecutive days [225]. Although it is possible to send spam without embedding URLs on
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Twitter, the majority of the spam contains RULs [228]. It is worth mentioning that we have
inspected thousands of spam tweets by hand and only find a few tweets that without URLs
which could be considered as spam. With the help of internal tools provided by Trend
Micro [225], we totally labelled over 600 million tweets to create the 10-day ground-truth
dataset for the research of spam detection.
Feature extraction is a key component in machine learning based classification tasks
[225]. Some studies [188, 194, 203] have applied a few features which make use of his-
torical information of a user, such as tweets that the user sent in a period of time. While
these features may be more discriminative, it is not possible to collect them due to the re-
strictions of Twitter’s API. Other researchers [195, 205] applied some social graph based
features, which are hard to be evaded. Nevertheless, It is significantly expensive to collect
those features, as they cannot be calculated until the social graph is formed. Thus, those
expensive features are not suitable for real-time detection, despite that they have more dis-
criminative power in separating spammers and legitimate users. The longer time a spam
tweet exists, the more chance it can be exposure to victims. Thus, it is very important to
detect spam tweets as early as possible. To reduce the loss caused by spam, real-time detec-
tion is in demand. Consequently, we only focus on extracting light-weight features which
can be used for timely detection. These features can be straightforwardly extracted from
the collected tweets’ JSON data structure with little computation. Table 6.1 summarised
the 12 features used in this study.
6.4.2 Base Classifiers
In order to examine the effectiveness of the new detection method, a large number of
experiments have been conducted using kNN, SVM, (Support Vector Machines), Naive
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Table 6.1: Lightweight Statistical Features
Feature name Description
account age The age (days) of an account since its creation
no follower The number of followers of this twitter user
no following The number of followings/friends of the user
no user favorite The number of favorites this user received
no list The number of lists this twitter user added
no tweet The number of tweets this twitter user sent
no retweet The number of retweets this tweet
no hashtag The number of hashtags included in this tweet
no user mention The number of user mentions included in tweet
no URL The number of URLs included in this tweet
no char The number of characters in this tweet
no digits The number of digits in this tweet
Bayes, LDA (Linear Discriminant Analysis), C4.5 Decision Trees and Random Forest
[182], [229]. We found that random forest (RF) and C4.5 achieved outstanding perfor-
mance compared with other classifiers. Therefore, we only compare our method with RF
and C4.5 in this chapter.
We reported the average of 10 runs of each experiment in which the datasets are ran-
domly partitioned into the training data and the test data. In each experiment, the imbalance
ratio is fixed to 10 and the original training data contains 1,000 spam tweets and 10,000
non-spam tweets. The whole dataset is divided into two part, one for generating train-
ing data and the other for generating test data. For the training data, the parameters for
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oversampling and undersampling rate are settled at 200% and 70%, respectively.
For test data, we used two settings. In the first case, the rate of spam to non-spam is
10. For example, the test data have 500 spam samples and 5,000 non-spam samples. In
the second case, the rate of spam to non-spam is 100. For example, the test data includes
100 spam tweets and 100000 non-spam tweets. The different settings can help us simulate
different real-world scenarios and evaluate the new method more effectively.
It is important to clarify that the developed algorithm is to build real time classification
models. In particular, we use each day’s data to create a new model everyday by using
the strategy proposed in this chapter based on small number of training data. Then, the
remaining data (the same day) is used for testing the classification model.
6.4.3 Performance Metric
In the experiments, we employed Accuracy (Acc, refer to equation 4.4.1), detection rate
(DR) which is also called recall (refer to equation 3.4.2), and Area under the ROC curve
(AUC) to evaluate the performance of the classifiers (refer to equation 3.4.4). AUC, which
is not sensitive to the distribution between the majority and minority classes, can sort mod-
els by overall performance. AUC is often used in models assessment. We used the spam
class as the positive class and the non-spam class as the negative class. The confusion ma-
trix values are true positive (TP), false positive (FP), true negative (TN), and false negative
(FN).
Moreover, we used one-factor ANOVA [230] to conduct a qualitative analysis of the
new detection method. The statistically significant level is set at α = 0.05 for all perfor-
mance measures. The ANOVA hypothesis is that there is no significantly difference for
detection techniques in terms of AUC. The alternative hypothesis is that at least one is
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Figure 6.4: Impact of twitter spam drift
significant different. Once the ANOVA results were statistically significant, we performed
Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) test, which indicated the different levels of
the resampling techniques’ performance. For Tukey’s HSD test, we use letter ‘A’ for the
first class performance, ‘B’ for the second class performance and ‘C’ for the third class
performance.
124
6.5 Results and Discussion
We report four sets of experimental results here.
• Section 6.5.1 reports the impact of twitter spam drift.
• Section 6.5.2 reports the overall performance through ANOVA and HSD testing.
• Sections 6.5.3 and 6.5.4 report the day-based detection performance with the differ-
ent test settings.
6.5.1 Impact of twitter spam drift
Figure 6.4 illustrates the impact of Twitter spam drift problem. Precisely, ‘RF model based
on day1 data’ means we used the tweets’ data collected on the ‘first day’ to train a classifi-
cation model and made use of it for 10 days Twitter spam detection. ‘RF model based on
real-time data’ means we build a classification model every day. We used a part of the same
day’s tweets data for classifier training and used the classifiers only on that day to detect
Twitter spam. The same operation was for C4.5.
In the figure, we can see that the classifiers created using the same day tweets data
exhibit outstanding performance, while the performance of classifiers built of using the
‘first day’ tweets data decreased dramatically. For example, the detection rate of C4.5
with the first day training data is about 0.57 for the first day test data. The detection rate
decreases to only 0.4 for the 6th day test data. If we used the 6th day training data, the
detection rate achieved to 0.65. The difference is huge. For example, the AUC of RF for
first day training and first day testing is about 0.77. If we used the 10th day data for testing,
the AUC dramatically reduced to 0.55. However, for the same day training and test, the
AUC of RF is up to 0.82 on the 10th day.
125
Table 6.2: ANOVA models for AUC
Dataset DoF SoS MS F-statistic p-value
Day1 2 0.0442 0.0220 16.0859 <0.0001
Day2 2 0.0282 0.0141 12.2279 <0.0001
Day 3 2 0.0373 0.0187 15.7276 <0.0001
Day 4 2 0.0523 0.0261 14.5999 <0.0001
Day 5 2 0.0347 0.0174 13.0157 0.0001
Day 6 2 0.0126 0.0063 6.2288 0.006
Day 7 2 0.0290 0.0145 9.8467 0.0006
Day 8 2 0.0318 0.0159 12.803 0.0001
Day 9 2 0.0156 0.0078 7.5356 0.0025
Day 10 2 0.0118 0.0059 5.4438 0.0103
The results show the impact of twitter spam drift to detection is very big. Twitter spam
drift can affect the spam detection accuracy and the robustness of the detectors. The results
also suggest the potential solution is to train a twitter spam detector for each day.
6.5.2 Overall Detection Performance
Table 6.2 reports the ANOVA model results for C4.5, RF and the new detection method
on the 10-day ground-truth dataset. In the experiments, the training data had 1,000 spam
tweets and 10,000 non-spam tweets. One can see the technique selection has a significant
impact to AUC at the level of α = 5% because p-value < 0.05 holds for the 10 days data.
Then, we used the Tukey’s HSD testing to identify which technique shows a significant
improvement over the others.
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Table 6.3: HSD with AUC statistic
Dataset C4.5 RF New
Day1 B B A
Day 2 B B A
Day 3 B B A
Day 4 B B A
Day 5 B B A
Day 6 AB B A
Day 7 B B A
Day 8 B B A
Day 9 B B A
Day 10 AB B A
Table 6.3 reports the Tukey’s HSD statistic test results on the datasets across ten days.
One can see the new detection method performed significantly better than the other tech-
niques in all cases. Precisely, the new method resulted in ‘A’ for all the ten small datasets,
while both C4.5 and RF didn’t obtain ‘A’ for any cases. Even though C4.5 achieved ‘AB’
for two cases, for most scenarios it did not exhibit any better performance compared with
RF. These results confirm the new detection method is robust and outperforms existing
machine-learning based twitter spam detection methods. The reason is the new method can
address the problem of a small number of imbalanced training data through the combina-
tion of fuzzy-based redistribution and ensemble with asymmetric sampling.
Figure 6.5 shows the overall performance of C4.5, RF and the new method. Accuracy,
detection rate and AUC are averaged over all experiments. In each experiment, the rate of
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Figure 6.5: Average performance
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Day
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Ac
cu
ra
y
RF
C4.5
New
Figure 6.6: Accuracy for testing set-1
spam test samples to non-spam test samples was set to 100. It simulated the realistic twitter
spam rate, about 1%. In the figure, we can observe that the three methods have comparable
accuracy. The new method results in an outstanding performance in terms of detection rate
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Figure 6.7: AUC and detection rate for testing set-1
and AUC. The detection rate of our new method is higher than the second best method,
C4.5, about 10 percent. RF has the worst detection rate, which is much lower than the new
method and C4.5. C4.5 and RF have comparable AUC. The AUC of the new method is
higher than other methods over 5 percent. We can make an initial conclusion that the new
method can detect more spam tweets accurately.
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6.5.3 Day-based Performance for Testing Set-1
In this work, we used two settings for test data. In the first test data, we set the imbalanced
rate between spam and non-spam samples to 10. It simulated a very high spam rate, about
10%, in some real-world scenarios. In the second test data, we set the imbalanced rate
between spam and non-spam samples to 100. It simulated a very low spam rate, about 1%,
in some real-world applications. This section reports the results on the first test data. The
results on the second test data are reported in Section 6.5.4
Figure 6.6 shows the accuracy of the three methods. All the accuracy are higher than
0.9. C4.5 has the lowest accuracy, about 0.92. The new method has the similar accuracy
with RF, which is higher than C4.5 up to 5 percent. In this case, accuracy is not critical.
Even if we classify all test samples to the non-spam class, the accuracy is about 0.91.
However, the classifier misclassified a large portion of the spam samples as non-spam.
Figure 6.7 reports the AUC and detection rate of the three methods. In general, the new
method shows the best AUC and the best detection rate across the 10 days. For AUC, C4.5
and RF display comparable performance. The AUC of the new method is higher than other
two methods up to 8 percent. For example, on day 1, the AUC of the new method is around
0.83, while the AUC of C4.5 and RF is approximately 0.77. On day 6, all methods have
very good AUC. The AUC of the new method outperforms that of C4.5 and RF about 4
percent. The worst improvement occurred on day 10. The new method has higher AUC
than the second best method, C4.5, less than 3 percent.
For detection rate, C4.5 has better performance than RF across all 10 days. The detec-
tion rate of the new method is higher than RF up to 20 percent. For example, on day 2, the
AUC of the new method is about 0.68, while the AUC of C4.5 is less than 0.55. RF has the
worst detection rate that is 0.5. On day 9, the detection rate of the new method is over 0.75,
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Figure 6.8: Accuracy for testing set-2
while C4.5’s detection rate is about 6.8 and RF’s detection rate is 6.5. On day 10, C4.5
has comparable detection rate with the new method. The detection rate of RF is lower than
other methods about 5 percent.
6.5.4 Day-based Performance for Testing Set-2
Figures 6.8 and 6.9 report the spam detection results on the second test data. In this testing
data, the imbalanced rate between spam and non-spam samples was 100. It simulated a
very low spam rate, less than 1%. The results have some difference to that reported in
Section 6.5.3.
Figure 6.8 shows a very high accuracy of the three methods. RF has the best accuracy,
which is close to 0.99. The difference between RF and the new method is about 2 percent.
The new method is better than C4.5 in terms of accuracy. As we mentioned before, ac-
curacy is not critical for the experiments of tweet spam detection. In this case, even if we
classify all test samples to the non-spam class, the accuracy is about 0.99. Accuracy is used
here to confirm the classification method is correctly implemented. We need to pay more
131
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Day
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
AU
C
RF
C4.5
New
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Day
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
D
et
ec
tio
n 
R
at
e
RF
C4.5
New
Figure 6.9: AUC and detection rate for testing set-2
attention to the amount of correctly detected spam tweets.
Figure 6.9 reports the AUC and detection rate of the three methods, RF, C4.5 and the
new method. In line with the results on the first test data, the new method had the best AUC
and the best detection rate across the 10 days. C4.5 does not always have better AUC than
RF. For example, on day 1, the average AUC of the new method is around 0.84. C4.5’s
AUC is 0.76, which is higher than RF about 2 percent. On day 4, the second best method
is RF, which has higher AUC than C4.5 about 2 percent. The AUC of the new method
outperforms RF about over 10 percent on this day. The C4.5’s AUC is comparable to the
AUC of the new method on day 10. They are higher than RF over 5 percent.
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For detection rate, the new method is the best one. RF is the worst method and C4.5
is in the middle. The detection rate of the new method is dramatically higher than other
methods in most cases. For example, on day 1, the AUC of the new method achieved 0.7,
while the AUC of C4.5 is less than 0.6. RF has the worst detection rate,which is 0.5. On
day 4, the detection rate of the new method is about 0.67, while the detection rates of C4.5
and RF are less than 0.5. On day 10, C4.5 has the same detection rate with the new method.
The detection rate of RF is lower than other methods about 15 percent.
We can see the results on two different test dataset are consistent. The new method
displays excellent robustness and outperforms c4.5 and RF significantly in any case.
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we addressed the critical challenge of Twitter spam drift. We treated it
as a special machine learning problem with a small number of imbalance data. We pro-
posed a new method combining two new techniques, fuzzy-based redistribution and asym-
metric sampling, to solve this problem. The fuzzy-based redistribution technique applied
information decomposition technique generate more sythetic spam samples. The asymmet-
ric sampling technique performed over-sampling on spam samples and under-sampling on
non-spam samples to balance the sizes in the training data. The ensemble technique was
used to combine the spam classifiers over two different training sets in order to improve the
robustness and accuracy of spam detection. To evaluate the new method, we carried out a
number of experiments on 10-day ground-truth datasets. The new method was compared
to other two methods, C4.5 and RF. Experiments results showed that the new method can
significantly improve the detection performance for drifting Twitter spam. AUC of spam
detection can be improved up to 10%. Detection rate can be improved over 20%.
133
Chapter 7
A Data-driven Attack against Support
Vector Machines
In this chapter, an effective attack strategy for crafting foreign support vectors in order to
attack a classic ML algorithm, the Support Vector Machine (SVM) has been proposed with
mathematical proof. The new attack can minimize the margin around the decision boundary
and maximize the hinge loss simultaneously. We evaluate the new attack in different real-
world applications including social spam detection, Internet traffic classification and image
recognition. Experimental results highlight that the security of classifiers can be worsened
by poisoning a small group of support vectors.
7.1 Introduction
Machine learning and pattern classification tools are commonly used in security applica-
tions such as spam detection [231], online traffic classification [232], image classifica-
tion [233], malware [234] and network intrusion detection [235], to differentiate between
malicious and legitimate samples. However, these applications are particularly becoming
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very challenging because sophisticated adversaries can modify the data to avoid being de-
tected [236]. For example, in spam detection, adversaries often disguise their email behav-
iors by adding unrelated words, sentences or even change their behaviors either to evade
or mislead learning [237]. In other words, an adversary can poison the training data or
craft the input data in order to fool the classifiers and produce incorrect decision-making.
Therefore, we must have a good understanding of the vulnerabilities as well as potential
attacks against the classification algorithms so as to develop novel method to guarantee that
machine learning can be securely applied in adversarial setting [238].
Previous work has been undertaken on attacks against the machine learning techniques
[33, 236, 238–240]. These approaches can be generally categorised into two groups: train-
ing targeted attacks and testing targeted attacks. The training targeted attack poisons the
training instances to mislead the trained classifier, such as herring attack [241], correlated
outlier attack [242], the allergy attack [243], feature selection-based attack [238],optimal
training-set attack [239], label contamination attack [244] and so on [37, 245, 246]. On the
other hand, testing targeted attacks do not alter the training instances but instead probe the
classifier in order to find its classification boundary. After knowing what kinds of instances
can be misclassified by the classifier, attackers can modify their own instances to the learn-
ing based detection system, such as the mimicry attack against ‘stide’ [247], evasion attack
at test time [248], extract sufficient knowledge in order to exploit the Googles phishing
pages filter [249] and PDFRATE system-based attack [250].
Although this emerging field has been attracting a growing interest [33, 251], there re-
main many unsolved research problems. Training targeted attacks have only been sparsely
addressed under different scenarios [238] or to a limited extent [33, 246]. For example, it
is hard to choose the best starting point and it is unreasonable to assume that the attacker
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controls the labels (e.g., flips the label) of the injected points in real world problems when
conducting a poisoning attacks against a support vector machine (SVM) [238]; It is hard to
identify the data distribution for the empirical framework of classifier security [33] in the
case of drifting Twitter spam [34].
This chapter investigates the vulnerability of the SVM with an effective and applicable
attack. We propose a new strategy to minimize the SVM margin and maximize the hinge
loss. In particular, we only focus on attacking a small group of support vectors, which will
lead the SVM classification model to lose its generalization capability. The reason behind
this is that support vectors are determining the decision boundary. Our work is different
from previous related work [238, 239, 244]. First of all, we do not consider label noise.
Flipping the labels within the training set may not be possible in real world scenarios since,
most of the time, the labelling process is implemented using an oracle. Secondly, we don’t
assume attackers can control the label, since this assumption may not hold when labels are
only assigned by trusted sources. Thirdly, the hard problem of selecting the best subset of
initialisation points does not occur in our proposed algorithm because we target the support
vectors. Finally, we iteratively identify the best solution for the Quadratic programming
(QP) problem, which doesn’t require the knowledge of data distribution. The assumptions
made in our study are therefore weaker than previous studies.
Instead of solving the original SVM Quadratic programming (QP) problem, the pro-
posed attack strategy considers the lower-level problem: min(1
2
‖w‖2 + C∑ εi), where
εi is the hinge loss and C is the regularization parameter. To weaken the generalization
of SVM classifiers, the idea behind the attack algorithm is to maximize this equation it-
eratively using a gradient ascent technique under Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
The outcome of the attack algorithm is to identify the best poisoning sample based on the
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initially identified support vectors. This new attack is interesting and practical. Attackers
can decrease the SVM’s generalization capability by inserting certain points that poison the
support vectors or even modify the features of the original support vectors if possible.
Our proposed algorithm is different from the previous work [40]. The previous method
only focuses on maximizing the hinge loss, (C
∑
εi), using the gradient ascent technique,
we deal with the soft-margin classifier and focus on maximizing (1
2
‖w‖2 + C∑ εi). Sec-
ondly, our method does not require the process of flipping the labels, which removes the
strong assumption that attackers can manipulate the data labels. This makes our new at-
tack method more practical, because the labelling process is usually conducted by trusted
sources such as authorized persons. Thirdly, the hinge loss in our study is calculated based
on the training data rather than the validation data. This further improves the practicality,
because the soft margin SVM learns the weights w and bias b by solving the convex opti-
mization QP problem. Lastly, the new attack strategy focuses on the support vectors rather
than choosing any point from the training dataset. In this respect, we solve the problem of
choosing the starting point for launching an attack.
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method, we choose four dif-
ferent applications for case study. Our experiment results show that the proposed approach
can significantly decrease the generalization capability of the SVM classifiers.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 reviews the related work.
Section 7.3 presents the details of the proposed attack strategy, followed by the effective-
ness of experiments investigation in Section 7.4. The defence strategy is discussed in Sec-
tion 7.5. Section 7.6 concludes this chapter.
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7.2 Related Work and Notation
In this section, we first recall the related works, and then the taxonomy of attacks that close
to our study will be discussed.
7.2.1 Adversarial machine learning
Many works have investigated the vulnerabilities of machine learning algorithms in secu-
rity related applications. The goal is not only to point out an unknown vulnerability but
also to evaluate security against the known attack. Among these classifiers, Support Vec-
tor Machines (SVM) algorithm has drawn more and more attentions in the security related
community, because its influence function can be bounded under certain attacks [252]. In
2011, Biggio et al. [253] investigated the robustness of SVMs against the scenario of ad-
versary can control over some training data, and aiming to impact the classification perfor-
mance. The problem is that in some ad-hoc heuristics applications, a priori agree regarding
the potential degree of label contamination is hard to select. Later, Biggio et al. proposed a
poisoning attack strategy against the SVM classifier [246]. The proposed attack is aiming
to find an extra sample whose addition to the original training data decreases the SVM’s
classification accuracy. The first disadvantage is that it is hard to choose the best subset
of points that used for the starting point for the attack. Another one is that the assump-
tion that an attacker can control the labels of the injected points usually cannot be hold
because labels often assigned by oracle. Further, Mei and Zhu investigated the problem
between machine learning and security, and presented a training-set based attack. Different
from [246], the attacker in [239] is mathematically illuminating and also relevant in prac-
tice, in which the attacker is only allowed to change the features. The drawback is that the
attacker should keep a specific target weight vector in mind before attack. However, as the
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optimization process is based on a weight-based risk function, it is usually hard to assign a
proper weight vector for the risk function. In addition, the adversarial against SVMs using
label noise attack has been evaluated in [244], in which it assumes that an attacker is aiming
to maximize the SVM’s classification error by flipping the some samples’ labels within the
training data. The shortage is that once the an attacker has limited knowledge about the
systems such as training dataset is unknown, the resulting error may inconsiderable from a
practical point of view.
Although the above strategies have been proposed regarding the SVMs classifiers, none
of them have studied the attack strategy from specifically support vectors perspective. To
be specific, for data points attack [246], training set attack, and even label noise attack,
the best subset from the training data usually need to be identified in order to conduct an
effective attack, which is very time-consuming. Therefore, evasion the classifiers particu-
larly using support vectors will be a good idea. Moreover, even though some framework
has been proposed for the study of classifiers under attack [33], a detailed foundational
attack strategy regarding SVMs has not been mathematically illuminated. Hence, we be-
lieve it very necessary to study the problem firmly from its original optimization equation,
min(1
2
‖w‖+ C∑ εi). This chapter is aiming to minimize the margin of SVMs algorithm
as well as maximize its hinges loss (maximizing (1
2
‖w‖ + C∑ εi) ) to the largest extent
by adding foreign items to poison the support vectors.
7.2.2 Notation
A series of works [33, 237, 247, 254, 255] have defined the taxonomy of potential attacks
against pattern classifiers. It categorizes attacks into three axes based on the influence of
attacks, kind of security violation, and the specificity of an attack. To be more specific, the
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influence of attacks include both causative and exploratory. A causative or poisoning attack
influences either the training data or both training and test data in order to mislead sub-
sequent classification of test samples, while exploratory attack directly only manipulates
the test data in order to cause misclassification. The kinds of security violation includes
integrity, system’s availability and privacy; an integrity violation are only interested in in-
trusion points being classified as legitimate; the system’s availability aims to downgrade
the generalization of the classifiers, causing high classification errors including both false
negatives and false positives, while privacy violation means an adversary aims to retrieve
confidential information from the system. The specificity of an attack ranges from targeted
to indiscriminate, depending on whether an attack is interested in changing the classifier’s
decision on a single or a targeted set of samples.
Accordingly, the evasion attack strategy proposed in this chapter belongs to the causative
availability attack, in which foreign support vectors are created and added based on its
original support vectors. Moreover, we assume the attackers are able to probe the learning
algorithm and draw data from the behind distribution of the training data as well. Further,
we assume the attackers know the training data that is used for training the classification
models. It is worth noting that even though it is a strong assumption, for the worst-case, an
attacker can use a surrogate training set drawn from the same distribution [256].
The presented attack strategy is based on the properties of optimal solution of SVM
supervised learning problem, which was first studied by Cauwenberghs and Poggio [257].
The solution for the incremental learning method demonstrated in [257] is depending on
the parameters of respective quadratic programming problem as well as the geometry of
the data points. In this case, an adversary can attack the SVMs classification learning
process by poisoning the training data. We found that it is effective to make use of support
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vectors to find such poisoning data points with retaining the optimal solution of the SVM
training problem. Our proposed algorithm is different from [246]. This method is only
focusing on maximizing hinge loss, (C
∑
εi), using gradients ascent technique. However,
the weights are also considered in our study, which means we are focusing on the soft-
margin classifier and aiming to maximize (1
2
‖w‖+C∑ εi). Secondly, our method doesn’t
require the process of flipping the labels, which removes the assumption that attackers
can control the labels. This is more reasonable from a practical point of view, because the
labelling process is usually completed by trusted sources such as humans. Lastly, the attack
strategy proposed in our study is focused on the support vectors rather than any point from
the training dataset. In this respect, we solve the problem of choosing the best subset of
points to use as the starting point for launching an attack. All in all, we provide a novel
and effective way for data-driven attacks, such attack must be considered in the design of
classification algorithms from a security point of view.
7.3 Evasion Attack against SVM
7.3.1 Support Vector Machines
Recall that given a training dataset of n point, Dtr = {(xi, yi)}ni , a soft margin SVM learns
the weights w and bias b by solving the following convex QP optimization problem [62]:
minL(w, b, ξ) = min
1
2
‖w‖2 + C
n∑
i
ξi (7.3.1)
such that
yi(w
Txi + b) ≥ 1− ξi,
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and
ξi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Let Dtr denote the original training dataset, where the margin is maximized by minimizing
1
2
‖w‖2, and variable ξi (the slack variables [258]) is the hinge loss. The parameter C (reg-
ularization parameter) tunes the trade-off between the classification error on the training
data and margin maximization.
Further, formula (7.3.1) is called the primal problem, which can be solved by means
of its dual Lagrange multipliers given by w =
∑n
i=1 αiyixi , where αi, i = 1, · · · , n, are
the Lagrange multipliers subject to the KKT conditions. Depending on the value of αi the
corresponding training samples xi can be referred to as non-support vectors, denoted as set
R if αi = 0 (lies outside the margin i.e., yi(wTxi + b) > 1); support vectors denoted as set
S, if 0 < αi < C (lies on the margin i.e., yi(wTxi + b) = 1); and error vectors as set E, if
αi = C (violates the margin constraint i.e., yi(wTxi + b) < 1). Motivated by the previous
work [40], the corresponding parts of vectors or matrices used in this chapter are indexed
by s, e, r. For example, QSS means the margin support vector submatrix of Q. It is worth
noting that in the following section, the regularization parameter C is set to 1.
7.3.2 Causative Availability Attack
Definition 7.3.1 (Causative Attack [31]). If an attacker aims to alter the training instances
or poison the training data so as to mislead the classifier, this kind of attack is called a
causative attack from the influence perspective.
Definition 7.3.2 (Availability Attack [31]). Of an attack successfully hacks a system, and
causes many classification errors, including both false negatives and false positives, result-
ing in the system becomes effectively unusable, this kind of attack is called an availability
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attack.
Definition 7.3.3 (Causative Availability Attack). If the target of an attack is to damage an
classifier’s generalization and usability through poisoning the training data, we call this
kind of attack a causative availability attack.
In a causative availability attack, the attacker injects some carefully selected foreign
data Df = (Xf , Yf ) into the training data Dtr. However, the learner is unaware of the
changes, and learns a model ΘˆDt using the tainting data Dt = Dtr
⋃
Df rather than using
Dtr. This attack may cause the classifier to lose its generalization capability, e.g. to cause
many misclassification errors including false positive (FP) and false negative (FN). In the
following example, we select one support vector point (xa, ya) as a poisoning attacking
point. The attacking goal is to add a foreign data item to Dtr which can maximize the
convex QP problem: max(1
2
‖w‖2 + C∑i ξi). The new attacking approach is to identify
an item by reversing the solution of QP optimization incurred on Dtr:
max(
1
2
∥∥w(xa)∥∥2 + n∑
i=1
ξ
(xa)
i ). (7.3.2)
where
ξ
(xa)
i = max(0, 1− yi(xTi w(xa) + b(xa))).
However, a poisoning attack against support vectors will only affectw if it incurs hinge loss.
Our approach is to identify an attack data point (xa, ya) in order to minimize the margin
of the SVM trained on Dtr
⋃
(xa, ya). Therefore, reflecting on the Quadratic Programming
problem, our goal is to solve equation (7.3.3):
maxL1(xa) = max
1
2
∥∥w(xa)∥∥2 (7.3.3)
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On the other hand, the attacker wants to maximize the hinge loss incurred on Dtr with
respect to SVM trained on Dtr
⋃
(xa, ya) at the same time, that is:
maxL2(xa) = max
n∑
i=1
ξ
(xa)
i (7.3.4)
Hence, we need an effective method that can both minimize the margin of a SVM classifier
re-trained on Dtr
⋃
(xa, ya) as well as maximize the hinge loss incurred on Dtr.
maxL(xa) = max(L1(xa) + L2(xa)) (7.3.5)
Suppose xa is a support vector, the attacking goal becomes identifying an effective point
that can poison the support vectors by iteratively optimizing xa,
x(t)a = x
(t−1)
a + hu (7.3.6)
where t means the current iteration, h means the step size, and u is the attack direction. We
employ the gradient ascent method to iteratively optimize x(t)a , in order to maximize L(xa).
∂L
∂u
=
∂L1
∂u
+
∂L2
∂u
(7.3.7)
Therefore, the attack direction u is obtained by estimating the gradient of L(xa) at each
iteration. L1(xa) is a convex function, which means we cannot reach its maximized val-
ues during its iteration steps. However, L2(xa) is a non-convex function [40], which can
reliably identify the local maxima of the test error surface. In this respect, we set L2(xa)
as a constraint. The iteration will stop whenever the hinge loss incurred on Dtr does not
change.
Minimizing the Margin: In this section, we will identify the attack direction assigned
by ∂L
(t)
1
∂u
. According to previous work [259, 260], we solve the following convex QP opti-
mization problem,
w =
n∑
i=1
αiyixi (7.3.8)
144
Therefore, solving equation (7.3.3) can be undertaken by transforming it to a constrained
single-level optimization problem [16]:
maxL1(xa) = max
1
2
∥∥w(xa)∥∥2 (7.3.9)
such that
w
(xa)
j − αi
n∑
i=1
f(1− yi(xTi w(xa) + b) ≥ 0)yixij = 0. (7.3.10)
where f(p ≥ q) = 1 if p ≥ q hold, and 0 otherwise. The descent can be calculated as:
∂L1
∂u
= hw(xa)
∂w(xa)
∂xa
Then we need is to compute ∂w
(xa)
∂xa
, denote g(w(xa), xa) = w
(xa)
j −αi
∑
i f(1−yi(xTi w(xa)+
b) ≥ 0)yixij . That is: g(w(xa), xa) = 0. According to [239], the Jacobian matrix of
∂g(w(xa),xa)
∂w is an identify matrix since the implicit function theorem holds under suitable
conditions. That is to say we have:
∂g(w(xa), xa)
∂w
= I.
The Jacobian ∂g(w
(xa),xa)
∂w
at the location xa is:
∂g(w(xa), xa)
∂xa
= −α(xa)yaf(1− ya(xTaw(xa) + b) ≥ 0). (7.3.11)
The element at the position of xa in ∂w
(xa)
∂xa
is:
∂w(xa)
∂xa
= α(xa)yaf(1− ya(xTaw(xa) + b) ≥ 0). (7.3.12)
Finally, we have the resulting gradient: Substituting formula (7.3.12) in equation (??), we
have
∂L1
∂u
= hw(xa)α(xa)yaf(1− ya(xTaw(xa) + b) ≥ 0). (7.3.13)
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Maximizing the Hinge Loss: Denote K as the matrix of kernel values between two
sets of samples. Q = yyT  K denotes the label-annotated version of K. We recall the
hinge loss optimization problem incurred in Dtr with SVM trained on Dtr
⋃
(xa, ya) and
the related KKT conditions 1:
maxL2(xa) =
n∑
i=1
ξ
(xa)
i =
n∑
i=1
(1− yi(xTi w(xa) + b(xa)))+ (7.3.14)
such that
gi = (yi(x
T
i w
(xa) + b(xa))− 1)+ =

> 0; i ∈ R
= 0 i ∈ S
< 0 i ∈ E
(7.3.15)
and
h =
∑
j∈Dtr
yjαj = 0 (7.3.16)
Under the margin conditions, We explicitly consider gi which are affected by xa, that
is:
gi =
∑
j
Qijαj + yib− 1
=
∑
j 6=a
Qijα
(xa)
j +Q
(xa)
ij α
(xa)
a + yib
(xa) − 1
(7.3.17)
The hinge loss is not everywhere differentiable. In this case only samples with non-zero
(ξi > 0) that contribute to L2(xa) are considered. Therefore, the gradient of L2(xa) can be
obtained as follows:
∂gi
∂u
= Qis
∂α
∂u
+
∂Qia
∂u
αa + yi
∂b
∂u
(7.3.18)
where,
∂α
∂u
=

∂α1
∂u1
· · · ∂α1
∂ud
... . . .
...
∂αs
∂u1
· · · ∂αs
∂ud
 (7.3.19)
1The hinge loss in our proposed method is evaluated using the training data , which is different to the
calculation on the validation data in the previous work [246].
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In the same way, we can calculate ∂Qic
∂u
and ∂b
∂u
.
According to previous work [246], with the KKT conditions shown in equations (7.3.15)
and (7.3.16), we can predict the response of the SVM solutions for the attacking data point
xa. The following equations hold by the differentiation of equations (7.3.15) and (7.3.16)
with respect to each component ul(1 ≤ l ≤ d), for ∀i ∈ S,
∂g
∂ul
= Qss +
∂Qsc
∂ul
αc + ys
∂b
∂ul
= 0
∂h
∂ul
= yTs
∂α
∂ul
= 0
(7.3.20)
which also can be expressed as:[
∂b
∂ul
∂α
∂ul
]
= −
[
0 yTS
ys Qss
]−1 [
0
∂Qsa
∂ul
]
αa (7.3.21)
Using the Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury equation [261], we have:[
0 yTS
ys Qss
]−1
=
1
ς
[
−1 vT
v Q−1ss − vvT
]
(7.3.22)
where v = Q−1ss ys and ς = y
T
s Q
−1
ss ys. Considering equations (7.3.21) and (7.3.22), and the
observation that xa is independent of all components of the inverted matrix, we have:
∂b
∂u
= −1
ζ
αa(Q
−1
ss − vvT ) ·
∂Qsa
∂u
∂a
∂u
= −1
ζ
αav
T · ∂Qsa
∂u
(7.3.23)
Using formula (7.3.23), (7.3.18) and (7.3.14), we can obtain the gradient as follows:
∂L2
∂u
=
n∑
i=1
{
Mi
∂Qsa
∂u
+ ∂Qia
∂u
}
αa (7.3.24)
where
Mi = −1
ζ
(Qis(Q
−1
ss − vvT )) + yivT .
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Algorithm 7.1: Causative Availability Attack Algorithm
1: INPUT: Dtr original training data, Dval the validation data, h attack step;
2: OUTPUT: optimized attacked point, (x(end)a , ya);
3: {SV } ← Train a SVM model on Dtr, SV : sets of support vectors;
4: Choose an initial attack support vector (x(1)a , ya);
5: {w(t), α(t)i , b(t)} ← Train a SVM model on Dtr
⋃
(x
(1)
a , ya);
6: Repeat;
7: compute ∂L∂u using formula (7.3.25);
8: Compute x(t)a using x
(t)
a = x
(t−1)
a + h
∂L
∂u ;
9: {w(t), α(t)i , b(t)} ← Retrain the SVM model on Dtr
⋃
(x
(t)
a , ya) using incremental SVM [257];
10: until L(t)2 = L
(t−1)
2 and
1
‖w(0)‖ >
1
‖w(t)‖ ;
11: return (x(end)a , ya) = (x
(t)
a , ya);
Gradient: Inserting equation (7.3.13) and (7.3.24) into equation (7.3.7), we obtain the
required gradient used for optimizing the attacking data point:
∂L
∂u
=
∂L1
∂u
+
∂L2
∂u
= hw(xa)α(xa)yaf(1− ya(xTaw(xa) + b) ≥ 0)
+
n∑
i=1
{
Mi
∂Qsa
∂u
+ ∂Qia
∂u
S
}
αa
(7.3.25)
The proposed algorithm can also use the common kernels such as the RBF and Polynomial
kernels. In this study, we employ a linear kernel, therefore:
∂Kic
∂u
=
∂(xi · x(t)a )
∂u
= hxi (7.3.26)
7.3.3 Algorithm Description
Algorithm 7.1 details the proposed attack strategy. Given a training dataset, a validation
dataset, and an attack step h. We first identify the support vectors by training the SVM
148
model based on the original training dataset Dtr, and select one support vector as the start-
ing point. Afterwards, we update the initial attacking point by training SVM model on
Dtr
⋃
(x
(1)
a , ya) using the obtained parameters such as {w, αi, b}. Then, we retrain the SVM
model and optimize the attacking point iteratively until it reach the terminate conditions.
In this study, we use the gradient ascend technique. The solution is in the negative
direction of the gradient. L1 is a convex objective function, so it will never reach a con-
vergence point. In this respect, we use L2 to constrain the iterative steps. Our algorithm
terminates when there are no further changes regarding the hinge loss, L2(xa). When the
value returned by L2(xa) does not change, we have L
(t)
2 = L
(t−1)
2 . This means that the
attacking point will not cause further hinge loss because of the fault-tolerant nature of the
SVM. Therefore, there is no need to further update the attacking point.
In Algorithm 1, any update of the attacking point will be used in creating the incremen-
tal SVM [262] model. To update the attacking point, a reasonable value of h is required. A
small h will cause a slow convergence, while a large step size h may cause the updated xa
to exceed the optimal point.
7.4 Experiments
In this section, experiments based on both artificial data and real-world data will be con-
ducted in order to demonstrate the behaviour of the proposed algorithm. Note that, in this
section, we also specifically choose one of previous developed algorithm for compare, be-
cause this algorithm work under a similar principle of our proposed approach. The previous
developed method [246] is focusing on poisoning the training data in order to maximize the
hinge loss incurred in the validation data, which is denoted as ‘MHL’ in the following part.
Since our work is focusing on both minimizing the margin and maximizing the hinge loss
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Figure 7.1: Example-toy of the proposed attack strategy regarding attacking one point on
each class (* means the ended point)
incurred on the validation data, we denote the proposed algorithm as ‘MMMH’ in the fol-
lowing part.
7.4.1 Simulation study
To investigate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, we first use a two-dimensional
Gaussian data distribution, which is motivated by the previous work [246]. The mean and
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Figure 7.2: The change in the optimal hyperplane display in terms of MMMH and MHL
covariance matrices of the data are: µ− = [−1.5, 0], µ+ = [1.5, 0],
∑
− =
∑
+ = 0.6I .
The size of each class is 25, while the testing data size is 500.
Fig. 7.1 shows the experimental results using a linear kernel. The black line indicates
the attack’s trajectory. In the upper two plots, the blue class (class ’+1’) is the attacking
class. In this process, we randomly pick a support vector as the attacking point from the
blue class, then update the attacking point by using our proposed method. The starred point
indicates the final location of the attacking point. Similarly, in the lower two plots, the red
class (class ’-1’) is the attacking class. The righmost plots are the hinge loss calculated on
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the training data while the leftmost ones are the classification errors. One can see in Fig.7.1
that our proposed method iteratively identifies good locations for both the blue class and
red class attack points. The updated attacking point terminates at another position which is
the new poisoned support vector.
In addition, Fig.7.2 demonstrates the change in the location of the optimal hyperplane
during the attack process. The stars represent the optimized attacking points, samples with
black circles are the support vectors and the black line is the resulting hyperplane. We
observe no changes regarding the hyperplane for the MHL algorithm when the numbers
of attacking points ranges from one to three. However, there is a dramatic shift in the hy-
perplane with increasing the number of attacking support vectors when using the MMMH
algorithm. This confirms the effectiveness of the proposed attack algorithm.
7.4.2 Effectiveness of the attacks on real world data study
In this section, the experiments of four scenarios have been conducted to show the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed attack strategy. All of the initialization points are randomly
chosen from the original set of support vectors. The accuracy and detection rate are used to
measure the classification impact in terms of attacking points [34]. A lower accuracy and
lower detection rate mean a more effective strategy (i.e., reduced generalization). In the
following plots, the x-axis represents the number of attacking points. In the experiments,
we randomly select 30% samples in the dataset for training and use the remaining 70% for
testing.
Case study 1: This case study uses the online traffic data for investigation [263]. In
particular, the traffic classification study focused exclusively on the TCP traffic data, which
constitute the vast majority of the traffic in the observed networks. Only the flows of
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Figure 7.3: Accuracy and Detection Rate for MHL and MMMH in terms of online traffic
data
data with valid TCP handshakes are considered. In a previous study [263], many major
applications in the data such as HTTP, SSH and FTP etc. were identified. In this case study,
we specifically choose the traffic data from the AIM software and MYSQL database. The
experiment dataset contains 2445 AIM flows and 889 MYSQL flows.
Fig.7.3 shows the experimental results for the online traffic data. There is a little differ-
ence when the attacking points are fewer than 3. However, the proposed MMMH attack is
more effective than the MHL when increasing the number of attacking points. For exam-
ple, MMMH can reduce the accuracy to about 60% compared with 70% produced when
8 attack support vectors are used. Under MMMH attack, the detection rate decreased to
30%. However, MHL only reduced the detection rate to about 60%.
Case study 2: This study quantitatively validates the effectiveness of the proposed
MMMHL method on the spambase data, which is publicly available at UCI [172]. There
are 4601 instances in this dataset, and 57 attributes in total. Among these attributes, there
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Figure 7.4: Performance of Accuracy and Detection Rate for MHL and MMMH in terms
of spambase data
are 48 continuous real [0,100] attributes equals the percentage of words in the e-mail that
match WORD, i.e. 100× (number of times the WORD appears in the e-mail) / total number
of words in e-mail; 6 continuous real [0,100] attributes equals the percentage of characters
in the e-mail that match CHAR; 1 continuous real attribute for the average length of unin-
terrupted sequences of capital letters; 1 continuous integer [1,...] attribute for the length of
longest uninterrupted sequence of capital letters; 1 continuous integer [1,...] attribute for
the total number of capital letters in the e-mail; and the 1 nominal 0,1 class attribute of type
spam which denotes whether the e-mail was considered spam (1) or not (0).
Fig.7.4 shows the classification performance of accuracy and detection rate on the
spambase data. We can see that both algorithms have achieved very similar performance
when the number of attacking support vectors is less than 4. The attack impact becomes
quite noticeable when the attacking support vectors range from 4 to 8. MHL negligibly de-
creases the accuracy from about 0.91 to nearly 0.909. The related detection rate decreases
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(a) Before attack (b) MMMH: after at-
tack
(c) Before attack (d) MMMH: after at-
tack
(e) Before attack (f) MMMH: after at-
tack
Figure 7.5: Display of three two-class problems: before and after attack with only attacking
one support vector
from about 0.900 to 0.875. However, MMMHL decreases the accuracy and detection rate
by further 2 percent and 3 percent, respectively.
Case study 3: This case study focuses on two-class sub-problems of discriminating
between two distinct digits. The problems considered were digit 4 vs. 0; 7 vs. 1; and 9 vs.
8. USPS2 Handwritten digits data, which is one of the standard datasets for handwritten
digit recognition, were used in the experiments. Each digit is regarded as a class. For
example, in the study of 4 vs 0, the dataset contains two classes: ‘4’ and ‘0’, where the
attack support vectors are selected from the leftmost digit class i.e., digit ‘4’.
Fig.7.5 shows the experimental results before and after attack. The attacking classes
2http://www.cs.nyu.edu/ roweis/data.html
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Figure 7.6: Performance of Accuracy and Detection Rate for MHL and MMMH in terms
of USPS Handwritten Digits data
are listed at the leftmost plots of each row, while the rightmost plots present the digits that
after attack. The visual appearance of the attack indicates the effectiveness of the proposed
algorithm. The second plots of each kind of digits blur the initial prototype and more or
less toward the appearance of the attacking class. Take the last one for example, the upper
segment of nine ‘9’ is divided by the attacking point, and therefore, is mimicking eight ‘8’.
For the classification performance, we only show the results based on the example digit
‘4’. For the other two digits, they have similar results. Fig.7.6 shows the accuracy and
detection rate for the digit ‘4’. Even though both MHL and MMMH can decrease the clas-
sification performance, MMMH can reduce the accuracy and detection rate more than MHL
by about 2 percent to 5 percent, respectively. Our proposed MMMH algorithm focuses on
the support vectors, which is more effective in causing the shift of SVM’s hyperplane than
the MHL algorithm.
Case study 4: In order to exam the effectiveness of the new attack on online social
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Figure 7.7: Performance of Accuracy and Detection Rate for MHL and MMMH in terms
of ground truth Twitter data
networks, we use a Twitter ground truth dataset for performance evaluation. Every tweet in
the dataset is represented by a feature vector, consisting of a set of predetermined features.
There are two classes in the dataset: ‘spam’ and ‘non-spam’. The dataset has been used
in our previous study on twitter spam detection [34]. We randomly choose 5000 samples
for experiments. In the experiments, we aim to weaken the SVM classifier by attacking the
support vectors in ‘spam’ class.
Fig.7.7 shows the experimental results. The figure shows that both algorithms have
similar results for 5 or fewer attacking points. However, when the number of attacking
points increases from 6 to 10, MMMH shows a stronger attacking capability than MHL.
For example, when we use 10 attack support vectors, MMMH can reduce the accuracy
and detection rate to nearly 56% and 20%, compared with MHL using a similar number
of attacking points not reduce the accuracy and detection rate to about 58% and 35%,
respectively.
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7.5 Analysis of defence
In order to deepen our understanding of the causative availability attack, we discussion the
potential users and the strategy of possible defence in this section.
7.5.1 Potential attacker
Insider attackers can potentially use our proposed attack technique. There are two classes
of malfeasant users regarding the definition of malicious insider: traitors and masqueraders
[264].
A traitor is a legitimate user within an organization who has the authorization to access
systems and information resources. However, his/her actions are counter to the organiza-
tion’s policy as long as his/her aim is to negatively affect the confidentially, integrity, or
availability of these information resources. A masquerader is an attacker whose goal is to
steal a legitimate user’s identity and impersonate another user for malicious purposes. The
main difference is that the masquerader normally has far less knowledge than the traitor. A
traitor has generally full knowledge of the systems they routinely use. Therefore, a traitor
is more able to make use of the proposed scheme to generate a certain number of support
vectors to poison the training data, and cause the detection system to lose its generalization.
Moreover, a masquerader can also make use of the proposed strategy to attack the detection
system as long as the masquerader has successfully stolen a legitimate user’s identity.
External attackers are also potential adversaries because external attackers are able to
know the training data through exploratory attack [237]. For example, in the evasion sce-
nario of the adversary’s capability is only limited to modifications of the training data (i.e.
altering the training data) [246], [239], under this restriction, an attacker is still able to at-
tack the detection system by creating extra data to poison the support vectors with the help
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of exploratory attack. For the worst case, even though an attacker is not able to manipulate
the training data, he/she still have opportunity to poison the training data when the defender
is collecting the training data to retrain the classifier.
7.5.2 Defence against causative availability attack
To defence the causative availability attack, there are two main problems that need to be
taken into account: defence against causative attack and exploratory attack. To be specific,
defence against causative attack is resilient against contaminate the training data, while
defence against exploratory attack is to limit the ability of an attacker in learning knowledge
from the classifier (e.g. defence against probing).
Defence from internal and external attack perspective: For insider attack, the ideal
scenario is to make use of insider detection techniques to detect the insider adversary and
prevent it from poisoning more training data. However, a detailed discussion of insider
attack is beyond this study, for more information, researchers are recommended refer to
[264–266]. We specifically discuss the strategy of removing the malicious data from the
training set and to harden the SVMs algorithm against the proposed causative availability
attack.
For attacks from external, one of most important security problem we have to consid-
ered is the defence of exploratory attack. Barreno et al. [255] have proposed the strategy of
defending against exploratory attacks, which is aiming to prevent an adversary from learn-
ing any knowledge about the training data and limits the attacker’s ability to reconstruct
internal states of classifiers. The main idea is to increase the difficulty of reverse engineer-
ing a learner using techniques such as randomization and limiting feedback or misleading
feedback.
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Defence from training data perspective: One one hand, to eliminate the impact
caused by the poisoned support vectors in the training dataset, we can make use of leave
one out strategy to train the classifier and remove these instances that have a significant
negative impact on classification performances. Assume we are given a training set Xtr
and an initial testing set Xte. Our goal is to identify the potential malicious data samples in
Xtr. For each data point (xi, yi) ∈ X (where xi is the sample and yi is the related label),
a classifier is training on X \ (xi, yi) and test on Xte. To determine the significance of a
change, we compare the shift in classification performance to the average shift caused by a
single points (xi, yi). If the classification performance of classifier Ci shown a significant
decrease compared to the averaged performance, (xi, yi) will be removed from the training
set Xtr.
On the other hand, to eliminate the effect from the potential candidate training data.
One recently proposed method is Reject On Negative Impact (RONI) defence [255]. It
focuses on shifting of accuracy caused by each training instance and eliminates those point
that have a substantial negative impact. To determine whether a candidate training sample
is the poisoning point or not, RONI defence first train a classifier on a base training set,
then updated the classifier by adding the candidate instance to the training set. Then both
classifiers are applied to a quiz set (i.e. safe training set). Finally, one can compare the clas-
sification results of the two classifiers, and once the second classifier produce substantially
more classification errors, the added instance will be rejected, otherwise, accept it.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we formulated a model of causative availability attack against support vec-
tors of support vector machines classification algorithm. The proposed scheme can be
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potentially used by both internal and external attackers. Experimental results based on
one simulated study and four scenarios of real-world problems showed that our proposed
causative availability attack can significantly decrease the classification performance. In
order to defence the proposed attack, we also presented several strategies against causative
availability attack.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
8.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we have addressed a number of research challenges and proposed effective
solutions in regard to the deficient data classification. Meanwhile, we have simulated and
analysed the security problem regarding support vector machine classification algorithm.
Firstly, extensive experiments have been conducted in order to examine the impact
caused by the class imbalance problem, especially when there are missing value. Experi-
ment results have demonstrated that class imbalance has a negative impact on classification
performance. Moreover, this problem can be more severe when there are missing values
presented in the imbalanced data.
Secondly, considering that many learning algorithms exhibit reduced performance when
there are missing values presented in the imbalanced data. We have proposed a fuzzy-based
information decomposition oversampling method for re-distributing the imbalanced train-
ing data to alleviate the problems. In the proposed scheme, both missing data imputation
and rebalance of the training data are treated as a specific missing data estimation problem.
In particular, FID rebalances the training data by creating synthetic samples for the minor-
ity class. The proposed scheme has two steps: weighting and recovery. In the weighting
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step, the weights obtained by membership functions are used to quantify the contribution
of the observed data to the missing features. In the recovery step, missing values will be
estimated by taking into account different contribution of the observed data. To evaluate
the performance of the new FID method, a large number of classification experiments have
been carried out on 27 well-known datasets. The results show that the FID method signifi-
cantly outperforms other 10 state-of-the-art individual methods and 8 different combination
methods in the critical situation of missing values and imbalanced data.
Thirdly, we have studied the spam detection problem in regard to online social net-
working and identified that the classification performance of online social networking spam
detection drops dramatically with the increase of imbalance ratio. To address the class im-
balance problem in online social networking spam detection, we have presented an interest-
ing work which makes use of well know ensemble approach to empower our information
decomposition algorithm used for repairing imbalanced data with which we integrate the
information decomposition algorithm, random oversampling and random undersampling
approaches into one unified technique. The proposed ensemble algorithm has been applied
to ground truth twitter spam detection, experiment results have confirmed the effectiveness
of the proposed scheme.
Fourthly, we have further explored the online social networking spam detection prob-
lem, we found there is limitation (data ‘drifting’) with classification algorithm when faced
with the streaming data. The classification performance reduces dramatically when histor-
ical data is used to build classification models for future spam detection, the reason is the
‘drifting’ data problem, which means the data structure are always changing. The other
limitation is that it is impossible to pre-label a large number of samples for training real-
time classification models. To address these problems, we proposed a new asymmetric
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sampling technique to re-balance the sizes of spam samples and non-spam samples in the
training data. Experiments show our proposed model is applicable in ‘drifting’ twitter spam
detection.
Finally, we formulated a model of causative availability attack against support vectors
toward the security analysis of support vector machines classification algorithm. The pro-
posed scheme enables both internal and external attackers to poison the identified support
vectors rather than the whole dataset which is more focused. The results of a simulated
study and four scenarios of real-world problems showed that our proposed causative avail-
ability attack can significantly decrease the classification performance. In order to defence
the proposed attack, we also presented several strategies against causative availability at-
tack.
The work presented in this thesis is significant for research areas either from academic
or industrial perspective. In particular, the proposed schemes have the potential to be
of benefits to the Internet of things, cyber-physical system, network system applications,
healthcare applications, health industries, researchers and finally the community as well.
The long-term potential benefits including security and privacy applications in social net-
work applications can be an attractive proposition.
8.2 Future Works
There remains a number of considerable scope for future theoretical and practical inves-
tigation. We summarized the ideas for future work to further improve the proposed FID
method as follows:
• Improve the proposed FID algorithm: One idea is to consider correlations among
different column vectors. In the proposed FID algorithm, we assume the feature
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vectors are independent to each other. If we can identify the correlations among
the feature vectors, and make use of these correlations when recovering the missing
values and rebalancing the imbalanced data, the classification performance can be
improved. In addition, we investigated one fuzzy membership function in this thesis,
but have not studied other functions. The best choice of membership function for
class imbalance problem with missing values still worth to further explore.
• Improve the validation strategy: In the proposed FID algorithm, we used k fold cross-
validation, while the distribution-balanced stratified CV (DBSCV) [267] or distribu-
tion optimally balanced stratified CV (DOB-SCV) [177] has not been considered.
When there are missing values in the training data, these methods usually do not
function. Take DOB-SCV for example, in our experiments, DOB-SCV does not
function on some small size datasets such as Colon, Glass5 MC2 and Glass016vs5.
It cannot find enough neighbours for an unsigned sample due to the missing data
problem. Therefore, how to improve DBSCV and DOB-SCV in order to provide a
better validation strategy is another interesting work.
• Further study the drifting twitter spam detection problem: In this thesis, a novel en-
semble learning has been proposed for addressing the drifting twitter spam detection
problem based on small training data. We make use of data-redistribution method
to handle the small training data problem, and employ ensemble learning to train
real-time classification models for predicting the out-coming test samples. That is to
way, all the training data are real time and the historical data have not been consid-
ered in building real-time models. However, historical data are usually really useful
for building new models, and it is very interesting to update the classification model
using real-time data. In this case, we are going to develop hybrid machine learning
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algorithm such as incremental learning for drifting twitter spam detection.
• Deepen the vulnerabilities investigation: For adversarial learning, we have specifi-
cally investigated the vulnerabilities of SVM with causative availability attack. Al-
though the assumption is weaker than the method we compared, there are still some
issues that worth to further explore. For example, for most of the times it is still hard
for adversaries to control the training data in real-world systems, in this case, how can
we simulate and launch an attack with weaker assumptions would be an interesting
direction. Moreover, this thesis only focused on evasion attack at training process,
therefore, how to simulate the vulnerabilities of SVM regarding the exploratory at-
tack would also be another interesting work.
• Develop and efficient and effective defence techniques: What is more, the proposed
scheme is focused on SVM for adversarial learning. We have discussed some po-
tential defence strategies, however, these potential methods are time-consuming and
not effective defence approaches for the proposed attack scheme in this thesis. For
example, we found that RONI delete too many useful information even if only in-
ject several crafted support vectors. Meanwhile, RONI is time-consuming when a
large training dataset is attacked. Therefore, our next step is to develop an effective
defence strategy regarding attacks against support vector machine.
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